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Automated negotiation technologies are being increasingly used in business applica-
tions, especially in the e-Commerce domain. Argumentation-Based Negotiation (ABN),
among the existing approaches, has been distinguished as a powerful approach to auto-
mated negotiation due to its ability to provide more sophisticated information (arguments)
that justifies and supports agents’ proposals in order to mutually influence their preference
relations on the set of offers, and consequently on the negotiation outcome. During the
recent years, argumentation-based negotiation has received a considerable attention in the
area of agent communication. However, current proposals are mostly concerned with pre-
senting protocols for showing how agents can interact with each other, and how arguments
and offers can be generated, evaluated and exchanged under the assumption of certainty.
Therefore, none of these proposals is directly targeting the agents’ uncertainty about the
selection of their moves nor designing the appropriate negotiation strategies based on this
uncertainty in order to help the negotiating agents better make their decisions in the nego-
tiation settings where agents have limited or uncertain information, precluding them from
making optimal individual decisions. In this thesis, we tackle the aforementioned prob-
lems by advocating an Argumentation-Based Agent Negotiation (ABAN) framework that
is capable of handling the problem of agents’ uncertainty during the negotiation process.
We begin by proposing an argumentation framework enriched with a new element
iii
called agent’s uncertainty as an important parameter in the agent theory to allow negoti-
ating agents to decide which moves to play and reason about the selection of these moves
under the assumption of uncertainty. Then, a method for agents’ uncertainty assessment
is presented. In particular, we use Shannon entropy to assess agent’s uncertainty about
their moves at each dialogue step as well as for the whole dialogue. Negotiation strate-
gies and agent profiles issues are also explored and a methodology for designing novel
negotiation strategies and agent profiles under the assumption of uncertainty is developed.
Moreover, two important outcome properties namely, completeness and Nash equilibrium
are discussed. Finally, the applicability of our framework is explored through several sce-
narios of the well-known Buyer/Seller case study. The obtained empirical results confirm
the effectiveness of using our uncertainty-aware techniques and demonstrate the usefulness
of using such techniques in argumentation-based negotiations.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost, I am thankful to Allah for endowing me with health, patience,
knowledge, and for all the bounties he bestowed on me to enable me to successfully finish
this thesis.
This thesis appears in its current shape due to the assistance and guidance of several
people. I would therefore like to take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to
all of them. In particular, I would like to sincerely thank my thesis supervisors, Dr. Jamal
Bentahar and Dr. Rachida Dssouli, for their invaluable support, patience, precious and never
lacking enthusiasm for research, continued encouragement and guidance in preparing and
writing papers and this thesis and doing my research during my PhD journey. I would also
like to thank Dr. Mohamed Mbarki for his useful and insightful online discussions.
I would also like to extend my gratefulness to all advisory committee members in-
cluding, Dr. Paolo Torroni, Dr. O. Ormandjieva, Dr. A. Ben Hamza, and Dr. Roch H.
Glitho for accepting to serve in the examination committee and for their constructive criti-
cisms that helped me to improve this work.
I am grateful for the opportunity I have been granted to study at the department of
Electrical and Computer Engineering (ECE) – Concordia University, which has provided
me with an excellent environment and research facilities in which I was able to innovate
and come up with new research ideas. In this respect, I would like to thank all the faculty
members and staff at ECE and CIISE for their assistance during my studies.
This work was funded by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research in
Libya through the Libyan/North American Scholarship Program represented by Canadian
Bureau for International Education (CBIE). I would like to take this opportunity to thank
them for their financial support. I am also grateful to Al-Mergeb University, Alkums-Libya
v
for nominating me to pursue my graduate studies in Canada.
I appreciate the truly wonderful friends that I have been blessed with, in Montreal
and elsewhere, who have contributed in one way or another to a rich and less stressful life
in Canada and helped me enjoy the little free time this PhD allowed me. My gratefulness
extends to all my colleagues in the Multi-Agent Systems and Web Services laboratory at
Concordia University. Special thanks go to Khalid Sultan, Faisal Alsaqqar, and Ehsan
Khosrowshahi-Asl for their nice company and support.
Each member of my family truly deserves my deepest appreciation. I would like
to take this opportunity to express my profound gratitude to my beloved mother, brothers,
and sisters for their moral support, patience, and continuous supplications during the whole
period of my studies.
Finally, but most importantly, my special thanks to my wife (Muna) and my won-
derful little boys (Mohamed, Ahmad, and Tameem) for their much needed encouragement,
support, love, relentless patience, and sacrifices which have been a pillar of strength for me
during the time-consuming process of this thesis.
vi
DEDICATION
To the memory of my father,
To my mother, brothers, and sisters who have been incredibly patient and supportive,
To my wife and little boys who have been giving me the strength through their patient,
cheers and sweet smiles.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv
LIST OF ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Research Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Motivations and Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Thesis Contributions and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 Thesis Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2 Research Background 16
2.1 Software Agent and Multi-Agent Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.1 Software Agent (SA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1.2 Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.1.3 Agent Communication Languages (ACLs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Types of Dialogue Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 Negotiation in Multi-Agent Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.1 Negotiation Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.2 Negotiation Agent Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.3 Negotiation Outcome Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4 Approaches to Automated Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4.1 Game-Theoretic Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4.2 Heuristic-Based Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4.3 Argumentation-Based Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
viii
2.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3 Argumentation System and Reasoning Models 40
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2 Argumentation Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2.1 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2.2 Argumentation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3 Negotiating Agent Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4 Relevance of Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.5 Argument Selection Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.5.1 Argument Selection Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.5.2 Relevance Ordering Relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.5.3 Computational Complexity of the Selection Mechanism . . . . . . 58
3.6 Reasoning Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.6.1 Strategic Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.6.2 Tactic Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4 Shannon Entropy for Agents’ Uncertainty Assessment 64
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3 Shannon Entropy: Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.4 Agent’s Uncertainty Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.4.1 Move’s Probability Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4.2 Probability Ordering Relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.4.3 Agents’ Uncertainty about their Moves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
ix
4.4.4 Agents’ Uncertainty about their Dialogues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.4.5 Arguments Evaluation and Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.4.6 Agents’ Uncertainty: Analysis and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.5 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.5.1 Buyer/Seller Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.5.2 System Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.5.3 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5 Uncertainty-Aware Mechanism for Bilateral Negotiation 111
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.3 Negotiation Settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.3.1 Agent Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.3.2 Negotiation Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.3.3 Concession Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.4 Agreement and Agent’s Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.4.1 Agreement Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.4.2 Agent Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.5 Offers Evaluation and Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.5.1 Acceptable Offer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.5.2 Reasonable Offer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.5.3 Negotiable/Non-negotiable Offer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
5.6 Adaptive Negotiation Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.6.1 Concession Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.6.2 Acceptance Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
x
5.7 Adaptive Agent Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.8 Negotiation Outcome Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.8.1 Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.8.2 Nash Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.9 Implementation and Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.9.1 Buyer/Seller Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.9.2 System Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.9.3 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.10 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
6 Conclusion and Future Work 162
6.1 Contributions Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
6.2 Critical Assessment of Our Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166




2.1 Walton and Krabbe classification of dialogues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.1 List of the notations used in Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.1 List of the notations used in Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.2 The uncertainty/certainty degree of the moveM0 in Example 4.1. . . . . . . 89
4.3 The uncertainty degree of the dialogues of Example 4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.4 Arguments classes vs. Uncertainty type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.5 Scenario 1a: Negotiation dialogue using our uncertainty-aware technique . 106
4.6 Scenario 1b: Negotiation dialogue using pure argumentation without the
uncertainty-aware technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.7 Scenario 2a: Negotiation dialogue using our uncertainty-aware technique . 108
4.8 Scenario 2b: Negotiation dialogue using pure argumentation without the
uncertainty-aware technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.9 Scenario 3a: Negotiation dialogue using our uncertainty-aware technique . 108
4.10 Scenario 3b: Negotiation dialogue using pure argumentation without the
uncertainty-aware technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.1 List of the notations used in Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.2 The nine agent profiles and their descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.3 Completeness and Nash equilibrium results for the different combination
of agent profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.4 Negotiation settings: constraint and bargaining zones . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.5 Negotiation progress Scenario 1, example 1; (AP1 vs. AP1) . . . . . . . . . 152
xii
5.6 Negotiation progress Scenario 1, example 2; (AP4 vs. AP3) . . . . . . . . . 153
5.7 Negotiation progress Scenario 1, example 3; (AP9 vs. AP9) . . . . . . . . . 153
5.8 Scenario 1 - Results summary for all possible combination of agent profiles:
Agreement, utility, and number of steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.9 Negotiation progress Scenario 2, example 1; (AP1 vs. AP1) . . . . . . . . . 156
5.10 Negotiation progress Scenario 2, example 2; (AP5 vs. AP8) . . . . . . . . . 157
5.11 Negotiation progress Scenario 2, example 3; (AP9 vs. AP9) . . . . . . . . . 158
5.12 Scenario 2 - Results summary for all possible combination of agent profiles:
Agreement, utility, and number of steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
xiii
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Research scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Motivating example: Telecommunication market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 The proposed framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1 A simple structure of software agent in its environment ([129]). . . . . . . . 18
2.2 Typical structure of a multi-agent system ([129]). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 Elements of an automated bilateral negotiation ([104]). . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4 Alternating offers protocol ([130]). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5 Conceptual elements of a classical negotiating agent [105, 109]. . . . . . . 38
3.1 A schematic view of the chapter contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2 A simple argumentation system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3 A simple attack relations between three arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.1 A negotiation dialogue D consists of n moves {M1, ...,Mn}, each move was
selected among different options of offers/arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2 A schematic view of the chapter contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3 Arguments classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.1 Conceptual elements of an ABAN agent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.2 An example illustrates the constraint and the bargaining zones for the two
negotiating agents s and b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.3 An example illustrates ABAN session between two agents (Buyer and Seller)
ended with achieving agreement that could be greater, equal, or less than
the best agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
xiv
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ABAN Argumentation-Based Agent Negotiation
ABN Argumentation-Based Negotiation
ACL Agent Communication Language
MASs Multi-Agent Systems
AI Artificial Intelligence
KQML Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language
FIPA Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents
KSE Knowledge Sharing Effort
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
KIF Knowledge Interchange Format
PA Potential Arguments
AF Argumentation Framework
RFA Risk of Failure over Arguments
FRA Favorite Relation over Arguments
PRA Preference Relation over Arguments
CS Commitment Store
CD Certainty Degree
ROF Risk Of Failure
CSP Constraint Satisfaction Problem
CR Concession Rate
CStr Concession Strategies
CWP Concede Whenever Possible
CNS Concede if Not Sure
xv













In this chapter, we first discuss the scope of our research, which is mainly about decision
making in argumentation-based negotiations under the assumption of uncertainty. More
precisely, we focus on the problem of agents’ uncertainty about the selection of their moves
and the strategies they consider in order to make better decisions. Then, we identify the
motivations and develop the research questions that we will address in this thesis. After that,
we present the contributions of this thesis along with the proposed methodology. Finally,
we conclude the chapter by stating the thesis outline.
1.1 Research Scope
Autonomous agents and Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) provide an alternative technology
for the design of intelligent and cooperative systems. Over the last decade, considerable
efforts have been made to develop novel tools, methods, and frameworks to establish the
necessary standards for a wider use of MAS as an emerging paradigm [40]. An increasing
interest within this paradigm has been on modeling agent interactions and dialogue systems.
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In this direction, several dialogue systems have been put forward in the literature for mod-
eling Information Seeking dialogues, e.g., [99, 101], Inquiry dialogues, e.g., [31, 32, 90],
Deliberation dialogues, e.g., [120], Persuasion dialogues, e.g., [11], and Negotiation dia-
logues, e.g., [60, 117, 115, 122].
Our focus in this thesis is on one of these dialogue systems namely, “Negotiation
Dialogue Games”, which can be defined as “a form of interaction in which a group of
autonomous agents, with conflicting interests, but a desire to cooperate, try to come to a
mutually acceptable agreement on the division of scarce resources” [127]. The aim of this
interaction is to enable negotiating agents to coordinate their activities, cooperate to reach
common objectives, or exchange resources to better achieve their individual objectives.
In agent-based applications, autonomous agents may have conflicts with one another
because of their different goals, constraints, and preferences. Hence, it is quite natural that
agents with conflicting preferences over multiple issues need to cooperate to achieve their
goals. This cooperation can be through the process of negotiation that aim to resolve these
conflicts by reaching an agreement on certain issues, taking into account the preferences
of each other. Examples of such applications are multi-agent systems that include con-
flicts over the usage of joint resources or task assignments, conflicts concerning documents
allocation in multi-server environments, and conflicts between a buyer and a seller in e-
commerce settings. In the literature, there exist three approaches to negotiation namely,
Game-Theoretic Approach (e.g., [95, 112]), Heuristic-Based Approach (e.g., [49, 67]), and
Argumentation-Based Negotiation Approach (ABN) (e.g., [8, 13, 18, 29, 33, 62, 87]).
The ideal negotiation process would enable negotiating agents to follow their pro-
posals, which they value most, with supporting information so that they can reach a faster
agreement. Given this, a growing body of research is now emerging to advocate ideas by
2
which agents can increase the likelihood and quality of an agreement by advancing argu-
ments for and against proposals, which influence each others’ beliefs and objectives. In
fact, the argumentation-based approach, which is the focus of this thesis, is distinguished as
a powerful approach to negotiation [1, 18, 33, 87, 109]. This approach came to overcome
the limitations of the two other approaches; game-theoretic and heuristic-based approaches,
by using additional information supporting the exchanged offers, so as to make these offers
more attractive to the opponent and therefore facilitate the achievement of an agreement.
The aim of this extra information is to provide explanations and justifications about the offer
made which, in turn, can reduce the uncertainty about the negotiating agents’ preferences
(without revealing their exact preferences) and moves selections. By so doing, this informa-
tion reduces the time and effort to reach the desired agreement by allowing the negotiating
agents to limit their search to a small number of proposals they value most. The main idea
behind using argumentation in negotiation is to provide negotiating parties with the abil-
ity to support their offers with arguments that play a key role in the negotiation process to
convince each other [30, 54]. Therefore, it allows the participants in the negotiation to not
only exchange offers, but also reasons and justifications that support these offers in order to
mutually influence their preference relations on the set of offers, and consequently on the
dialogue outcome. Argumentation theory has recently gained an increasing popularity in
the area of Artificial Intelligence (AI). It has been widely investigated and used in various
applications such as modeling and analyzing dialogue games [26, 30, 110], and supporting
decision making under uncertainty [16, 19, 43, 55, 83, 94]. Moreover, argumentation theory
provides a powerful tool to represent, model and reason about dialogue moves, strategies
and dialogue outcome. In this context, argumentation-based negotiation is considered as an
effective way to enrich the agents’ knowledge about each other to coordinate their negoti-
ation moves and cooperate to achieve agreements as collective goals. It has been proposed
3
Figure 1.1: Research scope
and studied with the purpose to contribute in the success of automated negotiation, which
needs solid decision making mechanisms and effective strategies to ensure the quality and
efficiency of the achieved agreements. It is worth mentioning that we only focus on bilat-
eral argumentation-based negotiation in which only two agents are involved in the dialogue.
Figure 1.1 depicts the context of our research.
1.2 Motivations and Research Questions
Automated negotiation applications are becoming important tools in our everyday life. In
most cases, these applications are composed of multiple agents (i.e., multi-agent system) in-
teracting with one another, each with its own aims, preferences, and objectives for the sake
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of achieving some goals over some issue(s) of contention. In such complex systems, agents’
uncertainty related to decision making is inevitable, and generally speaking, cannot be pre-
dicted in advance. However, current proposals for automated argumentation-based nego-
tiation, for instance [37, 53, 57, 77], assume typical negotiation settings in which agents
negotiate under the assumption of certainty, where in fact, the role of uncertainty cannot be
neglected and it is essential in any negotiation settings in order to achieve better outcome.
Therefore, a mechanism to deal with this uncertainty is needed to help negotiating parties
make better decisions about their actions in order to manage and resolve any conflicts that
might occur during the course of negotiation. Moreover, a carefully designed negotiation
mechanism is required in order to allow negotiating agents to better decide about the ac-
ceptance of other’s proposals or to make concessions in order to convince others about their
offers. To elaborate more on the agent’s uncertainty when they make their decisions, let us
consider the following motivating example.
Motivating Example: In the telecommunication market in Canada, let us assume that
there are three different companies namely Bell, Rogers, and Telus that provide customers
with different services such as home phone, cell phone, internet, etc. Assume that these
companies are deploying software agents to call and receive calls from customers regard-
ing these services. Moreover, assume that these software agents are authorized to negotiate
with customers to provide the service within specific limitations based on the flexibility
they have been granted, and on the customer interest (preferences). Our interest here is
to investigate the agents’ uncertainty when they select their offers to advance to the cus-
tomers at each step, and the strategies that they can play in order to achieve better outcome.
Suppose that the software agent that represents the customer is calling the software agent
that represents one of the companies (let’s say Bell) to ask for a specific service (let’s say
internet). At that moment, the agent representing the company has various choices of offers
5
Figure 1.2: Motivating example: Telecommunication market
to advance to its customer; e.g., (o1,o2,o3). In order to be sure that it picks the right choice
for its customer, which can be a deal (the customer accepts the offer), Bell agent needs to
know the probability of each offer to be accepted by the customer in order to play the one
with higher probability, which means avoiding choices with high risk of failure. In other
words, the agent needs to know the uncertainty degree about its choice, and its uncertainty
about the selected offer to be accepted by the addressee (the customer). Moreover, which
strategy to adopt based on the opponent’s strategy considering the encountered uncertainty
degree about the selected moves is another important factor that has to be considered in the
negotiation process in order to guarantee the achievement of agreement. Figure 1.2, depicts
the whole picture of this scenario.
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The underlying motivation of this thesis is to address the above mentioned uncer-
tainty issues by providing a technique that assess this uncertainty, and provide the negoti-
ating agents with flexible capabilities so that agents can reach better agreements through
automated negotiation in uncertain and dynamic environments. To do so, we address some
research questions, we name them RQ1, RQ2, RQ3 ...... etc., and we will provide the an-
swers for all these questions later on throughout the main contributions of this thesis. We
also back our contributions by a proof of concept using a concrete case studies.
Our first research question will be on the argumentation system and the agent theory
that are being used in argumentation-based negotiation. We have noticed that most propos-
als in the literature are either using the same abstract argumentation system of Dung [42],
which simply contains a set of arguments and attack relation among them, or extending this
argumentation system to include some new parameter(s) that serve the proposed framework
(see e.g., [4, 8, 18, 20, 56, 57, 88]). However, none of the existing approaches has consid-
ered the uncertainty factor in the agent theory to assess negotiating parties in making better
decisions about their moves. Thus, the first research question would be as follows:
• RQ1: Which argumentation system and agent theory to use in order to allow negoti-
ating agents to reason about their uncertainty?
It has been demonstrated in [87] that an intelligent agent uses its argumentation the-
ory and its reasoning models to always select the most relevant argument (here relevant
argument means that the argument is related to the negotiation subject) at each dialogue
step. However, there is still a doubt that the selected argument is the right one, and it will
be accepted by the addressee. This selection mechanism assumes typical negotiation set-
tings, in which agents negotiate under the assumption of certainty, which means, it ignores
the uncertainty aspect during the selection process. Also, the selection mechanism is not
linked to the agent’s reasoning models. Therefore, a selection mechanism that considers
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these important factors is required. So, the second research question is:
• RQ2: How can we design a selection mechanism that allows an agent to reason about
and decide on the selection of the most relevant argument based on its uncertainty?
To allow negotiating agents to pick up the move with less uncertainty degree of ac-
ceptance (the most likely to be accepted), this uncertainty has to be known or there should
be a way to assess this uncertainty at each dialogue step. Therefore, evaluating the uncer-
tainty degree of the dialogue moves is a very significant issue, yet to be addressed to ensure
quality developments of negotiating agents. Thus, the third research question would be:
• RQ3: Which method to be used in order to assess agents’ uncertainty in argumentation-
based negotiation?
The decision about which proposal to advance is based on the evaluation of the set
of available moves at each dialogue step in terms of agents’ constraints, preferences, and
uncertainty degree which directly influence the negotiation outcome. This is because the
actions of the negotiating parties, their preferences, and the constraints under which they
are negotiating to determine their individual areas of interest (agreement space) are not
known a priori. Thus, in order to increase the chance of successfully entering the agreement
space, and consequently achieving an agreement, negotiating parties need to be provided
with a mechanism to evaluate their proposals in terms of their constraints, preferences,
and uncertainty degree which, in turn, help them decide better about the selection of their
moves. Hence, the fourth research question is:
• RQ4: How can we help the negotiating agents evaluate their proposals (offers/argu-
ments) at each dialogue step based on their constraints, preferences, and uncertainty
degree to better decide about the selection of their moves?
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Another point that attracted our attention while reviewing the literature is the limi-
tation of the existing approaches in handling the negotiation strategies. In fact, designing
an effective negotiation mechanism for open distributed applications is a major research
challenge. Although negotiation strategies have been widely studied, e.g., [23, 24, 37, 53],
considering agents’ uncertainty in the design of such strategies has never been materialized
in former studies. Moreover, the vast majority of existing proposals in argumentation-based
negotiation have focused on one negotiation strategy at the time, and without considering
uncertainty issues (e.g., [24, 56, 77, 111]). However, strategies such as concession and ac-
ceptance cannot be separated and they are closely influencing each other in the negotiation
settings. Thus, there is a need for designing an uncertainty-aware negotiation mechanism
that considers both concession and acceptance strategies. Therefore, the fifth research ques-
tion would be:
• RQ5: How can we design a negotiation mechanism that considers both strategies
(acceptance and concession) in order to insure better negotiation outcome, and how
those strategies could be evaluated?
The last research question would be about the validation of the proposed techniques
and mechanisms as follows:
• RQ6: How can we validate the proposed technique for agents uncertainty assess-
ment, and the proposed negotiation mechanism?
1.3 Thesis Contributions and Methodology
The ultimate objective of this thesis is to develop a framework for decision making under
the assumption of uncertainty in argumentation-based agent negotiation. The discussion in
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Section 1.2 shows that agents’ uncertainty about the selection of their moves and consid-
ering this uncertainty in adopting the appropriate negotiation strategies in argumentation-
based negotiation is an important and challenging topic of research. So, in this thesis we
aim to investigate how agents can make better decisions about the selection of their moves
considering their uncertainty. More precisely, we show how an agent can decide which
move (offer/argument) to play from a set of potential proposals in the presence of uncer-
tainty. A part of this thesis is built on and extends the preliminary results of my Master’s
thesis [81]. However, in that work the focus was on a general negotiation dialogue game
where arguments are not considered. Moreover, only the uncertainty about the moves was
investigated, without taking the opponent and its beliefs into consideration. Hence, consid-
ering the probability for a move to be accepted by the addressee in the selection process
based on the classification of arguments, formalizing and identifying the impact of strate-
gies and tactics on the selection process, and analyzing the computational complexity of
this process, are novel contributions of this thesis. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to
propose a flexible negotiation mechanism that ensures and facilitates the achievement of an
agreement (if such an agreement exists) under the assumption of uncertainty. This thesis
adds to the state-of-the-art of argumentation-based negotiations six contributions as listed
below. The methodology we are following is illustrated in Figure 1.3. The figure depicts
the whole structure of our framework in which we link the contributions to each other,
map these contributions to the thesis chapters, and show where we answered each research
question.
Contribution 1: An extended agent theory that allows the negotiating parties to reason
about and decide on the selection of their moves in the presence of uncertainty.
More precisely, we take as a staring point, the argumentation system and agent theory
proposed by Mbarki et al. in [88], and the work of Amgoud and her colleagues [18], which
10
Figure 1.3: The proposed framework
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were built on Dung’s abstract argumentation framework [42]. Then, we incorporate a new
operator, agent’s uncertainty, to present the agent’s theory in a more abstract way to include
the negotiation constraints, the arguments owned by the agent, a conflict relation among
those arguments, a preference relation over arguments, a set of offers, a preference relation
over offers, a function that specifies the argument(s) supporting each offer, and a function
that returns a real number representing the agent’s uncertainty about the selection of its
moves [83, 84, 89]. This contribution answers the research question RQ1.
Contribution 2: A new argument selection mechanism that allows the negotiating agents
to select the most appropriate argument based on its uncertainty degree, i.e., the more likely
to be accepted by the opponent.
The selection mechanism is mainly designed based on the risk of failure of argument
(the likelihood for the move to be rejected by the addressee), how much it favors an argu-
ment over other arguments, and how much an agent prefers an argument over others. We
call these three criteria “Arguments Selection Criteria”, we examine these criteria for the
set of available arguments to order them based on their relevance degree (here the relevance
of argument is based on the probability to be accepted, and consequently on the agent’s un-
certainty) to help the negotiating parties select the most appropriate (relevant) argument. In
addition, we present an analysis of the computational complexity of the argument selection
mechanism and discuss two reasoning mechanisms namely, strategic and tactic reasoning
to allow the negotiating parties reason about the selection of their moves. [84]. Thus, this
contribution answers the research question RQ2.
Contribution 3: An evaluation method to assess agents’ uncertainty in argumentation-
based agent negotiations.
More precisely, we use Shannon entropy to assess agents’ uncertainty about the selec-
tion of their moves. In fact, at each step, the agent is assumed to have different choices, each
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choice is associated with a probability value reflecting the importance of the information
included in that move, which can be used to convince the opponent. The higher probabil-
ity an argument has, the more likely to be accepted. We conducted our analysis under the
assumption that negotiating agents are rational and aim to perform actions that will result
in the optimal outcome for themselves in the presence of uncertainty. So we measure the
uncertainty of each move at each dialogue step, then we measure it for the whole dialogue
in three methods; i) by taking the average of the uncertainty degrees of all dialogue moves,
ii) by computing all possible dialogues that can be generated from all possible moves and
compute their probabilities, then use Shannon entropy to get the uncertainty of the dialogue,
iii) using hypothesis testing, especially in the case of dialogues that last long. Moreover,
based on the uncertainty assessment, we proposed a novel classification for the set of the
potential arguments and showed that this classification is compatible with the probability
that the moves supported by those arguments will be accepted. Thus, considering the prob-
ability for a move to be accepted by the addressee in the selection process based on the
classification of arguments is another novelty of this research. Moreover, we analyze differ-
ent situations of agents’ uncertainty based on the available arguments and their respective
classes at each dialogue step. In addition to the theoretical analysis of agents’ uncertainty,
we discuss the implementation of the proposed approach by applying it on a concrete case
study (Buyer/Seller) scenario [83, 84]. This contribution answers the research questions
RQ3 and part of question RQ4.
Contribution 4: The analysis of the needed negotiation parameters and the proposition
of some metrics that are related to the negotiation progress, negotiation outcome, and the
agents’ performance.
To help negotiating parties make better decisions about whether to make concessions
or not and whether to accept others’ proposals or reject during the negotiation process.
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In particular, we analyze the negotiation constraints to specify the negotiation space and
the possible agreement space to help negotiating parties enter this area and consequently
achieve their goals. To enter the agreement space, negotiating agents should make some
concession until reach an acceptable offer for both of them. Therefore, we present an as-
sessment for the concession mechanism and compute the amount of the concession an agent
can make at each dialogue step to assess agents reach better outcome that makes each agent
as much as it can better-off. We also propose some metrics that evaluate the negotiation
outcome and the negotiating agents’ performance. Finally, we present an evaluation for the
set of potential offers and classify them into four groups based on their acceptability by the
opponent and the possibility to concede and make another offer1. By so doing, we provide
the answer of the rest of research question RQ4.
Contribution 5: A new uncertainty-aware mechanism for automated bilateral negotiation
using arguments. This mechanism allows the negotiating parties to reason about and decide
on the selections of their moves considering their uncertainty.
In particular, the mechanism considers two main sets of negotiation strategies namely,
Concession andAcceptance strategies, each of which is composed of three components. The
concession strategy set is based on the arguments classification (in contribution 3), whereas
the acceptance set is based on the offers classification (in contribution 4). Moreover, a
new set of agents’ profiles that results from the combination of all possible strategies is pre-
sented. Each agent profile consists of one concession and acceptance strategy. Furthermore,
we discuss two important outcome properties namely, completeness and Nash equilibrium,
which are related to the negotiation outcome and according to the different agent profiles2.
This contribution addresses the research question RQ5.
Contribution 6: The applicability of our framework is explored through several scenarios
1Part of these results are published in [89]. An extended and modified version of this contribution is
submitted to the Journal of Group Decision and Negotiation.
2this contribution has been submitted to the Journal of Group Decision and Negotiation [85].
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of the well-known Buyer/Seller case study. The obtained empirical results confirm the
effectiveness of using our uncertainty-aware techniques and demonstrate the usefulness of
using such techniques in argumentation-based negotiations. By doing so, we answer the
last research question RQ6.
We believe that these contributions are of great importance since they can be used as
guidelines for protocol and agent design in order to contribute to the automation of agent
negotiation.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organised into five chapters. Chapter 2 is dedicated to re-
view the basic concepts and background needed for this thesis. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are
devoted for our contributions, each chapter starts by introducing the related research prob-
lems, reviewing relevant work, and then, describes the contribution. In particular, Chapter 3
presents the argumentation system and agent theory that will be used throughout this thesis,
Chapter 4 tackles the problem of agents’ uncertainty assessment, and Chapter 5 presents a
flexible mechanism for automated bilateral negotiation using arguments. Finally, Chapter 6




The aim of this chapter is to provide the background needed for this thesis. In Section
2.1, we present the basic concepts of software agent, Multi-Agent Systems (MASs), and
Agent Communication Languages (ACLs). Section 2.2 is devoted to dialogue games and
their types. In Section 2.3, we explore in details the negotiation in multi-agent systems as
it is the focus of this thesis. More precisely, we discuss the need for negotiation and the
main components of negotiation which include the negotiation protocol, agent strategies,
and negotiation outcome. In Section 2.4, we explore the existing approaches to automated
negotiation. Finally, we summarize the chapter in Section 2.5.
2.1 Software Agent and Multi-Agent Systems
In this section, we discuss the basic concepts of software agent, multi-agent systems, and
communication languages that agents are using in order to be able to communicate with
each other.
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2.1.1 Software Agent (SA)
A Software Agent (SA) is a computer program working autonomously and continuously
in a particular environment. This implies that this agent is authorized to decide on behalf
of the user to reach some goals. In fact, there is no universally agreed definition of the
term software agent, however, there is general agreement that autonomy is a central issue to
the notion of intelligent agent. Therefore, the definition presented here and the Figure 2.1
which represents a simple structure of software agent are adopted from [129].
“An agent is a computer system that is situated in some environment, and that is capable
of autonomous action in this environment in order to meet its design objectives”.
Ideally, an agent uses its capability to decide about the most appropriate actions.
It can also apply some reasoning techniques to analyze the outcome of its actions, act
autonomously to achieve its predefined objectives, and cooperate with others to achieve
some common goals. Generally, intelligent agents possess the following properties [129]:
• Reactivity: the ability to respond in a timely fashion to the changes in its environment,
including those changes that result from the actions of other agents, to satisfy its
design objectives.
• Pro-activeness: the ability to exploit opportunities to satisfy its goals, rather than
constraining itself to predefined rules (goal-directed behaviour).
• Autonomous: the ability to act independently without direct intervention of other
agents.
• Social ability: the ability to interact with other agents in its environment to satisfy its
goals.
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Figure 2.1: A simple structure of software agent in its environment ([129]).
2.1.2 Multi-Agent Systems (MASs)
Amulti-agent system is a computerized system in which a group of software agents interact
with each other within an environment to solve complex problems that an individual agent
cannot tackle alone [129]. The settings of such systems allow participating agents to freely
enter and leave the system, thus making the environment continuously changing. Figure 2.2
(from [66, 129]) illustrates the typical structure of a multi-agent system, which contains a
set of agents interacting with each other in their environment; different agents have different
spheres of influence.
An attractive characteristic of multi-agent systems is that agents can act more effec-
tively in groups. Thus, agents are designed to communicate with each other, with individual
or collective tasks, different resources, and different skills to autonomously collaborate in
order to satisfy both their internal goals and the shared external demands generated through
their participation in agent societies. Multi-agent systems paradigm offers a powerful set
of metaphors, concepts and techniques for conceptualising, designing, implementing and
verifying complex distributed systems. As a result, these agent societies are becoming more
and more similar to the human ones [45].
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Figure 2.2: Typical structure of a multi-agent system ([129]).
2.1.3 Agent Communication Languages (ACLs)
Communication among agents is a key issue in multi-agent systems. It allows interact-
ing entities to coordinate their actions, share information, and cooperate in order to jointly
achieve their goals. Technically, agents are designed in such a way to be able to interact
with one another in their environment for the sake of solving complex problems that an
individual agent cannot handle. Agents may interact in different ways depending on the
underlying objectives. That is, they may communicate to negotiate deals, exchange infor-
mation, cooperate and even compete in order to satisfy their individual and social goals.
In order to communicate, agents firstly need a shared understood, unambiguously specified
language to talk to each other and decide what information to exchange or what actions to
take. Hence, the artificial language used by those agents to communicate is called Agent
Communication Language (ACL). The main objective of such a language is to model a
suitable framework that allows heterogeneous agents to interact and to communicate with
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meaningful statements that convey information about their environment or knowledge [72].
There have been two main attempts for developing ACLs: KQML and FIPA-ACL.
1- KQML
The Knowledge Query andManipulation Language (KQML) is a language and proto-
col for exchanging information and knowledge. This language came about as a result of the
Knowledge Sharing Effort (KSE)– an initiative of the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) of the US Department of Defense in the early of 1990s, which became
the first de facto standard for ACLs in several areas [51]. The overall aim of the KSE is
to develop techniques and methodologies for building large scale knowledge bases which
are sharable and reusable. Knowledge Interchange Format (KIF) is the content language
suggested by the KSE, but KQML messages can use any language for content.
The main primitives of this language are called performatives (i.e., message types).
As the term suggests, the concept is related to the speech act theory [22]. Performatives
define the permissible actions such as ask-about, tell, ask-if and ask-one that agents may
attempt when communicating with each other. The syntax of KQML messages consists of
a performative and a number of parameters. For example, a message representing a query
about the price of a share of IBM stock might be encoded as:
(ask-one






In the late of 1990s, the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents - Agent Commu-
nication Language (FIPA-ACL) [52] was formed to produce standards for autonomous and
possibly heterogeneous agents interacting within agent-based environments. It arose from
attempts to develop an industry and academia standard for agent communication through
providing a set of specifications that can be utilized by the developers of agents as a part of
their solutions. The term performative is identified by a verb such as tell or ask which is the
core meaning of a speech act.
FIPA-ACL distinguishes two levels in communication messages. At the inner level,
the content of messages can be expressed in any logical language. The outer level de-
scribes the locutions that agents can use in their communication. The FIPA-ACL’s message
contains the following attributes: performative, sender, receiver, content, ontology, and lan-
guage, which closely resemble that of KQML. The FIPA-ACL standard defines 22 distinct
locutions, and these have been provided with an operational semantics using speech act
theory [22]. For instance, the informal meaning of the request act is that the sender requests
the receiver to perform some action.
Besides ACLs, many proposals in the literature have adopted the view of the commu-
nication and interactions among autonomous agents as a joint activity regulated by means
of dialogue games. In the next section, we will present this concept and discuss the key
types of dialogue games in the literature.
2.2 Types of Dialogue Games
Over the last decade, considerable efforts have been made to develop novel tools, methods,
and frameworks to establish the necessary standards for a wider use of MAS as an emerging
1FIPA-ACL specifications (1997,1999,2001,2002) available at http://www.fipa.org/repository/aclspecs.php3
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paradigm [40]. An increasing interest within this paradigm has been on modeling agent
interactions and dialogue systems. A dialogue game is a normative model of dialogue,
which mainly consists of [6]:
1. A set of moves, e.g., propose, challenge, assertion, question, etc.
2. One commitment store for each conversant where the advanced moves are stored.
3. A communication language for specifying the locution that will be used by agents for
exchanging moves during a certain dialogue.
4. A protocol specifying the set of rules governing the dialogues, and
5. A set of agents’ strategies realized different tactics agents for selecting dialogue
moves (the difference between strategic and tactic reasoning will be defined in Chap-
ter 3).
A dialogue correctly proceeds as long as the participants conform to the dialogue
rules, and eventually ends when some termination rules are achieved [6, 86, 102]. In fact,
several dialogue systems have been proposed in the literature. Before going further, we dis-
cuss the six primary types of dialogue games recognized by Doug Walton and Erik Krabbe
in the argumentation literature [127].
Walton and Krabbe Classification of Dialogue Games
Walton and Krabbe [127] have classified dialogue games into six primary types based
on first, the information that the participants have at the commencement of the dialogue;
second, the goal of each participant; and third, the shared goals between the participants
(i.e., goal of the dialogue). The six types of dialogues are summarized in Table 2.1, which
lists the initial situation of each type, the participant’s goal, and the goal of the dialogue.
However, it is possible to refine these six types to subtypes by giving more elaborated
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conditions on the dialogues, e.g., the type of conflict and the degree of rigidity of the rules.
Therefore, for instance, a dispute is a subtype of persuasion, where each participant tries to
defend its own point of view.
Table 2.1: Walton and Krabbe classification of dialogues
Type of Dialogue Initial Situation Participant’s Goal Goal of Dialogue
Information-seeking Personal ignorance
(One party lacks infor-
mation)




(Need to have proof)
Find and verify evi-
dence
Growth of knowledge
(Prove or disprove hy-
pothesis)
Persuasion Conflicting point of
view
Persuade other party Resolution of conflict
Negotiation Conflict of interest Get what you most
want
Making a deal






(Decide best course of
action)




(Reveal deeper basis of
conflict)
• Information-seeking Dialogues
Nowadays, many spoken dialogue systems implement information seeking dialogues.
This means, the user is interacting with the system trying to obtain information from
it and perform a transaction, such as travel information, stocks information/banking,
movie information and voice portal systems. Essentially, information seeking dia-
logues implement three main tasks [101].
1. Elicit the information goal and related attribute-value pairs from the user,
2. Perform database queries with the information supplied by the user, and
3. Present query results and allow the user to navigate through the query results.
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In addition to these three main tasks, the user may also constrain or expand the queries
interactively, correct errors, ask clarification questions, and try to explicitly modify
system beliefs and task definitions. Therefore, the main goal of these dialogues is the
information exchange, where one participant seeks the answer to question or some
questions from another participant, who is believed by the first to know the answer(s).
• Inquiry Dialogues
In inquiry dialogues, the goal is to find collectively an answer to a given question,
which cannot be built from the knowledge of each participant individually. So the
main goal of the participants to these dialogues is to jointly discover new knowledge.
Therefore, an inquiry dialogue does not start from conflict, but rather from a lack of
information. When the dialogue starts, the two parties will try to establish the truth
or the falsity of some proposition (p), and the dialogue will end when either this has
been achieved or they realise that they cannot find a proof [11].
• Persuasion Dialogues
A persuasion dialogue, according to Walton and Krabbe [127], starts when a conflict
between two agents appears, so that one agent arguing in favor of a proposition (let’s
say p) and the opponent defending the opposite (¬ p). This means, one party seeks
to persuade the other to adopt a belief or point of view it does not currently hold.
These dialogues begin with one party supporting a particular statement, which the
other party does not support, and the first seeks to convince the second to adopt the
proposition. The second party may not share this objective. In this dialogue type,
each participant tries to persuade the other to change its mind by presenting some




Negotiation dialogues are the most fundamental and powerful mechanism for man-
aging conflicts among negotiators. For instance, negotiation dialogues arise when a
resource needs to be divided, and they can commence with a proposal by a partic-
ipant to divide the resource in some manner, perhaps optimally for that participant.
The negotiation will then proceed via responses to this proposal, including counter-
proposals which, in the best case, converge on a mutually acceptable settlement. If
a negotiation dialogue terminates with an agreement, then the resource has been di-
vided in a manner acceptable to all participants [60].
Negotiation can be defined as a process by which a group of self-interested agents
with a conflict of interest, but a desire to cooperate are trying to come to a mutually
acceptable agreement on some issues. In this process, negotiating parties attempt
to cooperate or coordinate between both artificial and human agents to achieve a
common objective. So, the main goal of the dialogue is to make a deal, however,
the individual aim of each agent is to make a deal that maximizes its profit. For an
agent to influence an opponent, the opponent needs to be convinced that it should act
in a particular way. The means of achieving this state are to make proposals, trade
options, offer concessions, and (hopefully) come to a mutually acceptable agreement
[67]. Thus, the goal of the dialogue may be in conflict with the individual goals of
each participant. Given the ubiquity and the importance of negotiation dialogues in
many different contexts, this type will be the focus of this thesis.
• Deliberation Dialogues
While the persuasion dialogue is highly adversarial, deliberation is a collaborative
type of dialogue in which parties collectively steer actions towards a common goal by
agreeing on a proposal that can solve a problem affecting all of the parties concerned,
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taking all their interests into account. In deliberation dialogues, the participants are
collaborating to decide what course of action is to be taken in some circumstances.
Thus, the participants share a responsibility to decide the course of action, and either
share a common set of intentions or a willingness to discuss rationally whether they
have shared intentions. A key property of this type of dialogues is that the proposal
that is optimal for the group may not be optimal for any individual participant. An-
other property is that each participant in the deliberation must be willing to share its
preferences and information with the other party [90].
• Eristic Dialogues
The ultimate objective of eristic dialogues is to win an argumentative exchange over
an opponent. In such dialogues, participants quarrel verbally with each aiming to
gain victory. Hence, eristic dialogue is not a technique of argumentation, but rather
a sort of forum in which an agent can use some argumentation techniques, such as
sophistry and vagueness, to get the best from its opponent [126].
We have discussed briefly the six primary types of dialogue games, however, our
interest in this research is on one of these six types namely, negotiation dialogue. More
specifically, we will be focusing on the argumentation-based negotiations. The following
section elaborates more on negotiation dialogues in multi-agent systems.
2.3 Negotiation in Multi-Agent Systems
Negotiation plays a key role in multi-agent systems. For instance, when one business or-
ganization wants to buy or sell goods or have services in an electronic environment, then it
always needs some processes that involve negotiation. So, the aim of this section is to spec-
ify some fundamental concepts used in the automated negotiation literature. As a starting
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point, one might ask what is the need for automation of negotiation in multi-agent systems?
Indeed, automation of negotiation, which corresponds to negotiation-based e-commerce,
has received a great attention from the multi-agent community, because such topics have
the potential to reduce significantly the negotiation time and to remove some of the reti-
cence of humans to engage in negotiation [104]. In fact, in multi-agent systems settings,
agents need to interact with each other in order to fulfil their objectives or improve their
performance. Generally speaking, different types of interaction mechanisms suit different
types of environments and applications. Thus, agents need mechanisms that facilitate in-
formation exchange, coordination (in which agents arrange their individual activities in a
coherent manner), collaboration (in which agents work together to achieve a common ob-
jective), and so on. One such type of interaction that is gaining increasing prominence in
the agent community is negotiation. Negotiation supports endeavors to cooperate and coor-
dinate, and is required both when the participating agents are self interested and when they
are cooperative. We adopt the following definition of negotiation from the work by Walton
and Krabbe on the philosophy of argumentation [127]:
“Negotiation is a form of interaction in which a group of agents, with conflicting interests
and a desire to cooperate, try to come to a mutually acceptable agreement on the division
of scarce resources”.
Another question that might be asked would be: why do current electronic commerce
technologies not support automated negotiation? The answer, briefly, is that negotiation
is difficult, and automated negotiation is even harder. Therefore, automated negotiation
is required to facilitate this process by hiring intelligent agents to negotiate on behalf of
users. Thus, by conducting this research, we are trying to contribute to the automation of
negotiation. Basically, negotiation dialogue has the following three main components [41]:
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Figure 2.3: Elements of an automated bilateral negotiation ([104]).
 The mechanism or the protocol, which are the rules of the game that determine who
is allowed to say what, and when.
 The agent strategies within the rules of the protocol (e.g., what offer should the agent
make, what information should it provide). It worth mentioning that agents’ strategies
are incorporating agents’ goals and resources.
 The outcome; which can be one deal from the set of possible deals or it can be a
conflict.
In short, we can say that:
Negotiation mechanism + Participants strategies ⇒ Outcome.
An overview of the elements defining an automated bilateral negotiation is depicted
in Figure 2.3 [104].
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2.3.1 Negotiation Protocols
Communication among negotiating agents is governed by means of protocols. A negoti-
ation protocol is the set of rules that govern the interaction between negotiating parties.
This includes the permissible agent types such as the negotiators and any relevant third
parties, the negotiation actions such as accepting offers or terminating the negotiation, the
conditions that lead to the change of negotiation states, e.g., no more offers or an offer has
been accepted by the addressee, and the valid actions of the participants in certain negoti-
ation states [67]. In Argumentation-Based Negotiation (ABN), agents are usually allowed
to perform some actions such as proposing an offer, accepting an offer, rejecting an offer,
justifying the rejection of an offer, or attacking an argument that supports an offer [41].
Roughly speaking, a protocol determines which messages can be exchanged and in
which order. Therefore, negotiation protocols enable agents to exchange and understand
messages under specific rules. For instance, a negotiation protocol can specify the exchange
of the following messages between two agents [128].
 Propose an offer
 Accept an offer
 Reject an offer
 Disagree with a proposed offer
 Give a counter-proposal for an offer
Based on these message types, the following conversation that may occur between
two negotiating agents i and j is considered as a part of an interaction protocol for negotia-
tion [128].
 Agent i proposes a course of action to agent j
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 Agent j evaluates the proposal, and
– sends acceptance to agent i,
– sends counter-proposal to agent i,
– sends disagreement to agent i, or
– sends rejection to agent i
In the literature, there exist several proposals for bilateral negotiation protocols. One
of the most general negotiation protocols was proposed by Parsons et al. [98]. In this
work, the authors described the negotiation as a process of exchanging proposals, critiques,
counter-proposals, and explanations. A proposal represents the basic component of the
negotiation that refers to an offer or a request. While a critique represents the rejection
of an offer and indicates the cause of the rejection, and it can be followed by a counter-
proposal. An argument can be seen as an explanation or justification for a proposal or a
critique [96]. The focus of this thesis is not on the negotiation protocols, however, we
adopt a well-known negotiation protocol in bilateral automated negotiation, which is the
alternating offers protocol proposed by Rubinstein in [114]. We use this protocol because
of its simplicity, and its variety of use in the literature. This protocol states that the two
negotiating agents alternate offers in turns. That is, the agents create a bidding history:
one agent proposes an offer, after which the other agent proposes a counter-offer, and this
process is repeated until the negotiation is finished under some constraints, for instance,
time running out, or by achieving an agreement. This protocol is illustrated by the state
transition diagram in Figure 2.4 [130].
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Figure 2.4: Alternating offers protocol ([130]).
2.3.2 Negotiation Agent Strategies
The second component of the negotiation is the agent strategies within the rules of the proto-
col. With the continuous introduction of new negotiation domains, negotiating agents may
encounter different types of opponents with different characteristics. Therefore, an impor-
tant factor for agents’ developers to be considered in automated negotiation is the design of
intelligent agents that can perform perfectly in a variety of circumstances. Such automated
negotiation agents should be capable of negotiating proficiently within randomly generated
negotiation scenarios, with various opponents that are behaving differently according to
their designed objectives. The key issue here is the design of a particular strategy that an
individual agent can use while negotiating to maximize its own individual welfare. A key
difficulty is that, typically, the strategies that work best in theory tend to be computationally
intractable, and are hence unusable by agents in practice [67].
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Several proposals have been advanced for automated negotiation strategies. Most
of them are designed to operate in specific and relatively simple scenarios and are often
based on simplifying assumptions (e.g., [47, 50, 53, 64, 111, 132]). A typical example of
such an assumption is that the opponent strategies and preferences are known or partially
known. This is generally unrealistic, as negotiators tend to avoid revealing their private
information, because the shared information may be used to the revealer’s disadvantage. As
an example, if one agent’s negotiation strategy is known to the other agent, the first agent
may be at a significant disadvantage. Suppose the buyer knows that the seller’s strategy
is to accept all offers above a certain (unknown) threshold value. The buyer can begin at
0.00, and repeatedly offer the seller a penny more each time, until the seller’s threshold
value is reached, at which point the (worst possible, for the seller) deal is made. Given
a set of possible deals and a negotiation process, a negotiation strategy represents a tactic
that an individual agent may employ to make decisions and achieve its goal. Hence, the
negotiation protocol, as well as the set of agent’s characteristics such as the amount of
knowledge it has about its environment determine the complexity of the agent decision
model [104]. As a result, agents’ strategies are always required for proper planning and
managing the negotiation process. In order to develop such strategies, the automation of
negotiation processes is necessary because it is one of the most important issues in business
domains.
2.3.3 Negotiation Outcome Space
“Recall that the main goal of negotiation is the allocation of some resources that are accept-
able to all negotiating parties. Since in real negotiation settings there are usually different
possible allocations (i.e., different possible agreements, deals, or outcomes)” [105]. Then,
“negotiation can be seen as a distributed search through a space of potential agreements”
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[67]. Hence, the outcome space is a useful way to capture the preferences of both negoti-
ating parties, and there should be some ways to characterize this space under the consid-
eration of some constraints (in Chapter 5, we will discus the notions of agreement space
and negotiation constraints in details). Abstractly, the negotiation outcome space can be
seen as a set of possible deals Ψ = {ψ1,ψ2, ....,ψn}, where n is the size of the search space
[105]. Each agent is trying to achieve the best possible outcome that satisfies its constraint
and maximizes its utility. Thus, during the negotiation process, a rational agent would not
propose an offer that makes its utility less than the utility of the last offer received from
its opponent. So, the ultimate goal of each negotiating agent is to maximize its profit by
proposing a possible outcome (say ψi) from the set of all possible outcomes Ψ by which it
gets the maximum utility. As an example, suppose that there are two agents, a seller s and a
buyer b negotiating over the purchase of a used car, where the negotiation issue is the price.
In this case, one of the negotiation constraints is the budget and each agent will propose
and accept offers only within its budget constraint, which ranges between minimum price
and maximum price, and an agreement will happen only if there is an accepted price that
satisfies the constraints of both agents.
2.4 Approaches to Automated Negotiation
Automated negotiations take place when the negotiation function is performed by software
agents—computer programs that act on behalf of users [46, 67, 71]. Even though the cur-
rent human-to-human negotiation appears to be an extremely complex process, automated
agents may not need to be similarly complex. Indeed, in agent-based settings, agents might
have conflicts with each other because of their different goals, constraints, and preferences.
However, perhaps the most primitive and powerful mechanism for managing these conflicts
is negotiation. In the literature, there exist three approaches to automated negotiation as
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discussed in [67]. These approaches are:
• Game-Theoretic approach,
• Heuristic-Based approach, and
• Argumentation-Based approach.
2.4.1 Game-Theoretic Approach
Game theory, a mathematical and economic theory, is about analyzing strategic interactions
among rational agents. This approach shares with decision theory many of the economic
concepts originated by von Neumann and Morgenstern [95]. The basic idea of the ap-
proach came from the study of some games such as chess. Then rapidly the idea applied to
all interactions between rational and self-interested agents such as automated negotiations.
Hence, game-theoretic is recognized as the first approach to automated negotiation and it
concerns with studying and developing strategic negotiation models based on game theory
precedents [95, 112]. The basic idea of this approach is to see the negotiation process as
a game in which each participant tries to maximize its own utility. Despite its promising
results analysis, this approach suffers from some drawbacks due to the assumptions upon
which it was built [18, 67].
Limitations:
• The approach assumes fixed preference relation over offers during the course of ne-
gotiation (i.e., it characterises each agent’s preferences with respect to the possible
outcomes), while in fact, this assumption is not realistic, and it is very common that
preference relation over offers may change during the negotiation process.
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• The approach assumes perfect computational rationality. This means, each agent
knows the space of possible deals and strategies and knows how to evaluate them.
Thus, no computation is required to find mutually acceptable agreement within the
range of possible outcomes. In other words, agents have an accurate way of deter-
mining the quality of the negotiation outcome. However, in most real world cases,
this assumption is not true; where agents typically know their own information space,
but they know nothing about that of their opponents.
• The approach allows agents to exchange offers only, but not reasons or justifications.
However, in everyday life, agents need to exchange more information other than of-
fers in order to support their proposals.
• The approach says nothing about how to program the agent, e.g., it is not clear how
to compute the space of possible strategies and how to compute the utility function.
2.4.2 Heuristic-Based Approach
Heuristic-based is the second approach to automated negotiations. It arose as a way of
overcoming the limitations of the game-theoretic approach. This approach states that there
is often a cost associated with the decision making and computation models. As such, a
non-exhaustive way to search for the negotiation space is required. Therefore, heuristic
protocols aim to achieve a good solution, but not necessarily an optimal one. Moreover,
this approach relaxes some of the strong assumptions made in the game-theoretic approach
such as the notion of agent’s rationality and their resources [18, 49, 67].
Unlike the game-theoretic approach, the heuristic-based approach specifies how to
program the agent’s strategies and study the performance of these strategies empirically.
However, it does not solve other problems of the game-theoretic approach. In particular,
the heuristic-based approach also has some disadvantages as described in [67, 105].
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Limitations:
• The approach does not solve the problem of the fixed preference relation over offers.
• The approach adopts an approximate notion of rationality and does not examine all
possible outcomes. So, as a result, the outcomes are often sub-optimal instead of
optimal.
• In this approach, it is not easy to predict precisely the behavior of both the system and
the negotiating agents. Thus, it needs an extensive simulation and empirical analysis.
• Like the game-theoretic approach, it assumes that agents know what they want. That
is, agents have an accurate way of determining the quality of the negotiation outcome.
2.4.3 Argumentation-Based Approach
Game-theoretic and heuristic-based approaches as discussed above have some common lim-
itations such as agents are allowed to only exchange offers and the assumption of fixed pref-
erence relations and utility function, etc. Thus, in order to outdo these problems, the need
for a new approach that can remove these limitations has emerged. So, the third approach
to automated negotiations is the Argumentation-Based Negotiation (ABN) approach.
In the last decade, this approach has become popular and powerful. It has been ex-
tensively investigated and studied as witnessed by several publications (see e.g., [18, 27,
33, 84]). The main idea behind the argumentation-based approach is to allow the negotiat-
ing parties to exchange additional information (justifications and explanations) that support
their proposals. Therefore, it allows them to exchange not only offers, but also reasons
and justifications that support these offers in order to mutually influence their preference
relations on the set of potential offers, and consequently the outcome of the dialogue. The
extra information is exchanged in a form of arguments that explain explicitly the opinion of
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the agent who sent it. Hence, besides rejecting a proposal, an agent can send a critique of
the proposal, explaining the reason of the rejection. In addition, an agent may accompany
an offer with an argument to convince its opponent to accept this offer.
Argumentation-Based Agent Structure
Before proceed to describe the structure of an argumentation-based agent, let us dis-
cuss the main components that constitute a basic or classical non argumentation-based
agent, which allow it to engage in any negotiation dialogue. As it can be seen in Figure
2.5, an agent needs to be equipped with the following basic components [105, 109].
1. Locution interpretation: parses incoming messages;
2. Proposal database: stores proposals for future use;
3. Proposal evaluation and generation: ultimately makes a decision about whether to
accept, reject, generate a counter proposal or terminate the dialogue; and
4. Locution generation: sends the response to the relevant party or parties.
However, these components are not an idealisation of all proposed models, it is rather
a good starting point to show the main differences between a non-ABN agent and an ABN
agent.
Unlike the conventional negotiating agents, an ABN agent can exchange more sophis-
ticated information by means of arguments that can influence the decisions these agents can
make. Therefore, an argumentation-based negotiating agent must be equipped with addi-
tional elements and mechanisms that make it capable of participating in such negotiation
dialogues. Thus, in addition to the above mentioned elements of a non-ABN agent, an ABN
























Figure 2.5: Conceptual elements of a classical negotiating agent [105, 109].
1. A mechanism for evaluating incoming arguments and updating the mental state ac-
cordingly;
2. A mechanism for generating arguments; and
3. A mechanism for selecting the best outgoing argument from the set of potential argu-
ments.
2.5 Summary
For a convenience reading, we discussed in this chapter the main research concepts and
background related to our work. Through our presentation of this background, we empha-
sized that the argumentation-based approach to automated negotiation is gaining increasing
interest and popularity for its potential ability of generating more flexible dialogues than
game-theoretic and heuristic-based approaches. However, this approach is typically more
complex compared to the other two. The challenge is how to define a clear process for
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evaluating, generating and selecting proposals (offers and/or arguments), to ensure generat-
ing better dialogues and consequently achieving the best agreement, especially in uncertain
settings. To do so, in the next chapter, we propose an argumentation system and reasoning
models that enable negotiating agents to decide about the selection of their proposals under
the assumption of uncertainty.
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Chapter 3
Argumentation System and Reasoning
Models
In this chapter1, we present the argumentation system and agent theory that will be used
throughout this thesis. The main goal is to allow negotiating parties to reason about and de-
cide on the selection of their moves under the assumption of uncertainty. We also propose a
new argument selection mechanism based on some selection criteria and analyze the com-
putational complexity of this mechanism. Moreover, we discuss two reasoning mechanisms
namely, strategic and tactic reasoning that allow the negotiating parties to reason about the
selection of their moves. The chapter contains a lot of notations, so for convenience reading
we listed all the notations in Table 3.1.
1The argumentation system, agent theory, and the reasoning models presented in this chapter have been
published in the Journal of Expert Systems with Applications [83], and in the Journal of Ambient Intelligence
and Humanized Computing [84].
40
Table 3.1: List of the notations used in Chapter 3
The notation The meaning of the notation
s and b Seller and Buyer agents
L A logical language
Γ The knowledge base of both agents
Γi The knowledge base of agent i
CS The commitment store of both agents
CSi The commitment store of agent i
O A finite set of offers
A Set of arguments
Arg(L ) The set of all arguments built from L
Arg= (H,h) An argument, where H is the support and h is the conclusion
B⊆A ×A A binary attack relation between arguments
T (S) A function that specifies all arguments defended by S, where S⊆A
T i Agent i’s theory
C i The set of agent i’s constraints
µ i(M) The uncertainty degree of agent i about its moveM
M The set of all possible moves
A i The set of agent i’s arguments
ipre f−ar A partial preorder preference relation over agent i’s arguments
O i The set of agent i’s offers
ipre f−o A partial preorder preference relation between agent i’s offers
F (oit) A function that specifies the supporting arguments for the offer o
i
t of the agent i at step t
NCi, j The negotiation context for an agent i committed in a negotiation with an agent j
S The speaker’s strategy
T A set of negotiation topics
T The current speaker’s tactic,such that T ∈ T
T A formula of L representing the negotiation topic that corresponds to the global goal
τ A formula of L representing the argument on which the speaker should act
Pi, j The set of agent i’s beliefs about agent j’s beliefs P
bel




|H| /0 the number of formulas in H that are not in (Γ∪Pi, j)
|H|Γ The number of formulas in H that are in Γ
|H|Pi, j The number of formulas in H that are in Pi, j
risk Risk binary relation that is complete and transitive
=risk The equal risk relation between any two arguments
OL A set of non-strict orders over arguments using the binary relation risk
Beli→ j(p) Agent i believes that agent j believes that p holds, where p is a proposition representing a preference
if av Favorite relation over arguments
≺if av The strict favorite relation over arguments
L(H) The preference level of an argument (H,h)
W
Pi, j
(H,h)/(H ′,h′) The weight of an argument (H,h) compared to another argument (H
′,h′)
rel A relevance ordering relation over arguments
B A set of goals
41
3.1 Introduction
The central aim of this chapter is to define the agent argumentation system needed in nego-
tiation dialogues to enable negotiating parties to generate and evaluate their arguments in
order to rationally select their best proposals considering their uncertainty. This is mainly
a decision making problem based on arguments, and it is usually subject to uncertainty,
especially in the absence of enough information. Argumentation systems provide a pow-
erful tool to represent, model, and reason about dialogue moves, strategies, and dialogue
outcomes. The main idea lies in the ability to support moves with justifications and ex-
planations, which play a key role in persuasion and negotiation settings [54]. During the
last decade, argumentation systems and agent theories have been widely investigated and
used to model and analyze dialogue games [26, 30, 76, 79, 87, 110]. Most of the existing
proposals are either using the same abstract argumentation system of Dung [42], which
simply contains a set of arguments and attack relation among them, or extending this ar-
gumentation system to include some new operator(s) that serve the proposed framework
(see e.g., [4, 8, 18, 20, 56, 57, 88]). However, to the best of our knowledge none of these
approaches has considered the uncertainty factor in the agent theory to assess negotiating
parties in making better decisions about their moves. To this end, we present in this chap-
ter an argumentation framework that extends and goes beyond the existing argumentation
frameworks [18, 42, 88]. We take as a staring point, the argumentation system proposed
by Mbarki and his colleagues in [88], which was built on the work of Amgoud and her
colleagues [18], and both of them are extensions of the well-known Dung’s abstract argu-
mentation framework [42]. And then, we extend the agent’s theory by incorporating a new
operator namely, agent’s uncertainty degree as an important parameter in the agent theory.
By doing so, we allow the negotiating agents to reason about and decide on the selection of
their moves based on their uncertainty degree.
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Figure 3.1: A schematic view of the chapter contributions
The chapter makes three main contributions to the automated negotiation literature
as illustrated in Figure 3.1. The first contribution is an extended argumentation framework
that allows negotiating agents to explicitly influence each other’s preferences and reason
about the selection of their moves during negotiation, thus dealing with fundamental limi-
tations of bargaining and auction protocols. The second contribution is the proposition of
new argument selection mechanism using three criteria that examine the set of potential
arguments and order order them to facilitate the selection of the most appropriate argument
(the most likely to be accepted by the addressee), and studying the complexity analysis of
this selection mechanism. The third contribution is the formalization of the strategic and
tactic reasoning to allow the negotiating agents to reason and decide about the selection of
the most appropriate argument locally at each dialogue step (using tactic reasoning), and
decide about the global communication plan (using strategic reasoning) according to the
adopted strategy.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we define the Ar-
gumentation Framework (AF), in which we make our assumption for our framework and
discuss the argumentation system. Section 3.3 is devoted to the agent theory. In Section
3.4, we discuss the relevance of arguments, and in Section 3.5.2, we present a new argument
selection mechanism based on some criteria, then we analyze the computational complexity
of the proposed selection mechanism. In Section 3.6, we present two reasoning capability
for agent’s strategic and tactic reasoning. Finally, a brief summary is given in Section 3.7.
3.2 Argumentation Framework
In this section, we briefly discuss the key elements of the argumentation system we use in
the thesis. We begin with Dung’s abstract argumentation framework [42], which simply
consists of a set of arguments and a binary attack relation among them. Thereafter, we
present our agent theory in a more abstract way that includes the negotiation constraints,
the arguments owned by the agent, a conflict relation among those arguments, the set of
potential offers, a preference relation over offers, a preference relation over arguments, a
function that specifies the argument(s) supporting each offer, and a function that returns a
real number representing the agent’s uncertainty about the selection of its proposals. This
encodes the fact that when an agent receives an argument from another agent, it can interpret
it correctly, and it can also compare it with its own arguments. This also allows an agent
to recognize whether the received argument is in conflict or not with its own arguments.
However, in its theory, only the conflicts between the agent’s own arguments are considered.
Moreover, an agent has the ability to decide which move to play based on its uncertainty
degree about its moves.
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3.2.1 Assumptions
For simplification reasons, we consider in the rest of this thesis a bilateral negotiation in
which only two agents are involved in the dialogue. More specifically, we will consider
the case of Buyer/Seller scenario in which two agents Seller s and Buyer b are involved
in a negotiation dialogue. Generalization to multi party negotiation (i.e., one-to-many or
many-to-many) is left to future work.
In our settings, we assume that the following elements are described in a formal
language L , where ` stands for classical inference.
• A finite and possibly inconsistent knowledge base Γ such that: Γ = Γb∪Γs, where Γb
and Γs represent the knowledge bases of the buyer and seller respectively.
• An uncertainty degree µ which includes two types of agent’s uncertainty; Type I:
agent’s uncertainty about the selection of its moves, and Type II: agent’s uncertainty
about the selected move to be accepted by the addressee.
• A finite set of constraints denoted by C . In this thesis, we will deal mostly with the
Budget and Time constraints.
• A finite set of offers denoted by O .
• A Commitment Store CS. As in [78], we assume that each agent is equipped with
a negotiation commitment store which will keep track of its different acts and is
accessible for all negotiating agents. Formally, for each agent i, where i ∈ {b,s},
we denote by CSi the commitment store of agent i, and the commitment store of the
negotiation is CS =CSb∪CSs, which is updated as usual after each negotiation turn
[12].
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Figure 3.2: A simple argumentation system
• A set of arguments, A ⊆ Arg(L ), where Arg(L ) is the set of all arguments built
from L . The elements of A maybe conflicting and in what follows, these conflicts
will be captured by an attack relation B.
3.2.2 Argumentation System
Now that we have introduced the key elements that constitute our framework, let us define
the argumentation system used in the thesis starting with Dung’s abstract framework [42].
Definition 3.1 (Dung’s argumentation framework). An Argumentation Framework (AF) is
a pair AF = 〈A ,B〉 where A is a set of arguments and B is a conflict based binary attack
relation between arguments.
In fact, an argumentation framework can be represented as a directed graph, called
argumentation graph, whose nodes are arguments A and edges represent the binary at-
tack relation B. Figure 3.2 shows a simple argumentation system that consists of a set of
arguments and attack relations between these arguments.
Following the abstract argumentation system proposed by Dung, an argument can
be defined as a reason or justification for some conclusion (belief, action, value, goal, etc.).
This means, arguments can be information about the agent’s state, about the world, or about
the target of the discussion that an agent send to another agent to persuade it to accept its
position about the issue under discussion. On the other hand, an argumentation system is
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the reasoning about these arguments (i.e., decide on conclusion).
Definition 3.2 (Argument structure). An argument Arg is a pair (H,h), where h is a formula
of L and H a subset of Γ such that:
1. H ⊆ Γ.
2. H is consistent.
3. H ` h
4. H is minimal, so that no subset of H satisfying 1,2 and 3 exists.
H is called the support of the argument, and h is its conclusion.
Example 3.1. : Given a set of well defined formulae (wff) in a language L , where L =
{q→ p,¬t,g→ p,m→¬p, p,m, t,q}, we can construct the following arguments.
1. X = [{q,q→ p}, p], the support of X is H = {q,q→ p} and the conclusion is h= p.
2. Y = [{m,m→¬p},¬p], the support of Y is H ′ = {m,m→¬p} and the conclusion is
h′ = ¬p.
3. Z = [{g,g→ p,¬t}, p∧¬t], the support of Z is H ′′ = {g,g→ p,¬t} and the conclu-
sion is h′′ = p∧¬t.
Agent’s arguments may be conflicting by contradicting themselves or they can be
used to attack the opponent’s arguments. In this context, this conflict or attack relation is
denoted by B, and defined as follows.
Definition 3.3 (Attack). Let X = (H,h) and Y = (H ′,h′) be two arguments. The argument
Y attacks the argument X (denoted by Y BX) iff H ′ ` ¬h. That is, an argument Y attacks
another argument X iff the negation of the conclusion of X can be inferred from the support
of Y .
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Figure 3.3: A simple attack relations between three arguments
In the previous example (Example 3.1), and by looking at the support and the conclu-
sion of the three arguments X , Y , and Z, we can figure out the attack relations among them.
It is obvious that the argument Y is attacking the argument X because the negation of the
conclusion of argument X can be inferred from the support of Y , as we can infer ¬p from
the support of argument Y . In other words, p is provable in X and it is not provable in Y . In
the mean while, the argument X attacks Y for the same reason. Likewise, the argument Z
attacks Y and Y attacks Z. The attack relations between these three arguments is depicted
and explained in Figure 3.3.
A set of arguments S is said to be conflict-free if and only if there is no attack relation
between any pair of its arguments.
Definition 3.4 (Conflict-free). A set S ⊆ A is said to be conflict-free iff @ X,Y ∈ S such
that XBY or Y BX .
A set S defends its elements if and only if any of its arguments is being attacked by
another argument that is not part of S, then there is an argument among its elements attacks
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that argument.
Definition 3.5 (Defense). Let S ⊆ A . An argument X is defended by S iff ∀ Y ∈ A if
Y BX , then ∃ Z ∈ S such that ZBY .
Definition 3.6 (Acceptability semantics). Let S⊆A be a conflict-free set of arguments and
T : 2A → 2A be a function such that T (S) = {x,x is defended by S}, then:
• S is an admissible extension iff it defends all its elements.
• S is a complete extension iff it is admissible and contains all the arguments it defends
“S= T (S)”.
• S is a preferred extension iff S is a maximal (w.r.t set ⊆) complete extension.
• S is a grounded extension iff S is the smallest (w.r.t set ⊆) complete extension.
• S is a stable extension iff it attacks any element in A \S
3.3 Negotiating Agent Theory
In the previous section, we presented and explained the concepts of the argumentation sys-
tem. In this section, we introduce the agent. Agent theory has been extended in several
ways to include more parameters than just a set of arguments and attack relation among
them. In this thesis, we take as starting point the agent theory proposed in [88] and extend
it by adding the following two components.
1. The agent’s uncertainty about the selection of its moves, and
2. A partial preorder preference relation over agent’s arguments.
The theory of a negotiating agent i is then defined as follows.
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Definition 3.7 (Negotiating agent theory). The theory of a negotiating agent i is a tuple
T i = 〈C i,µ i, A i,ipre f−ar,O i,ipre f−o,F ,B〉 such that:
• C i ⊆ C is the set of agent i’s constraints.
• µ i is a function that maps each move to a real number between [0,1] to capture the
agent’s uncertainty about the move.
µ i : M → [0,1].
Where M is the set of all possible moves.
• A i ⊆A is the set of agent i’s arguments.
• ipre f−ar⊆ A i ×A i is a partial preorder relation denoting a preference between
agent’s arguments. This preference is based on the facts constituting the support
of arguments.
• O i ⊆ O is the set of agent’s i offers (O i = {oi1, . . . ,oin}). This preference is based on
value of the offers.
• ipre f−o⊆O i×O i is a partial pre-order relation denoting a preference between agent’s
offers.
• F :O i→ 2A i is a function that assigns to each offer the set of supporting arguments.
• B⊆A ×A is a binary attack relation between arguments. For two arguments α and
β , we say that α attacks β (or β is attacked by α) if αBβ or B= (α,β ) holds.
The following example serves as an illustration of the basic components of the agent
theory.
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Example 3.2. For the argumentation system presented in Figure 3.2, letO i= {oi1,oi2,oi3,oi4}
be the set of agent i’s offers. Then we can represent the following basic components of the
agent theory.
• C i = {Budget,Time}
• A i = {a,b,c,d,e}
• F (oi1) = {a}, F (oi2) = {b}, F (oi3) = /0, F (oi4) = {c}.
• ipre f−o= {(oi1,oi2),(oi2,oi3),(oi4,oi3),(oi2,oi4)}
• ipre f−ar= {(a,b),(c,b),(c,d),(d,e)}
• B= {(a,b),(c,b),(c,d),(d,c),(d,e)}
• Associated with each move is the agent’s uncertainty (agent’s uncertainty will be
introduced in the next chapter). Assume that i is involving in a negotiation dialogue,
andM0 is its first move at t = 0, and assuming that iwas confusing about the selection
of the right move at that dialogue step, let us say it was uncertain about 0.25%, then
we say that the uncertainty degree about the selection of its moveM0 is 0.25, and we
write it as: µ i(M0) = 0.25
3.4 Relevance of Arguments
Investigating the relevance of an argument is a crucial issue in argumentation-based negoti-
ation. We define the relevance of arguments based on the negotiation context and according
to the selection criteria, that will be presented in the next subsection, in order to allow
the negotiating parties to select the most appropriate (relevant) argument from the set of
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potential arguments at each dialogue step, considering their uncertainty and the last com-
municative act as well as the previous ones. By doing so, we give the negotiating agents
the ability to backtrack and revise their choices in case the selected argument is shown to
be weak (i.e., uncertain) or got rejected by the addressee.
Let L be a logical language, and i and j be the two negotiating agents that represent,
in our case, the buyer and the seller agents (i.e., if i represents the buyer, then j represents
the seller and vice versa). In what follows, we define the negotiation context for an agent i
committed in a negotiation with another agent j as follows.
Definition 3.8 (Negotiation context). The negotiation context for an agent i (speaker) com-
mitted in a negotiation with an agent j (addressee) is a 7-tuple NCi, j =
〈
S ,T ,T,τ,Pi, j,Γ
〉
where:
• S is the speaker’s strategy,
• T is the current speaker’s tactic, which will be defined after introducing all the con-
text elements,
• T is a formula of L representing the negotiation topic,
• τ is a formula of L representing the argument on which the speaker should act,
• Pi, j is the set of agent i’s private beliefs about agent j’s beliefs Pbeli, j and about agent
j’s preferences P
pre f
i, j . Thus Pi, j = (P
bel
i, j ∪Ppre fi, j ),
• Γ is the common knowledge base that the two agents share about the negotiation
context.
This definition refines the definition proposed in [87] by considering the speaker’s
strategy, its current tactic, and the negotiation topic that corresponds to the global goal.
During the negotiation process, the common knowledge base Γ is constantly updated by
adding all the information the two agents agreed upon, including the accepted arguments.
We also assume that (Γ∩Pi, j = /0). It is worth mentioning that if an agent discloses its own
private beliefs (Pi, j), then it will become common knowledge.
In order to define the logical relation between T and τ , let us define the notion of
argumentation tree and the notion of path.
Definition 3.9 (Argumentation tree). Let i and j be the participating agents, and A ⊆
Arg(L ) be the set of arguments used by the agents in the negotiation dialogue. An argu-
mentation tree Tr is a 2-tuple Tr =
〈
N,→ 〉 where:
• N = {(i,(H,h)) | i ∈ {b,s},(H,h) ∈A } is the set of nodes. Each node is described
as a pair (i,(H,h)), which indicates that the argument (H,h) is used by the agent i.
• →⊆ N×N is a relation between nodes. We write n0 → n1 instead of (n0,n1) ∈→
where {n0,n1} ⊆ N. The relation→ is defined as follows: (i,(H,h))→ ( j,(H ′,h′))
iff i 6= j and (H ′,h′) attacks (H,h).
Definition 3.10 (Path). Let Tr =
〈
N,→ 〉 be an argumentation tree. A path in Tr is a finite
sequence of nodes n0,n1, · · · ,nm such that ∀i ,0≤ i< m : ni→ ni+1.
In order to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant arguments in a given negotia-
tion context, let us define the notion of irrelevant argument.
Definition 3.11 (Irrelevant argument). Let NCi, j =
〈
S ,T ,T,τ,Pi, j,Γ
〉
be a negotiation
context, i and j be the participating agents, Tr =
〈
N,→ 〉 be the argumentation tree associ-
ated to the negotiation, and (i,(H,h)) be a node in Tr where i ∈ {b,s}. (H,h) is irrelevant
in the negotiation context NCi, j iff:
1. There is no path between the node (i,(H,h)) and the root of Tr or;
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2. ∃x ∈ Γ : H ` ¬x.
The distinction between relevant and irrelevant arguments allows the negotiating
agents to eliminate irrelevant arguments at each dialogue step before ordering the rele-
vant arguments in order to select the most relevant one. In what follows, we discuss three
criteria for evaluating the potential arguments and order them based on their relevance to
help negotiating agents select the most relevant one at each dialogue step.
3.5 Argument Selection Mechanism
In this section, we propose a new selection mechanism for the set of potential arguments.
To do so, we introduce three criteria that can be used for evaluating and ordering the set of
potential arguments (PA) in such a way that allows them to better decide about the selection
the most relevant argument.
3.5.1 Argument Selection Criteria
1. Risk of Failure over Arguments (RFA).
In order to allow the negotiating agents to select the most appropriate argument during
the negotiation process, we first, examine the risk of failure over arguments. This
notion is based on the fact that Γ contains certain knowledge, whereas the set of
agents’ beliefs and preferences Pi, j contains uncertain beliefs. Intuitively, the more
subjective the justifications, the more risky the arguments. To define the notion of
risk formally:
• let |H|Γ be the number of formulas in H that are in Γ, and
• let |H|Pi, j be the number of formulas in H that are in Pi, j.
54
• let |H| /0 be the number of formulas in H that are not in (Γ∪Pi, j),
Definition 3.12 (Risk of failure over arguments). Let (H,h) and (H ′,h′) be two ar-
guments from the set of all arguments Arg(L ) that can be built from the logical
language L and OL be a set of non-strict orders over arguments using a binary re-
lation risk that is complete and transitive. The risk of failure over arguments is a
function mapping a subset of arguments to a non-strict order.
risk : 2Arg(L )→OL (3.1)
The function risk should satisfy the following: (H,h)risk (H ′,h′) iff:
• |H| /0 ≥ |H ′| /0; or
• |H| /0 = |H ′| /0 and |H|Γ ≤ |H ′|Γ; or
• |H| /0 = |H ′| /0, |H|Γ = |H ′|Γ, and |H|Pi, j ≤ |H ′|Pi, j
The intuition behind using the number of formulas in the definition of risk is that the
higher number of uncertain formulas, the higher probability of being attacked.
Example 3.3. :
Let (H1,h1), (H2,h2) and (H3,h3) be three arguments such that:
|H1|Γ = 3, |H1|Pi, j = 1, and |H1| /0 = 0.
|H2|Γ = 1, |H2|Pi, j = 2, and |H2| /0 = 0.
|H3|Γ = 0, |H3|Pi, j = 1, and |H3| /0 = 3.
In this example, the argument (H3,h3) is more risky to fail (i.e., rejected by the ad-
dressee) than arguments (H1,h1) and (H2,h2) because the number of formulas in H3
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that are not in (Γ∪Pi, j), which means in |H3| /0, are greater than those of |H1| /0 and
|H2| /0. On the other hand, the argument (H2,h2) is more risky to fail than argument
(H1,h1) because |H2|Γ (i.e., the certain knowledge) is less than |H1|Γ. So, the func-
tion risk produces the following order over the three arguments:
(H3,h3)risk (H2,h2)risk (H1,h1).
2. Favorite Relation over Arguments (FRA).
The second step for evaluating the set of potential arguments PA, is checking the
favorite relation over these arguments. In order to characterize this notion, we use the
beliefs of agents about the preferences of other agents. We use the notation Beli→ j(p),
where i, j ∈ {s,b}, which means agent i believes that agent j believes that p holds,
where p is a proposition representing a preference. So the second criterion, which is
the favorite relation over arguments, can be defined as follows.
Definition 3.13 (Favorite over arguments ). Let (H,h) and (H ′,h′) be two arguments
for an agent i. We define the favorite and the strict favorite relations over arguments
as follows.
• (H,h)if av (H ′,h′) iff Bi→ j((H,h)ipre f−ar (H ′,h′)),
• (H,h)≺if av (H ′,h′) iff Bi→ j((H,h)≺ipre f−ar (H ′,h′)).
3. Preference Relation over Arguments (PRA).
Agents also may have private preferences about different knowledge bases. There-
fore, they may have private preferences about arguments. So the third step in ordering
the arguments, is checking the preference relation over arguments. This relation is
denoted by (H,h) ipre f−ar (H ′,h′), which means that agent i prefers the argument
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(H ′,h′) to the argument (H,h). Because ≤ is an ordering relation, the preference
relation ipre f−ar is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive.
In order to define the preference relation over arguments, we need to define the pref-
erence level of an argument. We assume that, the knowledge base of an agent i,
Γi, is stratified into non-overlapping sets Γ1, ...,Γn such that facts in Γ1 are the most
preferred ones, and facts in the same set are equally preferred. Here the preference
among facts is related to the certainty degree of those facts. That is, the most preferred
facts are the more certain ones.
Therefore, we define the preference level as follows.
Definition 3.14 (Preference level). The preference level of a non-empty subsetH ⊆ Γ
denoted by L(H) is the number of the highest numbered subset of H.
Example 3.4. Let Γ = Γ1
⋃
Γ2 with Γ1 = {a,b} and Γ2 = {c,d}. If H = {a} and
H ′ = {a,d}, then we have: L(H) = 1 and L(H ′) = 2.
So the preference relation over arguments can be defined formally as follows.
Definition 3.15 ( Preference over arguments). Let (H,h) and (H ′,h′) be two argu-
ments for an agent i. We say that:
• Agent i prefers the argument (H ′,h′) over the argument (H,h) denoted by:
ipre f−ar= ((H ′,h′),(H,h)) or (H,h)ipre f−ar (H ′,h′) iff L(H ′) ≤ L(H), and
• Agent i strictly prefers the argument (H ′,h′) over the argument (H,h) denoted
by: ≺ipre f−ar= ((H ′,h′),(H,h)) or (H,h)≺ipre f−ar (H ′,h′) iff L(H ′) < L(H).
3.5.2 Relevance Ordering Relation
From the above discussed three criteria, we define the relevance ordering relation for order-
ing the set of potential arguments as follows.
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Definition 3.16 (Relevance ordering relation). Let NCi, j =
〈
S ,T ,T,τ,Pi, j,Γ
〉
be a nego-
tiation context, (H,h) and (H ′,h′) be two relevant arguments in this context, and let =risk
be the equal risk relation between any two arguments. (H ′,h′) is more relevant than (H,h)
denoted by (H,h)rel (H ′,h′) iff:
• (H,h)risk (H ′,h′); or
• (H ′,h′) =risk (H,h) and (H,h)≺if av (H ′,h′); or
• (H ′,h′)=risk (H,h) and (H,h)if av (H ′,h′) and (H ′,h′)if av (H,h) and (H,h)≺ipre f−ar
(H ′,h′).
According to this definition, (H ′,h′) is more relevant than (H,h) if the risk of (H,h)
is greater than the risk of (H ′,h′). If the two arguments have the same risk, the more
relevant argument is the more favorable one according to the favorite relation. If the two
arguments have the same risk and they are equal according to the favorite relation, the more
relevant argument is the more preferable one according to the preference relation. The two
arguments have the same relevance if in addition they are equal according to the reference
relation.
3.5.3 Computational Complexity of the Selection Mechanism
Computationally speaking, the arguments selection mechanism is based on:
1. The elimination of irrelevant arguments;
2. The ordering of the relevant arguments using the relevance ordering relation; and
3. The selection of one of the most relevant arguments.
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This process is executed by each participating agent at each dialogue step at the tacti-
cal level. The relevant arguments that are not selected at a step t, are recorded and added to
the set of potential arguments (PA) because they can be used at a subsequent step. The set
of potential arguments can be viewed as a stack in which the higher level argument is the
most relevant one. A relevant argument constructed at a step t and used latter at a step t ′,
(t < t ′), simulates the backtracking towards a previous node in the argumentation tree and
the construction of a new path.
In this thesis, we prove that our selection mechanism is tractable if arguments are
represented using propositional Horn clauses. Propositional Horn clauses is a restricted
language that has been proved to be sufficient to represent and reason about knowledge in
many concrete applications [28]. A propositional Horn clause is a disjunction of literals,
which are atomic propositions (called positive literals) or their negations (called negative
literals), with at most one positive literal. Formally, a propositional Horn clause has the
form¬p1∨¬p2∨·· ·∨¬pn∨c or also p1∧ p2∧·· ·∧ pn→ c, which is simply an implication.
A propositional Horn formula is a conjunction of propositional Horn clauses. We focus on a
further restriction called propositional definite Horn clauses, where each clause has exactly
one positive literal. A propositional definite Horn formula is a conjunction of propositional
definite Horn clauses. This restriction is of particular interest in modeling argumentation
reasoning for negotiation, because formulas of the type p1∧ p2∧ . . . pn→ c are adequate to
describe interrelationships between premises (i.e., reasons or justifications) and conclusions
(i.e., offers). Thus, agents could support their offers (the part c) as positive literals using the
support p1∧ p2∧ . . . pn.
Theorem 3.1. If arguments are represented in proportional definite Horn clauses, the ar-
guments selection mechanism runs in polynomial time.
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Proof. It is known from Bentahar et al. [28], that given a Horn knowledge base Γ, a subset
H ⊆ Γ, and a formula h; checking whether (H,h) is an argument is polynomial. To decide
if an argument is irrelevant, we have to check if:
1. H ` ¬x for an x ∈ Γ, which can be done in polynomial time since H is a definite Horn
formula; or
2. there is a path from the root to (H,h), which is a graph reachability problem, and it
is known by Jones [69] that the problem is in NLOGSPACE.
Since NLOGSPACE ⊆ P, the problem can be solved in polynomial time. To decide about
the preference, we only need to compute the level of an argument from the level of a subset
of Γ, which is a simple procedure that is obviously polynomial. Computing the favorite
argument given two arguments needs the computation of the arguments’ weight, which is
again a polynomial procedure as shown by Algorithm 1. To compere two given arguments
using the risk, we only need to compute the number of formulas in H and check if they
are part of different sets, which is a polynomial procedure. Finally, the relevance ordering
relation is simply based on comparing risks and favorites, which are both polynomial, so
we are done. 
3.6 Reasoning Models
A preliminary framework for strategic and tactic reasoning for agent communication was
proposed in [87]. This reasoning framework is specified using argumentation theory com-
bined to a relevance theory. In this chapter, we refine and use these notions of strategic and
tactic reasoning. In particular, we adopt strategic reasoning to enable the negotiating agents
to decide about the global communication plan in terms of the macro-actions to perform in
order to achieve the main dialogue goal (i.e., agreement). On the other hand, we use tactic
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reasoning to allow the negotiating agents to locally select, at each dialogue step the most
relevant argument according to the adopted strategy. So an agent uses its tactic reasoning
at each dialogue step for the assessment of the available arguments to achieve some sub-
goals of the global goal (i.e., the agreement in our case). In other words, how an agent can
select the right argument from a set of potential arguments at certain dialogue step depends
on its tactic reasoning, and how an agreement could be achieved is based on the strategic
reasoning of both agents. In the following section, we discuss the strategic reasoning.
3.6.1 Strategic Reasoning
Before engaging in a negotiation, agents must build a global strategy on the sub-goals to
achieve. Sub-goals determine the general steps to follow so that the global goal can be
realized. Strategy is subject to the agent’s current beliefs and constraints, such as the agent’s
budget and negotiation time limit. To achieve the same negotiation goal, an agent can have
several alternative strategies reflected by different sets of sub-goals. The dialogue goal, sub-
goals, and constraints can be expressed using propositional logic. The set of constraints can
be inconsistent, but the sub-set of those constraints and the sub-set of beliefs the agent
decides to consider should be consistent. In this thesis, we define the strategy as a function
that associates to a goal and a sub-set of consistent beliefs and constraints a sub-set of
alternatives, each of which is a set of sub-goals, which means an element of the set 22
B
,
where B is the set of goals.
Definition 3.17 (Strategy). 2
Let B be a set of goals, C a set of constraints and Γ the agent’s knowledge base. A
2The definition that we introduce in this thesis is different from the one proposed in [87], in the sense that
the new function associates a set of sub-goals to a sub-set of agent’s knowledge base and constraints instead
of associating a set of goals to a set of operational constraint and a set of conversational criterions. The new
definition is more complete as it considers the agent’s knowledge base and generates different alternatives of
different sub-goals from 22
B
, and not just one alternative from 2B as in [87].
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strategy is a function:
S : B×2C ×2Γ → 22B (3.2)
3.6.2 Tactic Reasoning
Tactics allow agents to select one action (i.e., the content of the move or the argument) from
a set of possible actions in order to achieve a sub-goal as computed by the adapted strategy.
The purpose of this theory is to ensure that the selected argument is the most relevant one
according to the current context, that is, the one with less risk of failure, more favorable,
and the more preferable one. In our framework, this turns to be the move with the higher
probability to be accepted by the addressee.
In the negotiation context NCi, j =
〈
S ,T ,T,τ,Pi, j,Γ
〉
, the influence of the strategy
on the tactic is reflected through the link between the topic T , the current argument s and
the strategy S .
Let T be the set of topics (T ∈ T), g the current goal (g ∈ B),C the sub-set of current
constraints (C ∈ C ), γ the sub-set of beliefs the agent is currently considering (γ ∈ Γ), and
A the set of arguments (τ ∈A ). We define the tactic function as follows.
Definition 3.18 (Tactic). A tactic is a function:
T : T×S (g,C,γ)×A → B (3.3)
The key idea is that the current action (at the tactic level) is related to a sub-goal,
which is determined by the strategy. From the operational perspective, the current argument
s can attack or support the formula representing the sub-goal T .
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3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced the argumentation system and agent’s theory needed for our
framework. Our agent’s theory incorporates important parameters that allow the negotiat-
ing parties to explicitly influence each others’ preferences and reason about the selection
of their moves during negotiation. Then, we proposed a new arguments selection mecha-
nism based on three criteria and analyzed the computational complexity of this selection
mechanism. Finally, we presented two reasoning mechanisms namely, strategic and tac-
tic reasoning. These reasoning capabilities allow negotiating parties to reason and decide
about the selection of the most relevant argument locally at each dialogue step (using tactic
reasoning), and decide about the global communication plan (using strategic reasoning) to
achieve their goal (the agreement) according to the adopted strategy. As such, this chapter
has answered the first two research questions (RQ1 and RQ2) raised in Chapter 1. In the




Shannon Entropy for Agents’
Uncertainty Assessment
In this chapter1, we address the problem of agents’ uncertainty about their moves and con-
sequently about the whole dialogue in Argumentation-Based Agent Negotiation (ABAN).
In particular, we propose an efficient method for agents’ uncertainty assessment to help the
negotiating agents make better decisions about their selections under the assumption of un-
certainty. More precisely, we use Shannon entropy—a well-known method in information
theory to quantify the information based on the randomness degree—to assess the agent’s
uncertainty about its moves at each dialogue step. To do so, we assume that at each dia-
logue step, each agent will have multiple choices of moves with different probabilities to
advance. The probability of each move reflects its degree of acceptability by the addressee.
The higher probability the move has, the more likely to be accepted by the addressee. In-
tuitively, a rational agent will select the move with higher probability, which means the
less degree of uncertainty. To measure this uncertainty, we define a function called Move’s
1The results of this chapter have been published in the journal of Expert Systems with Applications [83],
the Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Humanized Computing [84], and in The 5th International Conference
on Ambient Systems, Networks and Technologies (ANT 2014) [82].
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Probability Function based on the three criteria we discussed in Chapter 3. This function as-
signs a probability value between [0,1] to each move, such that the summation of all moves’
probability at each dialogue step is equal to 1. Then, we order the moves based on their
probability using what we call Probability Ordering Relation. Finally, we apply the general
formula of Shannon entropy. We also, measure the uncertainty of the whole dialogue in
three methods: i) by taking the average of the uncertainty degrees of all dialogue moves, ii)
by determining all possible dialogues that can be generated from all the moves, and iii) by
using a Hypothesis testing approach, this can be used in particular for those dialogues who
last long. Moreover, we present a novel classification for the potential arguments based on
their uncertainty degree, which will be used in the next chapter for designing the negotia-
tion strategies, then we analyze different situations and raise up some special cases based
on the number of available arguments and their respective classes. Finally, in addition to the
theoretical analysis of agents’ uncertainty, we discuss the implementation of the proposed
technique by applying it on a concrete case study (Buyer/Seller) scenario.
For a convenience reading of this chapter, we refer the reader to the list of notations
presented in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: List of the notations used in Chapter 4
The notation The meaning of the notation
s and b Seller and Buyer agents
L A logical language
H(X) Shannon entropy for a discrete random variable X
P(x) The probability mass function for random variable x
St A set of moves the agent has at dialogue step t
µ i(Mt) The uncertainty degree of agent i about the moveM at step t
Γi The knowledge base of agent i
CSit The commitment store of agent i at step t
mkt The k
th move among the possible moves an agent has at the step t
P(mkt ) The probability of the move m
k
t
ζ (Γi∪CS jt ) A function produces a set of moves along with their respective probabilities
Pi, j The set of agent i’s beliefs about agent j’s beliefs P
bel
i, j and about agent j’s preferences P
pre f
i, j
M The set of all possible moves
∆ A function associates a set of knowledge, preferred arguments, and favorable arguments to a set of possible
moves and their respective probabilities
fr The set of favorable arguments
pr The set of preferable arguments
P(Argl) The probability of argument Argl
risk Risk binary relation that is complete and transitive
=risk The equal risk relation between any two arguments
NCi, j The negotiation context for an agent i committed in a negotiation with an agent j
H(Mt) Shannon entropy of the moveMt
CDi(Mt) The certainty degree of agent i about moveMt
µ(D) The uncertainty index of the dialogue
ND The number of all possible dialogues
if av Favorite relation over arguments
≺if av The strict favorite relation over arguments
=if av The favorite equality relation
=ipre f−ar The preference equality relation
A i The set of agent i’s arguments
H0 The null hypothesis
H1 The alternative hypothesis
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4.1 Introduction
The process of selecting moves (offers/arguments) in argumentation-based negotiation is
usually associated with a high degree of uncertainty. Generally speaking, uncertainty can
be thought of as being the inverse of information. Information about a particular engineer-
ing or scientific problem may be incomplete, imprecise, fragmentary, unreliable, vague,
contradictory, or even deficient [118]. Uncertainty about values of given variables (e.g., the
disease affecting a patient in medical applications) can result from some errors and hence
from unreliability (in the case of sensors) or from different background knowledge (in the
case of agents). As a result, it is possible to obtain different uncertain pieces of information
about a given value from different sources [65]. We aim to investigate how an agent can
assess its uncertainty about its moves when more than one possible choice is available to
advance to its opponent in argumentation-based agent negotiations.
Basically, the notion of uncertainty was first introduced by Helton in [59], where he
classified uncertainty into two main groups, “objective uncertainty” and “subjective uncer-
tainty”.
• Objective uncertainty - Type A: this type corresponds to the variability that emerges
from the stochastic characteristics of an environment.
• Subjective uncertainty - Type B: this type, which is the focus of our work, concerns
the uncertainty that comes from scientific ignorance, uncertainty in measurements,
impossibility of confirmation or observation, censorship, or other knowledge defi-
ciency.
The focus of this chapter is on the second type “the subjective uncertainty”, which
is mainly about the agents’ uncertainty about the exchanged moves (offers/arguments) and
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their acceptance. The main issue we are investigating is the agent’s uncertainty about se-
lecting its moves during the negotiation process from not only the perspective of the agent
itself, but also from its beliefs about the acceptance criteria of the opponent. We are inter-
ested in measuring this uncertainty and analyzing the different argument classes under the
consideration of such an uncertainty.
In our settings, we assume that each negotiation dialogue D consists of a set of moves
{M0,M1, ....,Mn}. At each dialogue step (state), an agent has more than one option (i.e.,
offer and/or argument) to choose and each one has different available choices with different
probabilities to play, see Figure 4.1. In the figure, the rectangle on the left side represents
the set of offers and the rectangle on right side represents the set of arguments. So, in
order to select one of theses choices, an agent has to evaluate the candidate moves and
find the appropriate strategy that specifies which move to play that satisfies both agents in
order to achieve their goal. The probability assignment for those moves will be based on
the “Move’s Probability Function” and the “Probability Ordering Relation”, which can be
evaluated based on the selection mechanism we discussed in Chapter 3. The agent should
select the move with the higher probability (i.e., less uncertainty) and less risk of failure
to be accepted by its opponent. In negotiation dialogues, the probability associated with a
move corresponds to the probability for the move to be accepted by the addressee.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first attempt of its kind in dealing with
the agents’ uncertainty to help the agents reason about their moves, especially, in uncertain
settings so that they can make better decisions at each dialogue step, and select the right
moves by considering their beliefs on the opponents’ preferences.
The main contributions of this chapter is depicted in Figure 4.2 and are categorized
as follows. First, we use Shannon entropy to assess the uncertainty degree of selecting the
right moves during the dialogue (Type I), the uncertainty degree that the selected move will
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Figure 4.1: A negotiation dialogue D consists of n moves {M1, ...,Mn}, each move was
selected among different options of offers/arguments
be accepted by the addressee (Type II), and the uncertainty degree of the whole dialogue.
Then, based on the uncertainty degree we propose a novel classification for the set of the
potential arguments. Further, we advanced our research by analyzing the different situa-
tions of agents’ uncertainty based on the available arguments at each dialogue step. More
precisely, we discuss the agent’s uncertainty in two special cases based on the different
classes that arguments can belong to. The main idea is to give a good indicator about the
played move to be accepted by the addressee. In addition to the theoretical analysis of
agents’ uncertainty, we discuss the implementation of the proposed approach by applying
it on a concrete case study (Buyer/Seller) scenario. The obtained empirical results confirm
the effectiveness of using our uncertainty-aware technique and show that our negotiating
agents outperform others, which use pure argumentation with no uncertainty consideration.
We expect a significant contribution of the measurements and analysis we introduce
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Figure 4.2: A schematic view of the chapter contributions
in this chapter in the elaboration of guidelines and strategies that aim to enhance the negoti-
ation process between autonomous agents and advance the research in the area of automated
argumentation-based agent negotiation in multi-agent systems.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we discuss
the most relevant literature. In Section 4.3 we briefly review the concept of Shannon en-
tropy, then in Section 4.4, we present our approach for agent’s uncertainty assessment using
Shannon entropy. Section 4.5 discusses the implementation and the experimental results.
Finally, we conclude the chapter in Section 4.6.
4.2 Related Work
While negotiation has been studied in various disciplines for many years, the study of auto-
mated negotiations using argumentation in agent-based environments is relatively new. In-
deed, in everyday life, decision making is based on the exchange of arguments and counter
arguments. Therefore, in artificial intelligence, researchers have adopted the same idea and
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a similar decision system using argumentation. They have studied extensively the argu-
mentation in computing, especially for inference, decision making, dialogues, and negoti-
ation. Argumentation has been incorporated into negotiation dialogues in the early 1990s
by Sycara in [117]. In that work, the author introduced a specific argumentation frame-
work and emphasized the advantages of using argumentation in negotiation dialogues. In
addition to that, other frameworks were proposed [74, 97, 119]. In [74], the authors dis-
cussed the different types of arguments that are used in a negotiation dialogue, such as
threats and rewards, in addition to proposing a particular framework for negotiation. From
the literature it can be noticed that some researchers have mainly focused on linking ar-
gumentation with protocols for agent communication, while others have focused on the
decision-making problem, see for instance the approaches [14, 55, 70], in which the au-
thors argued that selecting an offer to make at a given dialogue step is a decision-making
problem. Although several studies have focused on argumentation-based negotiation (e.g.,
[4, 5, 18, 56, 70, 107]), little is known about agents’ uncertainty, especially during the deci-
sion making process. Unfortunately, most of current proposals are concerned with propos-
ing protocols to show how agents can interact with each other, and how arguments and of-
fers can be generated, evaluated, and exchanged during the negotiation process. However,
none of the current proposals has investigated the agents’ uncertainty about the exchanged
moves and how such uncertainty could be measured to assist negotiating agents to make a
better decision. To this end, decision making under uncertainty is usually based on the com-
parative evaluation of different alternatives by means of a decision criterion. Kraus in [73]
proposed decision making techniques for reaching agreements in automated negotiation
for multi-agent systems environments. More specifically, she discussed game-theory and
economics techniques such as strategic negotiation, auctions, coalition formation, market-
oriented programming and contracting. However, the use of alternative arguments and
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counter arguments and investigating the agents’ uncertainty about the selection of their
moves is neglected in this study.
Amgoud [3] proposed a decision model in which some decision criteria were articu-
lated in terms of two steps argumentation process. The first step, called inference step, uses
Dung’s style system [42] in which arguments in favor/against each option are built, then
evaluated using a given acceptability semantics. The second step, called comparison step,
in which the alternatives are compared using a given criterion based on the accepted argu-
ments computed at the inference step. A similar approach was proposed by Amgoud et al.
[15] in which the authors indicate optimistic and pessimistic decision criteria in terms of an
argumentation process that consists of constructing arguments in favor/against decisions,
evaluating the strengths of those arguments, and comparing pairs of alternatives in terms
of their supporting/attacking arguments. In [8], a more general setting decision model was
proposed. The authors proposed an abstract argument-based decision system, in which a
simple protocol allowing the negotiating agents to exchange offers and arguments is pre-
sented. Although these proposals are concerned with rank-order the offers to select the best
option, however, they have some drawbacks related to the separation of the two/three steps
(for the first/second approach respectively). Moreover, these proposals have said nothing
about the agent’s uncertainty about the selection of their proposals, which play a key role
in decision making systems.
Another study was presented by Morge [92] in which he presented a decision support
system using arguments in legal disputes. This decision system was built upon argumen-
tation framework for decision making. Even though the author has considered different
priorities attached to the data structure for holding the statements like knowledge, goals,
and decisions corresponding to the uncertainty of knowledge about circumstances, prefer-
ences, and the expected utilities, yet, he did not mention how such uncertainty could be
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assessed to help the negotiating agents make better decisions. A later decision making ap-
proach through preference-based argumentation was proposed by Amgoud et al. [9]. This
approach came to overcome the limitations of the above mentioned proposals [3] and [15].
However, the underlining ingredients are still the same, the only difference is that the rank-
order of the different options and the selection of the best offer among the alternatives are
done in one step. Our work differs from these proposals in the sense that it rank-orders the
different choices based on their probabilities to be accepted, and consequently on their risk
of failure (i.e., rejected by the addressee) besides considering the preference of each other.
Huang and Lin [61] have proposed an argumentation-based approach for designing
a multi-agent e-marketplace. In this system, buyers and sellers delegate agents to argue
about products via an argumentation mechanism. Another argumentation-based multi-agent
decision support system for freight planning was proposed by Chow et al. [38]. The later
work presents a system that supports the automatic collecting and updating of the relevant
information to the freight planning process, and implements the argumentation mechanism
for determining the best freight plan based on the principles of both cost minimization and
risk reduction. Even though all these frameworks are based on different logics, and use
different definitions of arguments, they all have at their heart an exchange of offers and
arguments. Nevertheless, none of those proposals explains when arguments can be used
within negotiation dialogues, and how they should be dealt with by the agent that receives
them. Moreover, none of them touches the agents’ uncertainty issues and explains how to
assess agents’ uncertainty about the selection of their moves at each dialogue step and the
uncertainty about their dialogue. Thus, measurements for handling arguments together with
their uncertainty are missing.
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Müller and Hunter [94] presented an argumentation-based system for decision anal-
ysis in which they used a grounded extension as acceptability criterion and added the ca-
pability to generate decisions. They also analyzed the requirements of some engineering
companies for decision analysis and documentation systems. This work is more concerned
about the decision analysis, in terms of defining semantics, that is being used to choose
the accepted arguments, which is in fact different than our approach that examines the un-
certainty degree of arguments based on some criterion, and selects the one with lower un-
certainty degree, which means the more likely to be accepted. Later on, a general method
that can be used as a tool for uncertainty assessment and management is identified by Ross
et al. in [118]. They started by defining different types of uncertainty such as ambiguity,
fuzziness, randomness, non-specificity, ignorance, etc., and concluded with a method for
assessing the total uncertainty. Even though the work was described in the context of phys-
ical science and engineering applications, however, nothing is said about the assessment of
uncertainty in the field of multi-agent systems, especially in the argumentation-based agent
negotiations. In [25], an adaptive decision making approach based on three families of tac-
tics namely, time dependent tactic, behavior dependent tactic, and time independent tactic
in automated negotiation has been proposed. Despite that the authors have considered very
important factors in negotiation, which are time and behavior, however, they neglected the
agents’ uncertainty resulting from the lack of information at the moment of making their
decision. Considering the preferences of each other is another aspect missing in this work.
Hunter in [63] proposed a probabilistic approach to modeling uncertain logical ar-
guments. In this work, the author considered a logic-based argumentation with uncertain
arguments based on a probability distribution over models of the language, which leads
to a probability distribution over arguments that are constructed using classical logic. A
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recent work concerning one-side uncertain reserve prices in bilateral negotiation was pro-
posed by An et al. [21]. The authors provided an algorithm based on the combination of
game theoretic analysis and search techniques that can find all sequential equilibria in in-
complete information bargaining games with deadline constraint. This work is more about
agents’ rationality (i.e., strategic behavior of the agent) in bilateral negotiation alternating
offers, and it focuses more on one side-uncertainty reserve prices. That is, it has neither
resolved the problem of agents’ confusion (uncertainty) when choosing their offers, nor
considered the preferences of the opponent at each dialogue step, which are crucial factors
in the assessment of uncertainty when making decisions. More recently, Amato et al. [2]
proposed agents based multi-criteria decision-aid framework for designing and developing
multi-agents solution of problems. They modeled the decision problem as a problem of
choosing among several alternatives or proposals to be retrieved according to the user’s
need.
To the best of our knowledge, the only proposals that have focused on measurements
are by Amgoud and Florence [6, 7], and by Yuan et al. [131], for dialogue strategies. In
[6], the authors have defined a set of quality measures for persuasion dialogue games from
an external agent’s point of view. They analyzed already generated dialogues whatever
the protocol used is, and whatever the strategies of the agents are. Moreover, they have
proposed measurements for the quality of exchanging arguments in terms of their persuasive
weights and measurements of the behavior of the participants to the dialogue from the
perspectives of their coherence, aggressiveness, and the novelty of their arguments. They
also proposed metrics for the quality of the dialogue itself in terms of the relevance and
usefulness of the exchanged moves. These measures are important to set the foundation of
measuring the quality of the dialogue and compare different dialogues on the same subject.
Yuan et al. [131] proposed some heuristics to measure strategies in order to allow the
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participants to choose moves in debating settings. However, these measures have been
analyzed in a symbolic manner, and no numerical functions have been proposed.
To summarize, most of the above mentioned approaches are on the one hand, similar
to ours in the sense that argumentation is used to generate arguments relating to decisions,
but on the other hand, they are different in the way agents make their decision, and the sort
of uncertainty they deal with. Our approach is more concerned with the agents’ uncertainty
about the selection of their moves at each dialogue step. To conclude, despite the huge
number of publications on argumentation-based negotiation, agents’ uncertainty has not
been thoroughly studied in the available research literature. So this chapter is devoted to
close this gab.
4.3 Shannon Entropy: Overview
Shannon entropy is a measure of uncertainty. It is a well-known method that defines and
quantifies the information based on its randomness degree. That is, the entropy of a mes-
sage is its amount of uncertainty; this uncertainty increases when the message is closer to
random, and decreases when it is less random. The idea behind using Shannon entropy in
information theory is based on the amount of randomness that exists in a random event.
Indeed, Shannon entropy is a measure of the uncertainty associated with a random vari-
able (i.e., in our case, the uncertainty associated with the selection of one argument from
a random set of potential arguments). The more uncertain we are about the content of the
message, the more informative it is. Shannon entropy (or entropy in short) for a random
variable X is defined as follows [39].
Definition 4.1 (Shannon entropy). Shannon entropy for a discrete random variable X taking






In negotiation dialogues, Shannon entropy H(X) depends on the probability distribu-
tion of X rather than the actual values of X . The logarithm in Equation 4.1 is considered to
be of base 2 in the computations. The value of H(X) varies from zero to Log(|S|), where
zero means that there is no uncertainty, while Log(|S|) is the maximum value of uncertainty.
The aim is to investigate to what extent we can use Shannon entropy to evaluate the agent’s
uncertainty in negotiation dialogues. We assume that at each dialogue step, the agent has
to select one choice among the different choices of arguments (i.e., the set of potential ar-
guments PA at that step). The selection process is based on the speaker’s knowledge base
and characterized by an amount of uncertainty over this base and an amount of randomness
over the addressee’s knowledge, beliefs, and preferences. We place ourselves in the role of
an external observer trying to evaluate the uncertainty of the participants to the dialogue,
i.e., how uncertain each agent is about the selected move, how uncertain it is about the se-
lected move to be accepted by the addressee, and the distinction between these two types
of uncertainty when it is necessary.
The main idea is to adopt the Equation 4.1 to be suitable with the settings of our
negotiation dialogue, then we use it to measure how much an agent is uncertain about
selecting the right move (let’s say Mt in a dialogue D) at step t by assuming that there is
a set St of choices facing the agent at each dialogue step. Throughout this chapter, we
measure this uncertainty using the general formula of Shannon entropy, then we normalize
it to have a value between [0,1]. We call this measure the Uncertainty Degree for the move
Mt and denote it by “µ
i(Mt)”. Further, we calculate the agents’ uncertainty about the whole
dialogue in three methods. The first one is by taking the average of the uncertainty degree
of all moves in this dialogue (taking the minimum is another choice that we also discuss). In
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the second method, we measure the uncertainty degree of the whole dialogue by computing
all possible dialogues, using the Cartesian product of all possible moves, and determining
the probability of each dialogue, and then, we apply the general formula of Shannon entropy
for the whole dialogue (exactly as what we do in the case of calculating the uncertainty of
the moves). The third method, we measure the uncertainty degree of some moves randomly
and we assume it is the uncertainty of the dialogue, then we use hypothesis testing to decide
about this assumption and see what is the uncertainty of the dialogue.
To allow agents to refer to their dialogue history, a data structure called commitment
store “CS ” is used to restore utterances that agents utter during the dialogue [58]. Let i and
j be the two negotiating agents i 6= j. Also, let Γi be agent i’s knowledge base (i ∈ {b,s}).
CSit is the commitment store of agent i at step t of the dialogue. Suppose that at step t−1,
agent j uttered a move. To utter a move at the next step t, agent i should consider its
knowledge base and the content of agent j commitment store. Let mkt be the k
th move
among the possible moves an agent has at step t and P(mkt ) be the associated probability
such that the relationship between the moveMt and m
k
t is as follows.
∀t ∃k :Mt = mkt (4.2)
Where Mt is the selected move the agent utters at the step t, and the production of
moves for agent i along with their probabilities is a function of Γi andCS
j
t :
ζ (Γi∪CS jt ) = {(mkt ,P(mkt ))|mkt ∈ St} (4.3)
Where St is the set of choices facing the agent at the dialogue step t.
The measures of agent’s uncertainty that we advocate in this chapter aim to help the
participants to a negotiation dialogue to make better decisions about the selection of the
most appropriate argument at each moment (i.e., at the tactical level) in order to facilitate
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the achievement of their goals based on the adapted strategy. In the next section, we discuss
how can we use Shannon entropy to measure the agent’s uncertainty in argumentation-based
agent negotiation.
4.4 Agent’s Uncertainty Assessment
In this section, we will discuss to what extent we can use Shannon entropy in negotiation
dialogues to assess the agents’ uncertainty about their moves and dialogues. To do so,
we first, define a function that assigns the probabilities to the different moves based on
the three criteria we discussed earlier in the previous Chapter, then we use a probability
ordering relation to order these moves based on their probabilities. Finally, we use the
general formula of Shannon entropy to measure the uncertainty for each move first, and
then for the whole dialogue. Moreover, this section introduces a novel classification for
the set of potential arguments based on their uncertainty degree, and presents a valuable
discussion and analysis for the different situations and raise up some special cases based on
the number of possible arguments and their relative classes in order to be able to distinguish
between the uncertainty of selecting the right move, Type I, and the uncertainty of a move
to be accepted by the addressee, Type II. Recall that the argument selection criteria are as
follows.
1. Risk of Failure over Arguments (RFA).
2. Favorite Relation over Arguments (FRA).
3. Preference Relation over Arguments (PRA).
These criteria have precedence relation over each other, that is, the order of examining
these criteria is important in order to assign probability to the different arguments available
at each dialogue step. The procedure is as follows.
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First, we check RFA to examine the risk of failure of each possible argument in the
move and assign the probability so that the less move’s risk of failure, the more likely to be
accepted by the addressee. Second, if there is more than one argument with the same risk of
failure, then we check the second criterion FRA, which examines the favorite relation over
these arguments, and we assign higher probability to the more favorable argument. Third,
if there are some arguments with the same risk and are equally favorable, then we check the
third criterion PRA, which examines the preference relation. This process follows the argu-
ment selection mechanism and it depends on the strategic and tactic reasoning presented in
Chapter 3.
The notion of argument’s probability is subjective and different heuristic approaches
to evaluate it can be proposed. In this thesis, we use a heuristic similar to the one used
to evaluate the risk of failure. Probabilities are based on the fact that the knowledge base
Γ contains certain knowledge and the set of agent’s beliefs and preferences Pi, j contains
uncertain beliefs. Therefore, the probability of an argument that belongs to Γ to be accepted
by the addressee is higher than the probability of another argument that belongs to the set
Pi, j. Consequently, the risk of failure of an argument belonging to Γ is less than another
argument belongs to Pi, j. In fact, in negotiation dialogues, the probability of a move at a
given step t depends on the knowledge the agent has at that step (i.e., the content of the
agent’s knowledge base at that step), the favorite relation, and the preference relation. Now
let us proceed to define the “Move’s Probability Function”.
4.4.1 Move’s Probability Function
Definition 4.2 (Move’s probability function). Let Γ be the set of common agents’ knowl-
edge base, Pi, j be the set of agent i’s beliefs about agent j’s beliefs, fr the set of favorable
arguments, pr the set of preferred arguments, and M the set of all possible moves. We
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define ∆ as a function associating a set of knowledge and preferences and favorites to a
set of possible moves and their probabilities. We call this function the Move’s Probability
Function.
∆ : 2kn×2 fr ×2pr → 2M×[0,1] (4.4)
Where:
kn = Γ×Pi, j,
fr = {(Argk,Argl) ∈A ×A | Argl if av Argk}, and
pr = {(Argk,Argl) ∈A ×A | Argl ipre f−ar Argk}.
We assume that Γ contains of a set of propositions P1,P2, · · ·Pn, i.e., Γ = {P1,P2, · · · ,Pn}.
fr: is the set of favorable arguments and we represent them as pairs (Arg1,Arg2) which
means Arg1 is more favorable than Arg2. So, fr = {(Arg1,Arg2),(Arg2,Arg4), · · ·}.
pr: is the set of preferred arguments and we represent them also as pairs (Arg1,Arg2) which
means Arg1 is more preferable than Arg2. So, pr = {(Arg1,Arg2),(Arg2,Arg4), · · ·}.
Thus the product of 2kn×2 fr ×2pr = {(M1,P(M1)),(M2,P(M2)), · · ·}, and the func-
tion ∆ should satisfy the following properties:
• Minimality: ∀I, I′ ∈ 2kn×2 fr ×2pr if I ⊆ I′ and no relevant argument can be gener-
ated from I′− I, then ∆(I) = ∆(I′).
• Uniqueness: ∀I ∈ 2kn×2 fr×2pr and ∀k, l s.t. {(Mk,P(Mk)),(Ml,P(Ml))} ⊆ ∆(I), if
k 6= l, then Mk 6=Ml .





4.4.2 Probability Ordering Relation
The probability ordering procedure is as follows. First, we examine the first criterion,
which is the risk of failure of each possible move based on the supporting arguments for
the sake of ordering them ascending based on their risk. Second, if there is more than one
move with the same risk of failure, then we examine the second criterion for the equivalent
arguments in terms of their risk, which is the favorite relation, and reorder them descending
based on this relation. Third, if there is more than one argument equally favorable, then we
examine the third criterion, which is the preference relation over arguments, and reorder
them descending based on their preferences.
The negotiating agents have to perform this procedure at each dialogue step in order
to be able to assign probabilities to the moves based on the order of arguments supporting
them. After that, the uncertainty can be measured using the general formula of Shannon
entropy based on their probabilities. So probability order relation can be defined formally
as follows.
Definition 4.3 (Probability ordering relation). Let NCi, j =
〈
S ,T ,T,τ,Pi, j,Γ
〉
be a negoti-
ation context, and Argk and Argl be two relevant arguments in this context. The probability
of argument Argk is greater than the probability of argument Argl denoted by P(Argl) ≤
P(Argk) iff (Argl)risk (Argk).
Algorithm 1 explains how to order and assign probabilities to a set potential argu-
ments PA at each dialogue step. The notation Argk =risk Argl means the two arguments
Argk and Argl are risk equal, i.e., Argk risk Argl and Argl risk Argk.
The process of selecting arguments is always associated with a degree of uncertainty.
Despite the fact that agents are rational and always select the most relevant argument at
each dialogue step, there still exists a doubt that the selected argument is the right one, and
it will be accepted by the addressee. The selection of one of the possible choices is based
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Algorithm 1 How to assign probabilities to the set of potential arguments PA
1: Let n be the number of possible arguments at dialogue step t.
2: Examine the first criterion and order the set of PA ascending based on their risk.
3: if ∃k, l ≤ n, k 6= l such that Argk =risk Argl then
4: Check the second criterion, and reorder these arguments descending based on their
favorite relation.
5: else
6: if ∃k, l ≤ n, k 6= l such that Argk =risk Argl and (Argk if av Argl) and (Argl if av
Argk) then




10: Assign a value between [0,1] to each possible argument, such that:
• The sum of all probabilities satisfies the probability condition ∑nx=1P(mxt ) = 1.
• Assign the same probability to all arguments having the same order.
• Assign 1/n+ ε1 to P(m1t ), (1−P(m1t ))/(n− 1)+ ε2 to P(m2t ), and so on, where
εi ≥ 0.
on the speaker’s knowledge base, and characterized by an amount of uncertainty over this
base, as well as the amount of randomness over the addressee’s knowledge, beliefs, and
preferences. In what follows, we discuss in details how to measure the agents’ uncertainty
about their moves.
4.4.3 Agents’ Uncertainty about their Moves
To measure the uncertainty degree of an agent about its moves, we calculate Shannon en-
tropy of that move using the “Move’s entropy function”, the modified version of the general
formula of Shannon entropy, which can be defined as follows.
Definition 4.4 (Move’s entropy). Let D = [M0,M1, . . . ,Mn] be a negotiation dialogue, and
suppose that at each dialogue step t a set St = {m1t ,m2t , . . . ,mxt } of moves are possible,
and each move is associated with a given probability P(mkt ), such that ∑mkt ∈St P(m
k
t ) = 1.








The value of H(Mt) varies from zero to Log(|St |), where zero means that there is no
uncertainty (i.e., there is only one choice), while Log(|St |) means that the uncertainty is at
its maximum value (i.e., all moves have the same probability). Note that, here we consider
only possible moves (i.e., moves whose associated probability is within [0,1]). Further, we
normalize H(Mt) to have a metric that ranges from [0,1]. This can be obtained by dividing




0 iff |St |= 1
H(Mt)/Log(|St |) otherwise
(4.6)
Proposition 4.1. The uncertainty (or entropy) of a move Mt at a certain step t during the
dialogue is equal to zero (i.e., µ i(Mt) = 0) iff at that step the agent has only one choice.
Proof. µ i(Mt) = 0⇔ Log(|St |) = 0
⇔ |St |= 1. 
So, there is only one move in St available to the agent at step t. Intuitively, at the be-
ginning steps of any dialogue, the uncertainty is expected to be high as all possible moves
have close probabilities, then the uncertainty decreases gradually because agents are ratio-
nal and they learn from each other when advancing in the dialogue.
Proposition 4.2. The uncertainty (or entropy) of a move Mt at a certain step t during the
dialogue is equal to one (i.e., µ i(Mt) = 1) iff at that step, all the moves in St have the same
probability.
Proof. Let us first prove the direct implication⇒.
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We assume that all the moves at a certain step t have the same probability, and prove that
the uncertainty is equal to one. Without loss of generality, we assume that |St |= Xt . So we
have:










Let us now prove the inverse implication⇐.
We assume that the uncertainty is equal to one, and prove that all moves have the same
probability. So we have:

















⇒ Log(1/Xt) = P(m1t )LogP(m1t )+P(m2t )LogP(m2t )+ . . .+P(mXtt )LogP(mXtt )



















⇒ 1/Xt = expLogP(m1t )P(m
1
t ) ∗expLogP(m2t )P(m
2
t ) ∗ . . .∗ expLogP(mXtt )P(m
Xt
t )
⇒ 1/Xt = P(m1t )P(m
1
t ) ∗P(m2t )P(m
2
t ) ∗ . . .∗P(mXtt )P(m
Xt
t )




Because 1 is the maximum uncertainty, the solution of this equation can be obtained
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P(mkt ) = 1
0< P(mkt )≤ 1 ∀ 1≤ k ≤ Xt
Using the nonlinear programming techniques, we can easily find the solution of this
problem, which is: ∀ 1≤ k ≤ X P(mkt ) = 1/Xt . 
To the contrary of agents’ uncertainty, it is interesting sometimes to see how certain
an agent is about its moves. This can be simply done by subtracting the normalized value
of agent’s uncertainly from one as it will be given in the following definition.
Definition 4.5 (Move’s certainty degree). Let D = [M0,M1, . . . ,Mn] be a negotiation dia-
logue, and suppose that at each dialogue step t a set St of moves m
k
t are possible, and each
one of them is associated with a given probability P(mkt ) such that ∑mkt ∈St P(m
k
t ) = 1. If





1 iff |St |= 1
1−H(Mt)/Log(|St |) otherwise
(4.7)
Using the certainty degree, we can determine at each dialogue step how much an
agent is certain about its move. The following lemmas are straightforward from Proposi-
tions 4.1 and 4.2.
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Lemma 4.1. The certainty degree of a move Mt at a given step t in the dialogue is at its
maximum value “1” iff the agent has only one choice at that step.
Lemma 4.2. The certainty degree of a move Mt at a given step t in the dialogue is at
its minimum value “0” iff the agent has more than one move at the same step with equal
probabilities.
By considering the uncertainty and certainty degrees of the dialogue moves, agents
should resolve at each dialogue step one of the following equivalent optimization problems.








Theorem 4.1. There is an algorithm for solving these optimization problems in a polyno-
mial time.
Proof. Because these problems are equivalent, we consider only one of them, for example
the maximization one. Without loss of generality, we assume that agent i should solve this
problem. The algorithm is as follows:
1) Agent i should calculate the probability of each possible move mkt (1≤ k ≤ x) using the




2) Take the move with the highest probability. Because Γi and CS
j
t are bounded at each
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step t, this calculation is clearly polynomial and searching the maximum probability is
polynomial, so we are done. 
This theorem is compatible with the intuition that by adding new information inCS
j
t ,
the number of possible choices decreases. However, this is only true when we consider just
the next move. When we consider the whole dialogue, the complexity is much higher.
Example 4.1. Let D be a negotiation dialogue between two negotiating agents i and j such
that D = [M0,M1,M2], and the number of possible moves at each dialogue step is |St | = 3.
In the following, we explain how to measure the certainty degree of the move M0. Using
Equation 4.7, we obtain:
CDi(M0) = 1−H(M0)/Log(|S0|)














From Table 4.2, we have:
CDi(M0) = 1+[((0.33∗−1.599)+(0.33∗−1.599)+(0.34∗−1.556))/Log(3)]
CDi(M0) = 1−1= 0
Table 4.2 shows the possible choices of the moves that facing agent i at step t = 0 to
play its first move M0 in the first column, and their associated probabilities in the second
column. From the above calculations, we notice that the certainty degree of the agent i
about selecting the right move at this step is at its minimum value “0” because agent i had
different choices of moves with equal probabilities of acceptance by its opponent agent j.
This means that agent i was uncertain 100% about which move to play.
The above calculations and Table 4.2 are just for the first move M0, and to obtain the
certainty degree of the other two movesM1 and M2, we use the same procedure as forM0.
At step t = 1, agent j to play its move M1 as a reply to agent i has three different
choices of moves with different values of probabilities (0.05,0.12,0.83), such that the sum
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Table 4.2: The uncertainty/certainty degree of the moveM0 in Example 4.1.







m10 0.33 -1.599 -0.528
m20 0.33 -1.599 -0.528
m30 0.34 -1.556 -0.529
H(M0)=1.58 µ
i(M0) = 1 CI
i(M0) = 0
is equal to one. From the calculation, it can be noticed that agent j was uncertain about
0.50%, (i.e.,µ j(M1) = 0.50%) that the selected move is the right one, which has the higher
probability (0.83), that is, a higher chance to be accepted by agent i.
At step t = 2, when agent iwanted to reply with its moveM2, it has also three different
choices of moves with different values of probabilities (0.9999,1E − 8,1E − 8). One of
these choices has a very high chance to be accepted (probability close to one), where as,
the other two have a very low chance of acceptance (their probabilities are close to zero).
So, the agent i was almost certain 100% about its choice, and the uncertainty degree is at
its minimum value “0”.
4.4.4 Agents’ Uncertainty about their Dialogues
In Section 4.4.3, we discussed how we could assess agents’ uncertainty about their moves
at each dialogue step. In this section, we discuss how to assess this uncertainty for the
whole dialogue. This can be done in three different methods. i) Method I: is by taking the
average of the uncertainty degree of all moves in the dialogue, ii) Method II: is by finding
the number of all possible dialogues and the probability of each one, and then applying
Shannon entropy in the same way as for the moves, and iii) Method III: is measuring the
uncertainty degree of some moves (sample) randomly, take the average and assume it is
equal to the uncertainty of the dialogue, and then apply a hypothesis testing approach to
find out whether this assumption is true. In what follows, we discuss these three methods.
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Method I: Taking the Average of Uncertainty Degrees of All Dialogue Moves
The basic idea is to measure howmuch each agent is uncertain about its moves at each
dialogue step. Then we calculate how much the two agents are uncertain about the whole
dialogue by taking the average of the uncertainty degree of all the moves in the dialogue.
Definition 4.6 (Dialogue’s uncertainty). Given an ABAN dialogue D = [M0,M1, . . . ,Mn].
Let |D|= n+1 be the length of this dialogue, i and j be the two negotiating agents, where
i utters the even moves and j utters the odd ones, and µ i(Mt) be the uncertainty degree of




Example 4.2. Assume that we have three negotiation dialogues D1, D2, and D3, each dia-
logue consists of 10 moves, i.e Dx = [M0,M1, . . . ,M9], (1≤ x≤ 3). The uncertainty degree
of each move for the three dialogues is given in Table 4.3. Below, we calculate the uncer-
tainty degree of D1, and in the same way we can calculate it for D2 and D3.
Using Equation 4.7, we have:
µ(D1) = ∑Mt∈D1 µ
i(Mt)/(|D1|)
From Table 4.5, we obtain:
µ(D1) = [0.01+0.20+0.15+0.05+0.22+0.02+0.11+0.21+0.10+0.05]/10
µ(D1) = 0.112
In the same way we obtain the uncertainty degree of the other two dialogues
µ(D2) = 0.503, and
µ(D3) = 0.936
It can be noticed that for the dialogue D1, the uncertainty degree is very low, and that
is because the uncertainty degrees of all dialogue moves are low, where they range between
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Table 4.3: The uncertainty degree of the dialogues of Example 4.2
Dialogue Moves µ i(Mt) of D1 µ
i(Mt) of D2 µ
i(Mt) of D3
M0 0.01 0.01 0.99
M1 0.20 0.99 0.98
M2 0.15 0.15 0.95
M3 0.05 0.95 0.99
M4 0.22 0.22 0.90
M5 0.02 0.80 0.90
M6 0.11 0.11 0.80
M7 0.21 0.75 0.95
M8 0.10 0.05 0.90
M9 0.05 1 1
µ(D1)=0.112 µ(D2)=0.503 µ(D3)=0.936
[0.01, 0.22]. This means that the participants were certain about their dialogue moves,
and if they achieve their goal (agreement), it could be the best agreement (the notion of
agreement and the evaluation of this agreement will be introduced in the next chapter).
In D2, the negotiating agents were moderately uncertain about their dialogue. It is
clear that agent i was always certain about its moves during the dialogue because its uncer-
tainty is very low, while agent j was highly uncertain about its moves in the same dialogue.
Not surprisingly, taking the average of the uncertainty degrees of all moves shows that it is
medium which reflects the uncertainty degree of both agents.
In the third dialogue D3, both agents were highly uncertain about their moves at each
step, which results in a very high uncertainty degree for the whole dialogue.
Method II: Using the Probability of All Possible Dialogues
In this method, we measure the uncertainty degree of the dialogue by calculating the
number of all possible dialogues that can be generated from all choices of moves, which
can be obtained by taking the Cartesian product of all possible moves at each dialogue
step. Therefore, by knowing the probability of each possible move, we can calculate the
probability of each possible dialogue, and then we apply the general formula of entropy.
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Definition 4.7 (Number of possible dialogues). Let D = [M0,M1, . . . ,Mn] be an ABAN
dialogue, and i and j be the two negotiating agents. Suppose that at each dialogue step t,
to utter the moveMt , an agent has a set St of alternative moves St = {m1t ,m2t , . . . ,mxtt }, each
of which is associated with a probability value P(mkt ). The number of all possible moves is
equal to ∑
n
t=1 xt . The union of all the sets of moves is Ω = S1∪S2∪ . . .∪Sn, such that there
is no intersection between these sets: S1∩S2∩ . . .∩Sn = /0. So, the number of all possible
dialogues can be obtained by: ND = |S0×S1× . . .×Sn|.
As explained in Equation 4.2, each move Mt in a possible dialogue Dl is equal to a
possible move mkt for a given k. Thus, P(Mt) = P(m
k
t ). Having known this probability, we
can calculate the probability of a dialogue Dl as follows.
P(Dl) = P(M0)×P(M1)× . . .×P(Mn) (4.11)
Because ∀t∑xtk=1P(mkt ) = 1, the sum of the probabilities of all possible dialogues is equal
to one (i.e., ∑
ND
l=1P(Dl) = 1). Now we can define the uncertainty degree of the dialogue as
follows.







Then, we normalize the obtained result by dividing it by Log(ND) to have the uncertainty
degree as a quantitative value between [0,1].
µ(D) = H(D)/Log(ND) (4.13)
Example 4.3. Let us consider the negotiation dialogue in example 4.1, where n = xt = 3,
1≤ t ≤ 3. The number of all possible dialogues ND = 27 dialogues, and the probability of
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each possible dialogue is computed by the product of probability of its moves. For example






2) with their respective
probabilities (0.33,0.05,1). So, the probability of D1 is equal to 0.02, and in the same way,
we compute the probability of all possible dialogues. By applying Equation 4.12, we get
the entropy of the dialogue, which is H(D) = 2.39, and by applying Equation 5.13, we
get the uncertainty degree of the dialogue µ(D) = 0.503. Here it can be noticed that the
uncertainty degree of the dialogue is medium, and if we compare the result in this method
with the result in the previous one, which uses the average of uncertainty degrees of all
moves, and apply it on the same example (Example 4.1), we notice that the result is almost
the same. Which confirms the consistency of the two methods.
Method III: Using Hypothesis Testing
• Hypothesis Testing Terminology:
A hypothesis testing is a procedure for determining if an assertion about a charac-
teristic of a population is reasonable [91]. The characteristic of our interest here is the
uncertainty degree which we want to estimate from the performance of the participants to
the dialogue. Suppose someone is monitoring a negotiation dialogue between two agents
and he claimed that the average of uncertainty degree of the dialogue is (µ = 0.50). How
would you decide whether this assertion is true? One of the direct results could be obtained
by calculating the uncertainty degree of each move as we did in Section 4.4, and then cal-
culate the uncertainty degree of the whole dialogue and compare it with this estimation.
This approach might be definitive, however, it could end up with costing more than the
information is worth (waste of time).
A simpler approach is to find the uncertainty degree of sample of moves, take the
average and compare it with estimated uncertainty degree of the dialogue. Of course, the
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average of the uncertainty degree will probably not be exactly (0.50%) due to the variability
in the choices at each dialogue step. Suppose that the obtained average of uncertainty
degree of the dialogue was (0.60%). Does this (0.10%) difference result from a chance of
variability, or from an incorrect original assertion? A hypothesis test can provide us with
the answer.
• Hypothesis Testing Steps
1. Calculate the uncertainty degree µ of some moves (randomly).
2. Take the average of the uncertainty degree (which represents the µ of the dia-
logue).
3. Assume that the uncertainty for the whole dialogue is (µ0).
4. Give the two sided hypothesis:
– Null hypothesis H0 : µ(D) = µ0,
– Alternative H1 : µ(D) 6= µ0.
5. Use the significance level (α = 0.05).







x¯ is the average of the uncertainty degree of the selected moves, µ0 is the as-
sumed uncertainty degree for the dialogue, n is the number of the selected
moves, and S is the sample standard deviation of these moves, which can be






7. Reject the null hypothesis H0 if the test statistic |t0| > tα/2,n−1, where tα/2,n−1
is the upper α/2 percentage of the t-distribution with (n−1) degree of freedom
(DF).
Example 4.4. Suppose that we have a negotiation dialogue D between two agents, s and b.
Assume that the length of the dialogue is n= 20 moves, so D= [M1,M2, .....,M20]. Assume
that the uncertainty degrees of agent i, i ∈ {s,b} about randomly selected moves are as
follows: µ i(M1) = 0.4, µ
i(M3) = 0.7, µ
i(M6) = 0.3, and µ
i(M9) = 0.5.
Can we claim that the actual uncertainty degree of the dialogue is 0.50? To answer
this question, let us go through the hypothesis testing steps:
• The uncertainty degrees of the randomly selected moves are given.
• The average of the uncertainty degree of these moves: x¯= 0.475.
• Assume that the actual uncertainty degree of the dialogue is: µ0 = 0.50.
• Give the two sided hypothesis:
– Null hypothesis H0 : µ(D) = 0.50,
– Alternative H1 : µ(D) 6= 0.50.
From Equation (4.15), the sample standard deviation S= 0.17, where n= 4, and from
Equation 4.14, we can find the test statistic t0 as follows:
t0 = (0.475−0.50)/(0.17/2) =(-0.025 / 0.085)=−0.294'−0.3.
Using the student’s t-distribution, tα/2,n−1 = t0.025,3 = 3.182
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∵ |t0|< tα/2,n−1. Hence we cannot reject the null hypothesis H0, and the uncertainty
degree of dialogue can be 0.50. We reject the null hypothesis only if |t0|> tα/2,n−1
4.4.5 Arguments Evaluation and Classification
In this section, we discuss how an agent can evaluate the arguments supporting its own
offers, specifically in terms of its uncertainty degree about their selection, and consequently
about their acceptance by the addressee. We classify the set of potential arguments into
three main classes based on their uncertainty degree. In fact, the uncertainty degree of the
arguments is obtained based on the evaluation criteria that have been proposed in Chapter
3.
Having the three criteria assessed based on their definitions for all the available argu-
ments, and the uncertainty degree of each possible argument is measured, we then classify
the set of potential arguments into three main classes; Class A: Highly Certain Arguments,
Class B: Moderately Certain Arguments, and Class C: Uncertain Arguments. The highest
class of argument is, the lowest risk of failure its arguments are. The three classes are dis-
joint, i.e., A∩B= A∩C= B∩C= /0, and each of which is divided into three subclasses, see
Figure 4.3. Indeed, measuring uncertainty is mainly based on the probability distribution
of the available arguments, which is in turn based on the above mentioned criteria.
In what follows we describe and formally represent the three main classes of argu-
ments and their subclasses.
• Class A - Highly Certain Arguments: this class represents arguments and con-
sequently moves supported by those arguments having very low risk of failure. Ar-
guments of this class are equally risky, and the risk of failure of each argument in this
class is less than the risk of failure of any other argument not part of this class. Let
=risk be the risk equality relation and risk be the strict risk relation, then we define
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Figure 4.3: Arguments classification
the class A formally as follows:
Argk ∈ A iff :


Argk =risk Argl ∀Argl ∈ A
Argl risk Argk ∀Argl /∈ A
(4.16)
This class is composed of three disjoint subclasses: Aa, Ab, and Ac, i.e., Aa ∩Ab =
Aa ∩Ac = Ab ∩Ac = /0, and to define these three subclasses, we need to define the
following relations:
– let =if av be the favorite equality relation defined as follows:
for two arguments Argk and Argl , Argk =
i
f av Argl iff:
Argk if av Argl and Argl if av Argk; and
– let =ipre f−ar be the preference equality relation defined from ipre f−ar in the
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same way.
So we formally define the three subclasses of the class A as follows.






f av Argl ∀Argl ∈ Aa
Argl ≺if av Argk ∀Argl ∈ A−Aa
Argk =
i
pre f−ar Argl ∀Argl ∈ Aa
Argl ≺ipre f−ar Argk ∀Argl ∈ A−Aa s.t. Argk =if av Argl
(4.17)
This means, arguments in Aa are equality favorable and preferable, more favorable
than any other argument which is not part of Aa, and more preferable than any other
favorably equally argument.
In the sam way, the second class Ab is defined as follows:






f av Argl ∀Argl ∈ Ab
Argl ≺if av Argk ∀Argl ∈ (A−Aa)−Ab
Argk =
i
pre f−ar Argl ∀Argl ∈ Ab
Argl ≺ipre f−ar Argk ∀Argk ∈ (A−Aa)−Ab s.t. Argk =if av Argl
(4.18)
Finally, the third class Ac is defined as follows:
Ac = (A−Aa)−Ab = A− (Aa∪Ab) (4.19)
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• Class B - Moderately Certain Arguments: this class represents arguments hav-
ing medium risk of failure. Arguments of this class have equal risk, which is less than
the risk of any other argument not part of the union of that class and Class A. For-
mally:
Argk ∈ B iff :


Argk =risk Argl ∀Argl ∈ B
Argl risk Argk ∀Argl /∈ A∪B
(4.20)
As for Class A, this class is composed of three disjoint subclasses: Ba, Bb, and Bc.
We define Ba formally as follows:






f av Argl ∀Argl ∈ Ba
Argl ≺if av Argk ∀Argl ∈ B−Ba
Argk =
i
pre f−ar Argl ∀Argl ∈ Ba
Argl ≺ipre f−ar Argk ∀Argl ∈ B−Ba s.t. Argk =if av Argl
(4.21)
In a similar way, the second class Bb is defined as follows:






f av Argl ∀Argl ∈ Bb
Argl ≺if av Argk ∀Argl ∈ (B−Ba)−Bb
Argk =
i
pre f−ar Argl ∀Argl ∈ Bb
Argl ≺ipre f−ar Argk ∀Argl ∈ (B−Ba)−Bb s.t. Argk =if av Argl
(4.22)
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Finally, the third class Bc is defined as follows:
Bc = (B−Ba)−Bb = B− (Ba∪Bb) (4.23)
• Class C - Uncertain Arguments: this class represents arguments having a high
risk of failure, and it is simply defined from the two other classes. knowing that A i
is the set of agent i arguments, then the third classC is defined as follows:
C = A i− (A∪B) (4.24)
The subclassesCa,Cb, andCc are defined in the same way as the subclasses of A and
B.
Generalization of Arguments Classification
The above arguments classification categorizes the set of potential arguments accord-
ing to their uncertainty degree into three main classes, each of which consists of three
subclasses. This classification seems to be a little strict, in the sense that it groups the argu-
ments in just three main groups. However, this classification can be generalized to include
n classes, each class is stratified into m disjoint subclasses as follows.
We classify the set of potential arguments into n classes C1,C2, ....,Cn, where C1 is
the highest class of arguments and it has the lowest risk of failure. Arguments of each class
Cx have equal risk, which is less than the risk of any other argument in any classCx′ , where
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x< x′. Formally:
Argk ∈Cx iff :


Argk =risk Argl ∀Argl ∈Cx









From this equation, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 4.2. The n classes C1, . . . ,Cn, are disjoint, i.e., C1∩C2 · · ·∩Cn = /0.
Each class Cx is stratified into m disjoint subclasses: C
1
x , . . . ,C
m
x . Let =
i
f av be the
favorite equality relation defined as follows: for two arguments Argk and Argl , Argk =
i
f av
Argl iff Argk if av Argl and Argl if av Argk. The preference equality relation =ipre f−ar is
defined from ipre f−ar in the same way. Each subclassCax is defined as follows:






f av Argl ∀Argl ∈Cax










pre f−ar Argl ∀Argl ∈Cx
Argl ≺ipre f−ar Argk ∀Argl ∈
m⋃
l=a+1
Clx s.t. Argk =
i
f av Argl
Argl ipre f−ar Argk ∀Argl ∈
a−1⋃
l=1




This means, arguments in Cax are equally favorable and preferable, more favorable
than any other argument which is in another class Ca
x′ such that x
′ > x, and more preferable
than any other equally favorable arguments inCa
x′ .
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From this equation, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 4.3. For each classCx, the m subclassesC
1
x , . . . ,C
m
x , are disjoint, i.e., C
1
x ∩C2x · · ·∩
Cmx = /0.
The following theorem is straightforward from the above equations.
Theorem 4.4. let x and x′ be two integers such that x< x′. Arguments in the class Cx have
higher probability to be accepted than arguments in the class Cx′ .
4.4.6 Agents’ Uncertainty: Analysis and Discussion
In this section, we focus on the analysis of agents’ uncertainty based on the available num-
ber of arguments and their relevant classes at each dialogue step in order to be able to
determine the uncertainty type of each move. For instance, if there is only one possible
choice (argument), then the probability of playing this argument will be “1”, and conse-
quently, the uncertainty will be “0”. So in this case, do we consider this uncertainty as the
agent’s uncertainty about selecting the right move (argument) Type I, or as its uncertainty
about the selected move (argument) to be accepted by the opponent Type II?. To answer
these questions, we discuss the different possible scenarios of the number of arguments that
an agent could have at each dialogue step, analyze them, and provide good justifications.
Indeed, this analysis of uncertainty is very important and we believe that considering these
cases in the agents’ design phase can help the negotiating parties to better decide about the
selection of their moves in order to achieve their goals.
In the previous sections, we explained in details how probabilities can be assigned
and presented a novel classification for the set of potential arguments based on three main
criteria (presented in Chapter 3) involving the addressee’s preferences, and showed that
probability assignment is based on the fact that the knowledge base Γ contains certain
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knowledge, whereas the set of agents’ beliefs about each other preferences Pi, j contains
uncertain beliefs. Therefore, the probability of an argument that belongs to Γ to be ac-
cepted by the addressee is higher than the probability of another argument that belongs to
the set Pi, j. Consequently, the probability of an argument belongs to Γ to be rejected is less
than another argument belongs to Pi, j. In what follows, we discuss agents’ uncertainty is-
sues in two different cases based on the number of the available arguments and their relative
classes at each dialogue step (the discussion will be based on the general classification for
the set of potential arguments).
Case 1: If there is only one possible argument per class
If the agent has just one possible argument at any dialogue step, then the probability
of playing this argument will be at its maximum value (i.e., equal to one to satisfy the
probability condition). In fact, since there is no other choice at that step, the agent will
be very certain to play this move. That is, the uncertainty Type I will be at its minimum
value (i.e., equal to zero). For an argument, being a unique to form the class C1 does not
guarantee that the opponent will accept it because this depends merely on the risk failure of
that argument.
On the other hand, if there are n classesC1 toCn, but only one possible argument per
class, then the argument should be in C1 and it has the highest probability to be accepted,
which means uncertainty Type II is represented. However, the agent is uncertain about its
move and it is possible that the argument in C1 is not the most preferred one. Uncertainty
Type I is then represented.
Proposition 4.3. In ABAN dialogue games, at any dialogue step if there is only one possible
argument Arg1, then Arg1 ∈C1, and the proponent faces only uncertainty Type II. If more
than one class exist with only one argument, then the proponent faces both Types I and Type
II.
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Case 2: If there is more than one possible argument in one or more classes
On the one hand, if the agent has more than one possible argument to play at any
dialogue step, and all possible arguments have the same class, then this class is C1 and all
the arguments will have the same risk of failure, but they will not necessarily be equally
likely selected. This depends on the number of subclasses. Arguments belonging to the
highest subclass are more likely, and equally, to be selected. This equality will confuse the
agent and make the uncertainty Type I at its maximum value, i.e., equal to one. The agent is
also uncertain about the acceptance of these arguments depending on the risk of failure. For
instance, if the possible arguments have very low risk of failure, the acceptance probability
will be high. In fact, when we look at the class of the argument and its risk of failure,
we can guess how likely this argument will be accepted, because it reflects the knowledge
about the addressee.
On the other hand, if the possible arguments belong to different classes from C1 to
Cn, then those arguments are highly uncertain. The probability assignment will be based on
the class of the argument. The higher argument class is, the more probably to be selected.
Thus, the agent will be uncertain about which argument to play “Type I”, and even after the
argument selection, it will be uncertain that the selected argument will be accepted by its
opponent “Type II”. The two types of uncertainty are then represented.
Proposition 4.4. In ABAN dialogue games, at any dialogue step if all possible arguments
are in the same class, then the uncertainty of the selected argument will be at its maximum
value “1”. The proponent faces the two types of uncertainty Type I and Type II If the
possible arguments are in the same class or in different classes.
Theorem 4.5. In all cases of addressing the uncertainty issues in ABAN dialogue games,
the proponent always faces uncertainty Type II.
Proof: The proof of this theorem is straightforward from the above propositions 4.4.
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Table 4.4 summarizes the aforementioned cases, and shows when each of the two
types of uncertainty is represented.
Table 4.4: Arguments classes vs. Uncertainty type





















Let us consider a buyer/seller scenario between two negotiating agents Seller and Buyer.
We assume that the buyer agent is interested in buying a laptop with certain specifications
(preferences) and a low price from the seller agent. The seller agent on the other hand, has
different laptops to offer with different specifications and prices, and it is trying to convince
the buyer to buy one of them based on its request. Each agent is provided in its knowledge
base with a set of different laptops with different specifications (e.g., price, screen size,
memory, brand name, etc), as well as a preference relation over these specifications. We
let the two agents negotiate by generating offers and counter-offers until they achieve an
agreement or end the negotiation without achieving an agreement.
In order to compare our proposed method against others (which use pure argumenta-
tion system with no uncertainty consideration), we run each scenario twice with the exact
agents’ setting. In the first run, we let the agents negotiate using our proposed technique to
choose the best argument/offer at each dialogue step in attempt to realize their goal. And
in the second run, we let the agents negotiate without uncertainty consideration (i.e., using
pure argumentation with no uncertainty consideration).
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4.5.2 System Overview
In this section, we describe the implementation of a proof of concept prototype2. The
implementation was done using Java language. In this prototype, we have developed agent
superclass, which contains the argumentation system, negotiation strategies along with the
tools needed for agents to reason and engage in negotiation based on its uncertainty, the
risk of failure of each argument, and the agents’ preferences. Our implementation can
be adapted to a wide range of applications; however, in our case we considered only two
agents; buyer and seller (i.e., bilateral negotiation). These two agents are inherited from
agent class and we have added specific negotiation strategies on top of the agent model.
On each run, these agents are initialized with different set of preferences over the available
arguments/offers. We let the agents exchange offers based on the information available in
the knowledge base and the agent’s believes and preferences.
4.5.3 Experimental Results
To discuss our results, we have chosen three different scenarios presented in the following
tables from Table 4.5 to Table 4.10.
Table 4.5: Scenario 1a: Negotiation dialogue using our uncertainty-aware technique







1 Buyer 8 0.92
√ √
0.69 C2,C3 C2 Rejected
2 Seller 1 0.0
√
1.48 C3 C3 Rejected
3 Buyer 3 0.79
√ √
0.13 C1,C3 C1 Rejected
Negotiation ended without achieving an agreement
In Table 4.5 Scenario 1a, even though the agents always select the argument with
the higher class and less Risk Of Failure (ROF), in all cases the selected arguments were
rejected. The interpretation of this is, for instance, the buyer agent in “step 1”, had “8”
2The source code of the implementation and data are available
at: https://github.com/Marooned202/negotiation
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Table 4.6: Scenario 1b: Negotiation dialogue using pure argumentation without the
uncertainty-aware technique







1 Buyer 8 0.92 N/A N/A N/A C1,C2,C3 C3 Rejected
2 Seller 2 0.99 - - - C3 C3 Rejected
3 Buyer 2 0.84 - - - C1,C3 C1 Rejected
4 Seller 2 0.99 - - - C1 C1 Rejected
5 Buyer 2 0.96 - - - C2,C3 C2 Rejected
6 Seller 2 0.99 - - - C1,C2 C1 Rejected
7 Buyer 2 0.18 - - - C1,C3 C1 Rejected
8 Seller 2 1.00 - - - C2 C2 Rejected
9 Buyer 2 0.83 - - - C1,C3 C1 Rejected
Negotiation ended without achieving an agreement
possible choices with different classes (from C2 and C3), and its uncertainty was very high
“0.92”, which represents the two types of uncertainty, uncertainty Type I, about which
moves to play in order to persuade the seller, and uncertainty Type II, about the selected
move to be accepted. The same thing applies to “step 3”. However, in “step 2”, the seller
agent had just one choice with class C3, but its uncertainty was very low to play this move.
It is worth mentioning that this does not mean that this move will be accepted by the buyer,
and this is because of the high risk of failure of this argument. The negotiation was ended
without achieving an agreement because all offers and counter-offers were rejected and
there were no more offers for both agents to play. In scenario 1a, the negotiation was
ended in very short time compared to scenario 1b, since there is no theoretical agreement
that could be achieved and our negotiating agents realized that very early, which confirms
the efficiency of applying our techniques compared to Scenario 1b in 4.6, where the same
negotiation was ended without achieving an agreement in much more time. In this scenario,
agents do not select the most appropriate move at each dialogue step and this results in
consuming more time and at the end they were not able to achieve an agreement.
In the same way, we interpret the other scenarios. In Table 4.7 Scenario 2a, our nego-
tiating agents were able to achieve an agreement in a very short time compared to Scenario
107
2b in Table 4.8, where the agents could not achieve such an agreement. Likewise, the nego-
tiations in Scenarios 3a and 3b which are included in Tables 4.9 and 4.10 respectively were
ended successfully with achieving an agreement on the sellers offer in both scenarios, but
in our case, the negotiating agents reached the agreement in much less time.
Table 4.7: Scenario 2a: Negotiation dialogue using our uncertainty-aware technique







1 Buyer 8 0.97
√ √
0.27 C1,C2,C3 C1 Rejected
2 Seller 1 0.0
√
0.83 C1 C1 Accepted
Negotiation ended with achieving an agreement on the seller’s offer
Table 4.8: Scenario 2b: Negotiation dialogue using pure argumentation without the
uncertainty-aware technique







1 Buyer 8 0.93 N/A N/A N/A C2,C3 C3 Rejected
2 Seller 2 1.00 - - - C3 C3 Rejected
3 Buyer 1 0.0 - - - C3 C3 Rejected
4 Seller 2 0.95 - - - C3 C3 Rejected
Negotiation ended without achieving an agreement
Table 4.9: Scenario 3a: Negotiation dialogue using our uncertainty-aware technique







1 Buyer 10 0.93
√ √
0.08 C1,C2,C3 C1 Accepted
2 Seller 1 0.0
√
0.83 C3 C3
Negotiation ended with achieving an agreement on the seller’s offer
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we presented an efficient method for agents’ uncertainty assessment to help
the negotiating agents make better decisions about their moves selection under the assump-
tion of uncertainty.
In particular, we used Shannon entropy to assess the agents’ uncertainty about their
moves at each dialogue step, and consequently for the whole dialogue. In our negotiation
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Table 4.10: Scenario 3b: Negotiation dialogue using pure argumentation without the
uncertainty-aware technique







1 Buyer 10 0.90 N/A N/A N/A C1,C2,C3 C3 Rejected
2 Seller 2 0.99 - - - C2 C2 Rejected
3 Buyer 2 0.96 - - - C1,C3 C3 Rejected
4 Seller 2 0.98 - - - C1,C2 C2 Rejected
5 Buyer 2 0.52 - - - C1,C3 C3 Rejected
6 Seller 2 0.90 - - - C1,C3 C1 Accepted
7 Buyer 2 0.98 - - - C1,C2 C1
Negotiation ended with achieving an agreement on the seller’s offer
settings, we assume that the negotiating agents have multiple choices of moves with differ-
ent probabilities to advance at each dialogue step. The probability of each move reflects its
degree of uncertainty. The higher probability the move has, the more likely to be accepted
by the addressee. To calculate this uncertainty, we defined a function called “Move’s Proba-
bility Function”. This function assigns a probability value between [0,1] to each move, such
that the summation of all moves’ probabilities at each dialogue step is equal to 1. Then,
the moves are ordered based on their probability using what we call “Probability Ordering
Relation”. Finally, we apply the general formula of Shannon entropy to measure moves’
uncertainty. We also, measured the agents’ uncertainty about their dialogue in three meth-
ods, the first one is by taking the average of uncertainty degrees of all dialogue moves, and
in the second method, we compute the number of all possible dialogues using the Carte-
sian product of all possible moves, then we compute the probability of each dialogue, and
finally we apply entropy to measure the uncertainty. In the third method, instead of going
through the process of calculating the uncertainty of all dialogue moves, we proposed to
use a hypothesis testing approach for agents’ uncertainty about their dialogue, especially,
for those dialogues who last long. Using this approach, we calculate the uncertainty for
a sample of moves, take the average of uncertainty for these moves and assume that the
uncertainty of the dialogue is equal to this average, then we apply the hypothesis testing
to decide about this assertion. Furthermore, based on the obtained moves’ uncertainty, we
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presented a novel classification for the set of potential arguments, which will be used in
the next chapter for designing some concession strategies. Moreover, we analyzed different
situations and raised up some special cases based on the number of available arguments and
their relative classes at each dialogue step. Finally, we implemented the proposed frame-
work by applying it on a real case study (Buyer/Seller) scenario from the business domain.
The obtained results confirm the effectiveness of using our uncertainty-aware approach.
To summarize, this chapter has answered the research questions (RQ3, part of RQ4,
and RQ6) raised in Chapter 1. In the next chapter, we explore some negotiation strate-
gies and introduce new agent profiles taking into account the uncertainty assessment and





In this chapter1, we investigate the influence of agents’ uncertainty on their decisions to
make concessions or accept the opponent’s proposals in argumentation-based negotiation.
In particular, we focus on a specific type of negotiation namely, bargaining. We analyze
the needed negotiation parameters and propose some new metrics related to the negotiation
progress, negotiation outcome, and the performance of the negotiating parties. This in-
cludes: i) the analysis of the negotiation constraints to specify the negotiation space and the
possible agreement space, ii) the assessment of the concession by computing the amount of
the loss of an agent at each dialogue step and at the end of the dialogue, iii) the proposition
of some metrics to evaluate the negotiation outcome and the agents’ performance such as
the difference between the achieved agreement and the best agreement, the goodness de-
gree of an agent in the real dialogue, and farness degree of an agent from the ideal dialogue,
and iv) evaluating of the set of potential offers and classifying them into four groups based
1Part of this chapter’s results are published in the 26th IEEE International Conference on Tools with
Artificial Intelligence (ICTAI) [89], and an extended and modified version of this work is submitted to the
Journal of Group Decision and Negotiation.
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on their acceptability. Thereafter, we use the output of these parameters to design a new
negotiation mechanism for automated bilateral negotiation using arguments. The devel-
oped mechanism allows negotiating parties to reason about their moves selections consid-
ering their uncertainty. More precisely, we propose two main sets of negotiation strategies
namely; Concession and Acceptance strategies, each of which is composed of three subsets.
The concession strategy set is based on the arguments classification proposed in Chapter
4, whereas, the acceptance strategy set is based on a new offers classification (that will be
discussed in this chapter). Further, based on these two set of strategies, we introduce a new
set of agents’ profiles. Each agent profile consists of one concession and one acceptance
strategy. Furthermore, this chapter discusses two important properties namely, complete-
ness and Nash equilibrium, which are related to the negotiation outcome and according
to the different agent profiles. Finally, we empirically validate the proposed negotiation
mechanism by applying it on a concrete case study namely, Buyer/Seller scenario.
For a convenience reading of this chapter, we refer the reader to the list of notations
presented in Table5.1.
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Table 5.1: List of the notations used in Chapter 5
The notation The meaning of the notation
s and b Seller and Buyer agents
Ag The set of all negotiating agents
µ Uncertainty degree
Ψ The set of all possible outcomes
ψ A possible outcome
U The utility function
ipre f−o Preordered preference relation over offers for agent i
O i The set of agent i’s offers
oit The offer made by agent i at step t
PO
i
t The set of potential offers for agent i at step t
PA
i
t The set of potential supporting arguments for agent i at step t
F (oit) A function that specifies the set of supporting arguments for the offer o
i
t
C The negotiation constraint
A SC The constraint agreement space
T P
i The target point of agent i
RP
i The resistance point of agent i
N Sb↔sC The negotiation space for both agents
A Sb↔sC The agreement space for both agents
V (oit) The value of the offer o
i
t made by agent i at step t
lossit The loss of agent i at step t
T lossi The total loss of agent i
CR The concession rate
NC Number of concessions
ψAch The achieved agreement
ψAch∗ The desired outcome
U i(ψAch) The utility of the achieved agrement for agent i
Γi The knowledge base of agent i
ψBest The best outcome
G D
i(ψAch) The goodness degree of agent i based on the achieved agreement
G D
i(ψBest) The goodness degree of agent i based on the best agreement
FD
i The farness degree of agent i
ψAchS The achieved agreement (the offer is made by the Seller)
ψAchB The achieved agreement (the offer is made by the Buyer)
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5.1 Introduction
In the last decade, various approaches have been carried out to model the negotiation pro-
cess, negotiating agents, arguments, and preferences (see e.g., [17, 36, 56, 80, 108, 125]).
While other approaches have focused on the analysis of offers and counter-offers generation
and on the classification of negotiation strategy based on the agents’ willingness of mak-
ing concession against different types of opponents [24, 68, 124]. Moreover, other studies
have concentrated on the analysis and optimization of the decision making strategies, and
on the supporting systems for the negotiating parties [34, 93, 100]. However, most of these
proposals lack the analysis of the dialogue outcome quality under the assumption of uncer-
tainty, especially, when different agent profiles and negotiation strategies are considered. In
fact, deciding about which move to advance among the alternatives considering the differ-
ent classes of the supporting arguments based on their uncertainty, and the acceptance of
other’s proposals based on the adopted acceptance strategies in argumentation-based nego-
tiation has not been investigated yet. Indeed, providing the negotiating agents with such a
mechanism that helps them better decide about the selection of their moves in the presence
of uncertainty is a key issue in automated negotiations.
In our approach, to improve the quality and efficiency of the negotiation process,
negotiating parties are allowed to provide a feedback with more sophisticated and useful
information (arguments) about their proposals in a form of a critique or a counter-offer.
From such feedback, the proponent should be in a position to generate a new offer that is
more likely to be accepted by the opponent and will possibly lead to a mutually accept-
able agreement. In addition, the negotiating agents are assumed to be rational and consider
their uncertainty about the played moves at each dialogue step. To do so, negotiating par-
ties are provided with a negotiation mechanism that allows them to adopt some concession
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strategies based on the supporting argument classes (i.e., the uncertainty degree of the sup-
porting arguments). Further, each participant is allowed to evaluate its opponent’s proposals
besides evaluating its own offers using what we call acceptance strategies. We also assume
that agents exchange information in the form of offers/arguments, each offer consists of
a value assignment to the negotiation constraint. Therefore, offers are not values of con-
straints, but values that satisfy the negotiation constraints. In other words, constraints are
used to model the conflict of interest between agents and to specify the agreement space for
each agent. Constraints are also used to analyze the agent’s satisfaction so that each agent
avoids the risk to concede everything to its opponent. In our work, we view the negotiation
as a process of cooperative and competitive decision making between two agents in which
arguments and negotiation constraints are essential in generating offers and counter-offers.
Based on the fact that the negotiating parties have limited information about the preferences
and constraints of each other, they can make their decisions based on the adopted negotia-
tion strategies, which can be specified based on the available information about their indi-
vidual preferences, constraints, and the uncertainty degree about the supporting arguments.
Hence, the ultimate goal of each participant is to achieve the agreement that maximizes its
profit or utility (resp. minimizes its loss) using arguments while respecting its constraints.
By doing so, each negotiating agent is trying to optimize its performance in the negotiation
in order to get closer to the best outcome.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we present the most
relevant literature. Section 5.3 outlines some assumption and gives the settings of our ne-
gotiation framework. In Section 5.4, we present evaluation methods for the negotiation
outcome and the performance of the negotiating parties. Offers evaluation and classifica-
tion technique is presented in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 introduces a new set of negotiation
strategies, and a new taxonomy of agent profiles is presented in Section 5.7. In Section 5.8,
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we discuss some outcome properties. A discussion of the implementation and the experi-
mental results are presented in Section 5.9. Finally, a brief summary of the chapter is given
in Section 5.10.
5.2 Related Work
Argumentation-based negotiation has been an active area of research for more than a decade.
It has attracted the attention of researchers in the area of Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) in
general, and automated negotiations in particular. Different perspectives related to argu-
mentation have been already investigated such as modeling the negotiating agents (see e.g.,
[35, 88, 106, 121]), designing the negotiation strategies (see e.g., [10, 23, 24, 37, 53, 57,
113]), analyzing the agreements about certain actions (see e.g., [123]), Studying the logical
approaches to argumentation (see e.g., [76]), and proposing different protocols and tech-
niques showing how these agents can communicate with each other in their environments
(see e.g., [8, 44, 56, 70, 108]). The focus of this chapter is on the negotiating agents per-
formance and the adopted negotiation strategies that influence the process of selecting the
right moves at each dialogue step under the assumption of uncertainty. Despite the huge
number of publications on modeling software agents and negotiation strategies, there still
exists room for improvements. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the existing
works has addressed the problem of agents’ uncertainty during the process of selecting the
right moves and making decisions about their selections.
In [111], Ros and Sierra argued that agents can make concessions by using different
tactics and/or a trade-off algorithm. However, this approach does not allow the negotiat-
ing agents to reason about their beliefs to justify their offers and to influence the behavior
of their opponents. In our approach, negotiating agents use the negotiation constraints to
ensure their satisfaction and to avoid the risk to concede everything to the opponent. In
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addition, by using their argumentation system, negotiating agents are able to make conces-
sions when it is necessary, thus increasing their chances to achieve their best goals.
Kakas and Moraitis in [70] proposed an argumentation-based negotiation protocol
in which negotiating agents can link their offers to the different arguments they can build
according to their individual negotiation strategy, and make their decisions through an argu-
mentative self-deliberation of the agents with their own theory. This describes the dynamic
aspect of this work, where negotiating agents can change their strategies during the course
of negotiation based on their environment changes. However, in this case, agents cannot
expect the behavior of each other, especially in the absence of enough information (i.e., in
uncertain settings). In addition, which strategy to adopt based on the opponent strategy is
not considered. In contrast, our framework guarantees that each agent can adopt its profile
(i.e., its strategy) based on its opponent’s strategy during the course of the dialogue which
may lead to the best outcome.
Based on the acceptability semantics proposed by Dung [42], Amgoud and her col-
leagues [8] proposed a general framework for argumentation-based negotiation in which
they formally linked the set of offers and their supporting arguments. In particular, they
classified the set of arguments into three sets namely, accepted, rejected and undecided ar-
guments. Moreover, they classified the set of offers into four sets: acceptable, rejected,
negotiable and non-supported offers. Although this classification seems to be important
and helps somehow negotiating agents make their decisions, neither agents’ uncertainty
about the supporting arguments nor the appropriate negotiation strategy that agents can ap-
ply in order to achieve a better outcome are considered in this work. Rahwan et al. [108]
proposed another argumentation-based negotiation approach to maximize the positive in-
teraction among the goals of negotiating agents. This work considers only the context of
cooperative negotiation, while in our work, we focus on the connection between offers and
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the supporting arguments in the context of a non-cooperative negotiation. In addition, we
discuss different agent profiles and negotiation strategies that agents can employ with regard
to their concession and acceptance decisions.
Lopes and Coelho in [77] introduced a model for bilateral negotiation that incorpo-
rates a set of concession strategies and negotiation tactics. The authors have defined the
concession strategies as computationally tractable functions that define the tactics to be
used during the negotiation, whereas tactics are defined as functions to designate the move
to be made at each dialogue step. Even though the authors have considered some con-
cession levels, they did not consider the effect of neither the acceptance strategies nor the
agent’s profile that can be adopted in each dialogue session. At the same time, Hadidi et
al. in [56] introduced an argumentative version of the well known alternating offers pro-
tocol in which they linked offers to specific type of arguments called practical arguments,
and defined the order relation between offers based on the number of acceptable arguments
supporting each offer. This means, each negotiating agent favors offers that are supported
by more acceptable arguments. This work has examined only a specific type of agents
namely, argumentative agents. Furthermore, unlike our approach, this work does not allow
negotiating agents to reason about their beliefs to select the most relevant argument (i.e.,
the most likely to be accepted by the addressee) among the arguments supporting an offer.
Moreover, it does not take into account agents’ uncertainty to specify when and how agents
can make concessions.
In the context of concession strategies, Baarslag et al. in [24] proposed a quantitative
concession-based classification method for negotiation strategies in which they measure the
willingness of an agent to concede against different types of opponents. In this work, the
authors reached to some extent their goal in addressing the concession strategies. However,
the work does not consider the uncertainty issue related to the moves selection when making
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concessions, and also neglected the other types of strategies that can be considered besides
the concession strategies such as acceptance strategies. The first attempt to handle the
concession and acceptance strategies together was by Mbarki et al. in [88]. The authors
proposed a framework for argumentative agent types in which they defined two concession
strategies and two acceptance strategies, and combined these strategies to come up with four
agent types. Though this framework seems interesting, it dose not investigate all possible
ways to make concession and accept others proposals. Moreover, the uncertainty issue has
not been addressed in that work. To overcome these limitations, later on Mbarki et al. in
[89] extended that work by having more concession and more acceptance strategies, and
combined them to have twelve agent types. This work is the closest one to ours in terms of
handling the concession and acceptance strategies together. However, our work is different
in the way we propose these strategies. More precisely, they designed their strategies based
on the arguments classification proposed by Amgoud and her colleague [8], which does
not consider agents uncertainty. Whereas, we designed our concession strategies based on
our arguments classification [83] in which we consider the agents incomplete information
about the selection of their moves. Moreover, the acceptance strategies we propose are
based on a new evaluation and classification for the set of offers. Also, what distinguishes
our work from others is the validation of the proposed approach through the empirical
results that we provide at the end of this chapter. Studying some properties related to the
agents’ performance and the negotiation outcome is also a novel contribution advancing the
state-of-the-art of argumentation-based negotiation.
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5.3 Negotiation Settings
As discussed in Chapter 2, we will adopt the well-known Rubinstein’s alternating-offers
protocol for bilateral negotiation [114]. However, instead of allowing the negotiating par-
ties to exchange offers only, we allow them to exchange offers and arguments to support
their offers. For the rest of this chapter, we assume that the two negotiating agents (Seller
s and Buyer b ) are exchanging their offers and/or arguments in turns. The two parties
negotiate over some issue(s), each of which has an associated range of alternatives or val-
ues. Moreover, we consider in our settings another important factor namely, the agents’
uncertainty degree µ about their proposals. A negotiation outcome consists of a mapping
of every issue to a value. We denote to the set of all possible outcomes by Ψ, and we call
it the negotiation outcome domain. Also, both parties have certain preferences over offers
and arguments prescribed by a preordered preference relation, which can be modeled by a
utility functionU that maps a possible outcome (ψ ∈Ψ) to a real number in the range [0,1].
Assumptions: in our negotiation settings, we have the following set of assumptions.
• Agents are rational and always select the offers that maximize their profit and conse-
quently minimize their loss.
• Agents always consider their uncertainty about their moves (offer/argument) selec-
tion to play the one with less degree of uncertainty.
• Agent i’s offers are ordered based on a preference relation as follows:
(oin ipre f−o oin−1 · · · ipre f−o oi1), where oi1 is the most preferred offer.
• Each agent starts by offering its most preferred offer (i.e., oi1) from the set of potential
offers, which has a higher probability to be accepted by the addressee.
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• At each dialogue step t, an offer can be chosen from the set of potential offers at that
step PO it = {oi1, ....,oin}.
• Each potential offer oit , (1≤ t ≤ n) is supported by an argument or a set of arguments
from the set of potential arguments at that step A it ⊆PA it , which can be captured
by the function F i(oit) = A
i
t . Formally:
∀oit ∈PO it ,∃ A it ⊆PA it : F i(oit) = A it .
One of the negotiating parties (let’s say agent i) starts the negotiation by sending its
best offer oi1 along with the supporting arguments, in its turn, the opponent (agent j) has
two possibilities: (1) accept the offer if no counter-offer can be generated; or (2) reject
the offer by presenting a counter-argument(s) justifying the rejection and so attacking the
argument(s) supporting the offer oi1. In the case of acceptance, the negotiation succeeds
and ends by achieving an agreement, whereas, in the case of rejection, the proponent uses
its argumentation system to compute the new set of its potential offers and arguments, and
check the possibility for proposing a new offer. In the following subsection, we briefly
discuss the elements that constitute our negotiating agent.
5.3.1 Agent Architecture
Recall that the basic elements of the classical agent (non-ABN) as presented in Chapter 2
are as follows.
1. Locution interpretation: parses incoming messages;
2. Proposal database: stores proposals for future use;
3. Proposal evaluation and generation: ultimately makes a decision about whether to
accept, reject, generate a counter proposal or terminate the dialogue; and
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4. Locution generation: sends the response to the relevant party or parties.
Also from Chapter 2, recall that an ABN agent must be equipped with the following.
1. A mechanism for evaluating incoming arguments and updating the mental state ac-
cordingly;
2. A mechanism for generating arguments; and
3. A mechanism for selecting the best outgoing argument from the set of potential argu-
ments.
Therefore, an ABAN agent simply consists of all the above mentioned components
in addition to the following two new elements.
1. Opponent’s strategy discovery: discovers the opponent’s strategy to play in the next
round accordingly; and
2. Argument’s uncertainty evaluation and strategy update: evaluates (computes) the un-
certainty degree of all the generated arguments and suggests the one with less un-
certainty degree and updates the agent’s strategy (changes it if needed) based on its
opponent strategy.
Figure 5.1 shows the conceptual elements of an ABAN agent, where the additional
elements that distinguish ABAN from the classical non-ABN and ABN are potted in double
dotted lines.
5.3.2 Negotiation Constraints
Constraints are amongst the different negotiation criteria that need to be satisfied in order
to reach an agreement between the negotiating parties. This implies that negotiation can be
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Figure 5.1: Conceptual elements of an ABAN agent.
modeled as a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) [75], which can be defined as a set of
variables with the associated domains and a set of constraints acting on the variables with
the aim of finding an instantiation of the constrained variables such that all constraints are
satisfied at the same time. As such, negotiation constraints may range over a quantitative
constraint (e.g., the price or delivery date) or qualitative constraint (e.g., quality of service).
In this thesis, we follow the approach proposed in [48], and define the negotiation constraint
as a quantitative variable ranging over a real domain. Such a domain designates all the con-
straint values that are acceptable by an agent. In the context of negotiation, the constraints
are distributed between the negotiating agents and the information is exchanged in the form
of offers/arguments, that is, the preferred instantiation of the variables corresponding to the
negotiation issues. Moreover, the offers already exchanged between the negotiating agents
influence the negotiation process, and consequently their future decisions. For instance, a
rational agent would not propose an offer with less value than the offer already received
from its opponent. So, the ultimate goal of each negotiating agent is to maximize its profit
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(or utility) by maximizing the value of the negotiation constraint (for the Seller) and respec-
tively minimizing this value (for the Buyer). For instance, the price of product is a typical
example of budget constraint in a bargaining session where the Buyer is looking for the
lowest price, whereas the Seller is trying to get the highest possible one.
The value of the negotiation constraint C for an agent i, ranges between ‘minimal’
and ‘maximal’. This range represents the agent’s aspiration or what we call “Constraint
Agreement Space” for an agent. The two boundaries of the constraint agreement space are
determined by the agent before starting the negotiation. One of them represents what the
agent considers as its best offer, we call it the “Target Point”, whereas the other one repre-
sents the limit that the agent cannot overtake, we call it the “Resistance Point”. Moreover,
the range of agent’s constraint (or the individual area of interest) prescribes the preferred
solutions for that agent, whereas the common set of constraints (or the common area of
interest of both agents) prescribes the possible joint solutions for both agents. In this con-
text, the final objective of the negotiation is to find any solution from the common area of
interest that maximizes the utility of both parties.
The formal representation of the negotiation constraints and the different areas of
negotiation (bargaining zones) will be as follows.
• The negotiation constraint for an agent C ∈ [Cmin,Cmax].
• The Constraint Agreement Space (or agent’s aspiration range) is denoted by A SC .
• The Target Point of an agent i is denoted by T P i.
• The Resistance Point of an agent i is denoted by RP i.
• The union of the constraint agreement spaces of the two agents represents the Nego-
tiation Space, denoted by N Sb↔sC (Equation 5.1).
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constraint associated with the price of the product (budget constraint). Let us assume that
A SbC = [50,80] and A S
s
C = [60,100]. Thus:
N Sb↔sC = [50,80]∪ [60,100] = [50,100]
A Sb↔sC = [50,80]∩ [60,100] = [60,80]
The negotiation process consists of a sequence of moves (offers and counter-offers)
in turns between the negotiating agents b and s. Since the common area of interest is not
known to both agents a priori, this process continues and agents move towards a possible
agreement (if such an agreement exists) by making concessions until an offer is accepted
by both agents (i.e., an agreement is achieved), or one of the parties terminates the negoti-
ation before achieving an agreement (i.e., the negotiation has failed). Thus, the concession
mechanism used by our negotiating agents is outlined in the following subsection.
5.3.3 Concession Mechanism
Negotiation is a process in which the negotiating parties are seeking for jointly acceptable
agreement. In order to successfully achieve such an agreement, both parties should be flex-
ible to change their positions and move towards a possible solution within the common area
of interest by making concessions. This flexibility often keeps the negotiation ongoing—the
more flexible negotiator seems to be, the more its opponent will believe that an agreement is
possible. During the concession process, agents move from one offer to another, that is less
preferred for it, within the available options. This means, the ranges of available options for
each agent shrink until an agreement is reached. Moving from one option to another (i.e.,
making concession) should be done in a certain way that ensures the constraints consistency
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and satisfaction.
An agreement can occur when the two parties enter the agreement space A Sb↔sC ,
that is, the individual areas of interest of each party become the common area of interest
of both parties (see Figure 5.2). At this stage, the two parties can accept any solution or
may choose to continue the negotiation in order to find better solution/agreement from the
available range.
In typical negotiation settings, each agent starts the negotiation by offering its most
preferred offer from the set of potential offers and tries to achieve this value or closest value
to it. If the offer is accepted by the addressee, then the negotiation succeeds and ends with
the agreement of both parties on this offer. If, on the other hand, the addressee did not
accept the offer, then it makes a counter-offer in order to move the negotiation closer to
a possible agreement. When the achieved agreement goes far from the initial proposal by
making concessions, the agent’s loss increases and consequently the agent’s gain or utility
decreases. The decision about whether to make a concession or not is then based on the
negotiation constraints and the adopted concession strategy which will be mainly based on
the agent’s uncertainty.
To define the concession formally, let D be an ABAN between the two negotiating
agents b and s, and let O i = {oi1,oi2, ....,oin} be the set of agent i’s offers, where i ∈ {b,s},
and V (oit) be the value of the offer o
i
t made by agent i at step t, where (1 < t < n). Let
us assume that at certain dialogue step t = m, (m 6= 1) the proposed offer is oim, which is
in fact, less preferred than oi1. We define the ‘CONCESSION’ as the difference between the
value of these two offers as follows.
Definition 5.1 (Concession). In a given ABAN dialogue D, let b and s be the two nego-
tiating agents, and let O i = {oi1,oi2, ....,oin} be the set of agent i’s offers, where i ∈ {b,s}.
Assume that oim ∈ O i is the agent i’s offer at dialogue step t = m, we say that agent i has
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conceded iff ∃ oim−1 ∈ O i made by agent i at step t = m−1, such that:
• (oim ipre f−o oim−1)
• V (oim−1)> V (oim) if (i= s)
• V (oim−1)< V (oim) if (i= b)
Concession Computation
The amount of concession can be computed either at each negotiation step, which
represents the amount of loss incurred up to that step, or at the end of the dialogue, which
reflects the total loss incurred by all concessions an agent has made during the dialogue. To
compute the agent’s loss between any two consecutive dialogue steps, we simply subtract
the value of the new offer from the value of its previous one and take the absolute value to
avoid having negative value. Thus, the agent’s loss (concession) at a certain dialogue step
is defined as follows.
Definition 5.2 (Agent’s loss at certain dialogue step). Let D be an ABAN dialogue between
two agents b and s. The loss of an agent i, i ∈ {b,s} at certain dialogue step t is obtained by





V (T P i)−V (oit) i f i= s
V (oit)−V (T P i) i f i= b
(5.3)
Similarly, we compute the total loss of an agent by subtracting the value of the last
proposal from the value of first proposal (i.e., target point). Therefore, the agent’s total loss
at the end of dialogue is defined as follows.
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Definition 5.3 (Agent’s total loss). Let D be an ABAN dialogue between two agents b and
s. The total loss of an agent i, i ∈ {b,s} at the end of the dialogue (i.e., at tn) is obtained





V (T P i)−V (oitn) i f i= s
V (oitn)−V (T P i) i f i= b
(5.4)
We can also obtain the total loss of each agent by taking the sum of all its concessions




T losss = ∑nt=0 loss
s
t , j = i+2
T lossb = ∑nt=1 loss
b
t , j = i+2
(5.5)
During the negotiation process, each agent may concede more than once depending
on its constraints, its uncertainty degree about each move, and based on the adopted con-
cession strategy. The amount of the concession (loss) each time might be different. So
the “Concession Rate” (CR) that quantifies the amount of concession an agent has made
towards its opponent during the negotiation process can be obtained by dividing the amount
of the total loss (concession) by the number of concession times.
Definition 5.4 (Concession rate). Let T lossi be the total loss of an agent i, and NC be
the number of concessions made during a dialogue D. Then the concession rate CR for an
agent i is defined as follows.
CR= T lossi/NC (5.6)
The final objective of the two negotiating agents is to reach an acceptable agreement
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on certain issues, which satisfies the negotiation constraint of both agents in the best possi-
ble way. Therefore, an agreement about an offer is reached between the two agents b and s
iff:
1. The value of the negotiation constraint, which is represented by the offer, belongs to
the new agreement space of both agents A Sb↔s
C
;
2. The addressee does not have any potential argument supporting a better offer; and
3. The addressee does not have any potential argument attacking the argument support-
ing this offer.
If such an agreement is not reached, and no more offers can be made, then the ne-
gotiation breaks down. In the next section, we discuss the dialogue outcome/agreement
from different perspectives and evaluate the participating agents performance during the
dialogue.
5.4 Agreement and Agent’s Performance Evaluation
The aim of this section is to seek the answers of some questions such as:
• What is the outcome/agreement of the dialogue?
• What is a good outcome/agreement from the point of view of a participating agent,
and from the point of view of an external agent? and
• How good an agent is in the real dialogue and how far it is from the ideal dialogue?
To answer such questions, we analyze the dialogue outcomes/agreements and show
that there are two types of dialogue outcomes depending on who is the evaluator and what
kind of information is available for the evaluation process. For instance, if the evaluator
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is one of the participants to the dialogue, then a good solution is the one that maximizes
its utility considering just its knowledge base and ignoring the other party’s utility. If on
the other hand, the evaluator is an external agent who knows everything about the two
parties, then the best outcome is the one that maximizes the profit of both agents without
harming any one of them considering the knowledge bases of both parties. Let us start by
defining the notion of outcome or agreement first, then we proceed to answer the rest of the
questions.
5.4.1 Agreement Evaluation
Definition 5.5 (Dialogue agreement). A dialogue agreement is a possible solution ψ from
the negotiation outcome domain Ψ (ψ ∈Ψ) that satisfies to some extent the preferences of
both agents participating in ABAN dialogues.
If such a solution exists and negotiating agents could not reach it, then we say that the
negotiation has failed. Let us assume that the rational agents achieved their goal and reached
a possible agreement in a given ABAN dialogue. So, we define the achieved agreement
formally as follows.
Definition 5.6 (The achieved agreement). Let D = [M0, ...,Mn] be an ABAN dialogue be-
tween two agents b and s under the constraint C . The achieved agreement ψAch at certain
dialogue step t is the value of the accepted offer by both parties at that dialogue step, V (oit),
which is the last proposal of one of the agents conveyed by the last moveMn, and accepted
by the other agent. The achieved agreement should be part of the agreement space of both
agents A S b↔sC .
ψAch = V (oit) (5.7)
where i ∈ {b,s} and V (oit) ∈A Sb↔sC
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Because agents are rational and self interested, they try to maximize their utility and
minimize their losses. The utility function of a possible dialogue outcome ψAch at step t for




V (oit) − V (RP i)
V (T P i) − V (RP i) i f i= s
V (RP i) − V (oit)
V (RP i) − V (T P i) i f i= b
(5.8)
The utility function maps a value between zero and one to each possible solution. It
reaches its maximum value, i.e., equal to one if the first offer (i.e., the target point) of the
agent accepted by its opponent, and equal to zero when the agent reaches its resistant point.
So the final objective of an agent i is then to resolve one of the following optimization







Where ψAch∗ is the desired outcome.
In real negotiations, it is not always the case that the desired outcome is the best
outcome due to the lack of information. The best outcome usually can be seen by an external
agent who knows the knowledge bases of both parties.
Figure 5.3 shows a simple ABAN session between two agents (Buyer and Seller) ne-
gotiate over a product price. The negotiation succeeded and ended by achieving an agree-
ment. The figure also shows the different positions that the achieved agreement ψAch could
take compared to the best agreement ψBest . As it can be seen, the achieved agreement could
be greater than, less than, or equal to the best agreement.
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Figure 5.3: An example illustrates ABAN session between two agents (Buyer and Seller)
ended with achieving agreement that could be greater, equal, or less than the best agreement
5.4.2 Agent Performance Evaluation
Now that we have distinguished the two types of dialogue outcomes, it is worth to in-
vestigate how good an agent is (i.e., “Goodness Degree”) in the real negotiation, i.e., the
dialogue that effectively took place between the negotiating agents, and how far is it from
the ideal dialogue, i.e., the best dialogue that can be produced by the participants if they
know the knowledge bases of each other, we call this metric “Farness Degree”. In other
words, for the achieved agreement ψAch, which one of the negotiating agents is doing better
and gaining more in the real dialogue compared to its opponent, and considering the best
agreement; how far an agent is from this ideal solution which makes both agents better-off.
In what follows, we give the formal definitions of the “Goodness Degree” and “Farness
Degree” for the participating agents in an ABAN negotiation.
Definition 5.7 (Goodness degree). Let D be a real ABAN dialogue, i and j be the two
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negotiating agents, where i, j ∈ {b,s}, ψAch is the achieved agreement, and T lossi be the
agent i’s total loss in the dialogue. We define the goodness degree of an agent i based on
the achieved agreement in the real dialogue as follows:
G D
i(ψAch) = 1− [T lossi/ |V (T P i)−V (T P j)|] (5.11)
From the above definition, we can easily prove the following proposition:
Proposition 5.1. Let i and j be two negotiating agents and G D i(ψAch) and G D j(ψAch) be
their goodness degree respectively. Assuming that they achieved an agreement, then:
G D
i(ψAch)+G D j(ψAch) = 1 (5.12)
Proof. G D i(ψAch) + G D j(ψAch) = 1
⇒ (1− [T lossi/ |V (T P i)−V (T P j)|]) + (1− [T loss j/ |V (T P i)−V (T P j)|]) =
1
⇒ 1 - (T lossi/ |V (T P i)−V (T P j)|) + 1 - (T loss j/ |V (T P i)−V (T P j)|) - 1=0
⇒ 1 = (T lossi/ |V (T P i)−V (T P j)|) + (T loss j/ |V (T P i)−V (T P j)|)
⇒ 1 = T lossi+T loss j/ V (T P i)−V (T P j)|
⇒ 1 = (V (T P i)−V (oit) + V (o jt )−V (T P j)/ V (T P i)−V (T P j)|)
Because V (oit) = V (o
j
t ) which is equal to the value of the achieved agreement ψ
Ach at that
step, hence:
⇒ 1 = (V (T P i)−ψAch+ψAch−V (T P j))/ V (T P i)−V (T P j)|
⇒ 1 = (V (T P i)−V (T P j)/ V (T P i)−V (T P j)|). 
As it can be seen from the above definition, the goodness degree of an agent in the
real dialogue is calculated based on the achieved agreement ψAch. However, to find how far
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an agent is from the right dialogue (i.e., best agreement from an external evaluator’s point
of view), we need to consider the best agreement ψBest instead of the achieved agreement.
Therefore, in our calculation we need to recompute the total loss of an agent based on the
best agreement, and then recompute the goodness degree (Equation 5.11) of the agent based
on the best agreement.
Indeed, achieving the best agreement means that the participants are doing the right
dialogue, i.e., the best dialogue that can be produced by the participants if they know the
knowledge bases of each other. In order to find the distance from the right dialogue, we
calculate the goodness degree of an agent based on the achieved agreement and recompute
it again for the best agreement. Then we simply subtract the goodness degree based on the
best agreement from that which was obtained based on the achieved agreement.
The total loss of an agent i in the dialogue based on the best agreement is given by:
T lossi(ψBest) = |V (T P i)−ψBest | (5.13)
And the goodness degree of an agent i in the dialogue based on the best agreement is
given by:
G D
i(ψBest) = 1− [T lossi(ψBest)/|V (T P i)−V (T P j)|] (5.14)
We call the distance between the best agreement and the achieved agreement Farness
Degree of the agent, which represents the distance from the real dialogue to the right one.
In other words, it shows how far an agent i is from the best agreement or the right dialogue,
which can be defined as follows.
Definition 5.8 (Farness degree). Let D be an ABAN dialogue, and i and j be the two
negotiating agents. Let G D i(ψAch), where i, j ∈ {b,s}, be the goodness degree of an agent
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i based on the achieved agreement and G D i(ψBest) be the the goodness degree of the agent
based on the best agreement. We define the farness degreeFD i of an agent i in the dialogue
as follows:
FD
i = G D i(ψAch)−G D i(ψBest) (5.15)
The farness degree of an agent i, FD i, could be positive, negative or null.
• (+) : positive means that the agent is far from the right dialogue towards the positive
side of its performance and it is doing better in the real dialogue.
• (-) : negative means that the agent is far from the right dialogue in the negative side
of its performance, and it is doing worst in the real dialogue.
• (0) : zero means that the two agents are doing the right dialogue.
Now, if we compare the goodness degree of an agent based on the achieved agreement
in the real dialogue with the goodness degree of the same agent (without loss of generality
let us consider the Buyer agent) based on the best agreement that could be achieved, we can
readily come up with the following properties.
Property 5.1. : If (ψAch < ψBest), then the goodness degree of the Buyer agent b in the
real dialogue is better than that of the Seller agent s. That is, in the real dialogue b is doing
better than s. Formally: G Db(ψAch) > G D s(ψAch)
Property 5.2. : If (ψAch = ψBest), then the two agents are performing the right dialogue
from the evaluator’s standpoint. Formally: G Db(ψAch) = G D s(ψAch)
Property 5.3. : If (ψAch > ψBest), then the goodness degree of the Seller agent s in the real
dialogue is better than that of the Buyer agent b. That is, in the real dialogue s is doing
better than b. Formally: G D s(ψAch) > G Db(ψAch)
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One of the most challenging tasks during the negotiation process is the evaluation of
proposals (i.e., offers, counter-offers, arguments, counter-arguments, etc.) considered by
both parties. In what follows, we present an efficient method for evaluating and classifying
these proposals.
5.5 Offers Evaluation and Classification
In negotiation settings, it is very important for each party to be able to assess its opponent’s
offers in order to evaluate their acceptability. It is also required that each agent is able
to order the available offers within its area of interest to identify and propose the most
appropriate offer. To do so, negotiating agents should be provided with a mechanism that
allows them to adopt the suitable negotiation strategies (e.g., acceptance strategy) for each
negotiation dialogue. In this context, we present a new mechanism for offers evaluation and
classification. The proposed mechanism categorizes the set of potential offers into three
groups namely, acceptable offers, reasonable offers, and negotiable/non-negotiable offers.
Besides, we present an algorithm for each group by which we illustrate how an agent can
assess its opponent’s offers and its own offers and relate them to one of these groups.
5.5.1 Acceptable Offer
Definition 5.9 (Acceptable offer). Let D be an ABAN dialogue between two negotiating
agents s and b. Suppose that agent i sent the offer oit at step t to the agent j, where i, j ∈
{b,s}, and let V (oit) be the value of that offer.
• The offer oit of the agent i is acceptable for the agent j if and only if:
V (oit) ∈A S jC , where i, j ∈ {b,s}
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It should be noted here that one agent is evaluating the other agent’s offer, that is,
the offer oit , which was sent by agent i, will be evaluated by its opponent j, and it will
be accepted only if it belongs to its agreement space. However, theoretically, a possible
agreement can be achieved only if the offer belongs to the common area of interest of both
agents (i.e., the agreement space A Sb↔s
C
).
The following algorithm (Algorithm 2) explains how an agent evaluates the accept-
ability of its opponent’s offers. In the algorithm, we assume that the two negotiating agents
s and b are exchanging their offers in turns in such a way that the Seller agent utters the
even moves and the Buyer agent utters the odd moves.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for Evaluating Acceptable Offers
1: Let D = {M0,M1, . . . ,Mn} be an ABAN, where n is the number of dialogue moves.
2: Let Os be the set of agent s’s offers, and
3: Let Ob be the set of agent b’s offers.
4: for <i = 0 to n> do
5: if i = even then
6: The Seller agent s sends its proposal.
7: The Buyer agent b evaluates Seller’s proposal as follows.
8: if V (ost ) ∈A SbC then
9: The offer ost is acceptable so, ( Buyer← Accept)
10: else
11: The offer ost is not acceptable so, (Buyer← Reject).
12: end if
13: else
14: The Buyer agent b sends its response
15: The Seller agent evaluates buyer’s proposal as follows.
16: if V (obt ) ∈A SsC then
17: The offer obt is acceptable so, ( Seller← Accept)
18: else






Asmentioned earlier, each agent has the ability to evaluate offers received from its opponent
and decide about its acceptability based on the adopted acceptance strategy (the acceptance
strategies will be discussed in Section 5.6). One of these strategies allows the agent to
accept any offers within its agreement space that has a value close to its last proposal, i.e., a
slightly greater than its last proposal for the Buyer and a slightly less than its last proposal
for the Seller. According to a specific acceptance strategy, we call this offer a reasonable
offer, and we define it as follows.
Definition 5.10 (Reasonable offer). Let D be an ABAN dialogue between two negotiating
agents b and s, Ob be the set of b’s offers, Os be the set of s’s offers, and let t be the current
dialogue step (t−1 is the previous step and t+1 is the future step). Then:
• The Buyer’s offer obt at dialogue step t is reasonable for the Seller s if and only if:
V (ost+1)≤ V (obt )≤ V (ost−1)
Recall that an agent will present its most preferred offer at first, then starts to make
concessions until it reaches its resistant point. As such, according to the prordered
preference relation over offers, the offer ost+1, which is the next offer by the Seller, is
less preferred than the offer ost−1, which is the last proposal the Seller has made. Con-
sequently, any offer between these two offers is supposed to be reasonably accepted.
• The Seller’s offer ost at dialogue step t is reasonable for the Buyer b if and only if:
V (obt−1)≤ V (ost )≤ V (obt+1)
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Similarly, the Buyer agent should accept reasonably any offer falls between its previ-
ous offer obt−1 and its next one o
b
t+1.
Algorithm 3 explains the process performed by each agent to evaluate its opponent’s
offers in terms of its reasonability.
Algorithm 3 Algorithm for Evaluating Reasonable Offers
1: Let D= {M0,M1, ....,Mn} be an ABAN, where n is the number of dialogue moves.
2: Let Os be the set of agent s’s offers, s.t. at the current dialogue step t, ost ∈ Os
3: Let Ob be the set of agent b’s offers, s.t. at the current dialogue step t, obt ∈ Ob
4: for i = 0 to n do
5: if i = even then
6: The Seller agent s sends its proposal.
7: The Buyer agent b evaluates Seller’s agent s proposal as follows.
8: if V (obt−1)≤ V (ost )≤ V (obt+1) then
9: The offer ost is reasonable offer so, (Buyer← Accept).
10: else
11: The offer (ost ) is not reasonable offer so, (Buyer← Respond).
12: end if
13: else
14: The Buyer agent b sends its response.
15: The Seller agent s evaluates Buyer’s agent b proposal as follows.
16: if V (ost+1)≤ V (obt )≤ V (ost−1) then
17: The offer obt is reasonable so, (Buyer← Accept).
18: else




Property 5.4. : From Definition 5.9 and Definition 5.10, any reasonable offer is acceptable
offer. However, the reverse is not true.
5.5.3 Negotiable/Non-negotiable Offer
In contrast to the acceptable and reasonable offers in which agents evaluate their opponents’
proposals, agents may evaluate their own offers as well, that is, each agent can evaluate its
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own offers at each dialogue step to decide whether to make concession and propose a new
offer or to stick to its current preferred offer. In other words, if the adopted strategy and
negotiation constraint allow an agent to concede and make a new offer, then the current
offer is a negotiable offer. Contrary, if the agent reaches its limit and cannot concede any
more, then the current offer is non-negotiable.
Definition 5.11 (Negotiable/Non-negotiable offer). Let D be an ABAN dialogue between
two negotiating agents s and b. Let oit ∈PO it be the agent i’s offer at step t, where i∈{b,s},
and V (oit) be the value of this offer.
• The offer oit is said to be negotiable iff:


V (oit)> V (RP
i) ifi= s;
V (oit)< V (RP
i) if i= b
• The offer oit is said to be non-negotiable iff:
V (oit) = V (RP
i), where i ∈ {b,s}
This simply indicates that all individual areas of interest for each agent is considered
as negotiable offers except the resistant point, which is considered as non-negotiable offer.
When an agent reaches this point and makes its non-negotiable offer, no more offers can
be made by the same agent as it reaches its limit, however, it can still support its offer by
another argument, if the previous one is attacked. It should be noted that at any dialogue
step, the Seller (resp. Buyer) agent can make a new offer only if its value is less than (resp.
greater than) its previous offer. Algorithm 4 illustrates how an agent can evaluate its own
proposals to decide whether or not to make concession.
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Algorithm 4 Algorithm for Evaluating Negotiable/Non-negotiable Offers
Let D= {M0,M1, ....,Mn} be an ABAN, where n is the number of dialogue moves.
Let O i be the set of agent i’s offers, where i ∈ {s,b}.
for i = 1 to n do
Agent i evaluates its proposal as follows.
if i = s then
if V (ost )> V (RP
s) then
The offer ost is Negotiable so, ( Seller⇐ Concede)
else
if V (ost ) = V (RP
s) then




if V (obt )< V (RP
b) then
The offer obt is Negotiable so, ( Buyer⇐ Concede)
else
if V (obt ) = V (RP
b) then






5.6 Adaptive Negotiation Strategies
Negotiation strategies are essential for the negotiating parties in order to realize their goals.
In this section, we discuss two main sets of negotiation strategies namely, concession and
acceptance. In particular, three concession and three acceptance strategies are proposed.
In each negotiation session, each agent is allowed to adopt one concession strategy and
one acceptance strategy together, which in turn confirm its profile for that negotiation ses-
sion. Applying such mechanisms in automated negotiation would allow to generate bet-
ter negotiation dialogues which, in turn, results in better agreements. The idea is that,
well-performing components of strategies together constitute well-performing negotiating
agents. Besides, allowing each agent to update its strategy (change it if necessary) during
the dialogue after discovering its opponent’s strategy is an important feature that leads to a
better performance and consequently to a better outcome.
5.6.1 Concession Strategies
Concessions are often necessary in negotiation and negotiating agents need to be flexible in
making concessions and moving from one position to another, which constitutes the con-
cession process. In our settings, Concession Strategies (CStr) are mainly based on agents’
constraints and their uncertainty about the played moves, which have a direct effect on the
negotiation outcome and consequently on the agent’s utility. Rational agents are assumed
to consider their uncertainty about their moves at each dialogue step to make concessions
— the more uncertain the agent is about its move, the more it will be willing to concede and
move from one proposal to another. In this context, we introduce the following concession
strategies, which are based on the arguments classification introduced in Chapter 4, Section
4.4.5.
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• Concede Whenever Possible (CWP): this concession strategy allows an agent to
concede whenever possible within its agreement space even if the current offer is
still supported by highly certain arguments (Class A), moderately certain arguments
(Class B), or uncertain arguments (Class C).
• Concede if Not Sure (CNS): this concession strategy is less flexible than CWP strat-
egy. It allows an agent to concede and move to the next preferred offer within its
agreement space only if its most preferred offer is no longer supported by neither
highly certain arguments (Class A) nor moderately certain arguments (Class B), but
still supported by uncertain arguments (Class C).
• Concede Only if Not Supported (CONS): this concession strategy is stricter than
CWP and CNS strategies in the sense that it allows an agent to concede and move
from one position to another within its constraint agreement space only if the current
offer is no longer supported by any argument from the three different classes.
5.6.2 Acceptance Strategies
In addition to the aforementioned concession strategies, which are related to the agent’s own
proposals, agents need to adopt some Acceptance Strategies (ASrt) that determine whether
the proposals presented by the opponent are acceptable. In our approach, acceptance strate-
gies are mainly based on the negotiation constraint and offer status that can be captured
by the offers classification. The idea is to evaluate the opponent’s offers and decide when
to accept based on the offer status. In this regard, the following acceptance strategies are
proposed.
• Easily Accept (EA): this acceptance strategy allows an agent to accept any acceptable
offer (Definition 5.9), that belongs to its constraint agreement space, if there is no
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other reason to reject.
• Reasonably Accept (RA): this acceptance strategy allows an agent to reasonably
accept its opponent’s offer if its value is reasonable compared to its best current offer
(Definition 5.10).
• Hardly Accept (HA): this acceptance strategy allows an agent to accept only offers
that make its utility at least as good as its utility for the current offer which is still
supported by some arguments. In other words, an agent who adopts this strategy
sticks to its current offer rigorously and does not accept other offers quickly, or at all.
In order to allow negotiating agents to adopt one strategy of each set (concession and
acceptance sets), we define a function called Strategy Selection Function (SSF).
Definition 5.12 (Strategy selection function). Let D be an ABAN dialogue, Ag be the set of
negotiating agents,CStr be the set of concession strategies and AStr be the set of acceptance
strategies. The Strategy Selection Function (SSF) is a function that maps to each negotiat-
ing agent one concession strategy and one acceptance strategy, which in turn confirms the
agent’s profile in that dialogue.
SSF : Ag → CStr×AStr (5.16)
In the next subsection, we highlight the different agent profiles resulting from all
possible combination of the two sets of strategies.
5.7 Adaptive Agent Profiles
In this section, we present the different Agent Profiles (AP) resulting from all possible
combinations of the above outlined negotiation strategies. In particular, this combination
145
results in nine agent profiles denoted by AP1 to AP9, see Table 5.2. The idea is to allow
each agent to adopt one concession strategy and one acceptance strategy in each dialogue
session.
Definition 5.13 (Agent profile). An agent profile is a tuple AP = 〈AStr,CStr〉 such that
in each negotiation session each agent adopts one concession strategy and one acceptance
strategy.
Table 5.2: The nine agent profiles and their descriptions
Agent Profile Adopted Strategies Description of Strategies
AP1 CWP/EA Concede Whenever Possible/Easily Accept
AP2 CWP/RA Concede Whenever Possible/Reasonably Accept
AP3 CWP/HA Concede Whenever Possible/Hardly Accept
AP4 CNS/EA Concede if Not Sure/Easily Accept
AP5 CNS/RA Concede if Not Sure/Reasonably Accept
AP6 CNS/HA Concede if Not Sure/Hardly Accept
AP7 CONS/EA Concede Only if Not Supported/Easily Accept
AP8 CONS/RA Concede Only if Not Supported/Reasonably Accept
AP9 CONS/HA Concede Only if Not Supported/Hardly Accept
5.8 Negotiation Outcome Properties
In this section, we analyze two properties related to negotiation outcome namely, complete-
ness and Nash equilibrium. In particular, we show when to say that an ABAN dialogue is
complete, and when the outcome of the dialogue is Nash equilibrium.
5.8.1 Completeness
In our settings, the completeness property means that if the ongoing negotiation has a theo-
retical agreement (i.e., the negotiation agreement space is not empty), then the negotiation
dialogue under given agent profiles should lead to the achievement of that agreement.
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Definition 5.14 (Completeness). An ABAN dialogue between two negotiating agents b and
s is said to be complete if and only if: if A Sb↔s
C
6= /0, then the negotiation ends successfully
by achieving an agreement.
Proposition 5.2. In a given ABAN dialogue, let b and s be the two negotiating agents,
and assume that the agreement space is not empty (A Sb↔s
C
6= /0). If at least one of the
two agents’ profiles is of the types AP4 to AP9, then the negotiation completeness is not
guaranteed.
Proof. Let D be an ABAN dialogue between the two negotiating agents b and s, and let ob1
and os2 be the two first offers made by b and s respectively. In order to guarantee achieving
an agreement, the two negotiating agents should enter the agreement space. However, if
ob1 ,o
s
2 /∈A Sb↔sC , and they are still supported by some arguments from Classes A, B, or both,
then no one can accept, and no one can make concession since both agents are playing CNS
or CONS strategy. Consequently, no agent can enter the A Sb↔s
C
zone, hence the result. 
Theorem 5.1 (Completeness). In a given ABAN dialogue, let b and s be the two negotiating
agents. If the agreement space under the constraint C is not empty (A Sb↔s
C
6= /0), then the
completeness is guaranteed if and only if the two agents’ profiles are of the types AP1, AP2,
or AP3.
Proof. (⇒): From Proposition 5.2 agent profiles AP4 to AP9 are excluded. Now assuming
that a given ABAN is complete (i.e., the completeness is guaranteed) and an agreement is
achieved, we prove that the two agent profiles are of type AP1, AP2, or AP3. Achieving
agreement means that both agents b and s have entered the agreement space A Sb↔s
C
, and
to enter this area both agents have to make the necessary amount of concessions that bring
them inside this zone. It follows that both agents should adopt a flexible concession strategy
that allow them to concede even if their current best offers are still supported with any
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argument from the different classes. Consequently, both agents should adopt concession
whenever possible CWP strategy, that is, the two agents must be of AP1, AP2, or AP3.
Hence the result. 
(⇐): Being not of agent profiles (AP4 to AP9) means that the agent adopts CWP concession
strategy with the different acceptance strategies. Therefore, since both negotiating agents
are playing CWP, then it is certain that they will enter the agreement space A Sb↔s
C
zone,
and whatever their acceptance strategies are, they will reach to a compromise that satisfies
both of them, and consequently, an agreement will be achieved, so we are done. 
5.8.2 Nash Equilibrium
Definition 5.15 (Nash equilibrium). Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies, one for each
agent, such that an outcome ψ of a negotiation dialogue is Nash equilibrium if the change
of strategy by any agent would lead that agent to earn less than if it remained with its current
strategy. That is, no agent can do better by unilaterally changing its strategy.
Theorem 5.2. In a given ABAN dialogue, let b and s be the two negotiating agents. As-
suming that the agreement space is not empty (A Sb↔s
C
), and an agreement is achieved.
Then the negotiation outcome is a Nash equilibrium if and only if both negotiating agents’
profiles are of type AP9.
Proof. If a negotiating agent chooses AP9 as a profile, the opponent has no better choice
than choosing a AP9 profiles, as any other profile with less strict concession strategy or
acceptance strategy will end up with a less preferable outcome, and consequently will lead
that that agent to earn less. 
The different results found in this section are summarized in Table 5.3. The abbrevi-
ations in the table are as follows, where if the property holds then we put (X), otherwise we
put (x).
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• NE: Nash Equilibrium
• CG: Completeness Guaranteed.
Table 5.3: Completeness and Nash equilibrium results for the different combination of
agent profiles
Agent i AP1 AP2 AP3 AP4 AP5 AP6 AP7 AP8 AP9
Agent j NE CG NE CG NE CG NE CG NE CG NE CG NE CG NE CG NE CG
AP1 x X x X x X x x x x x x x x x x x x
AP2 x X x X x X x x x x x x x x x x x x
AP3 x X x X x X x x x x x x x x x x x x
AP4 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
AP5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
AP6 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
AP7 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
AP8 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
AP9 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x X x
5.9 Implementation and Experimental Results
5.9.1 Buyer/Seller Scenario
To validate the proposed negotiation mechanism, we take the Buyer/Seller scenario as a
case study. We assume that two negotiating agents Seller and Buyer are negotiating the
purchases of a used car. We assume that a Buyer agent is interested in buying a car (e.g.,
Toyota) with certain specifications (preferences) and a low price from a Seller agent who
has different choices of Toyota to offer with different specifications and prices, and it is
trying to convince the Buyer to buy one of them based on its request. The ABAN system




The ABAN system has been implemented in Java using a single Intel Xeon X3450 machine
with 6GBs of memory. We implemented Buyer and Seller classes which inherit behaviors
from an Agent interface. The Agent interface contains the shared functionalities between all
agent profiles. The agents can be initiated with parameters from their respective knowledge
bases, also they can adopt different agent profiles. We have implemented two important
functions for the Buyer and Seller objects. The first function is for evaluating the received
offers, where upon receiving an offer an agent will decide whether or not to accept or reject
it based on the adopted acceptance strategy (i.e., its profile). While the second function is
for making concessions. This function helps the agent decide whether to concede or not
based on the adopted concession strategy (i.e., its profile). These two functions use the
internal agent parameters such as agent profiles (APs) and their knowledge bases to make
decisions, and function independently in an object oriented manner. Then, a negotiation
engine class will initiate a Buyer and a Seller and let them trade offers and make their
decisions. The results for each step and also the final agreement criteria are analysed and
reported in formatted log files.
The ABAN environment consists of two autonomous agents representing the Seller
and the Buyer. They negotiate on behalf of users and try to find the best agreement for
them based on the adopted strategies. The negotiation engine allows the users to enter
their negotiation constraints, the set of potential offers, and the supporting arguments for
each offer for both agents. It also provides the main decision making functionality of an
agent during negotiation based on its profile by allowing it to evaluate its own supporting
arguments of each offer before making any concession and evaluate the received offers to
decide about their acceptance as well as the generation of the counter-offers from the set of
potential offers according to the negotiation constraints and agent profiles.
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A number of experiments have been conducted to test the feasibility of the proposed
approach and to demonstrate how the agents can or cannot reach an agreement based on
the adopted agent profiles (or negotiation strategies). Two scenarios are discussed. In the
first scenario, we implemented non-argumentative negotiating agents, i.e., we neglect the
effect of the supporting arguments and consequently the effect of the agents uncertainty on
making their decisions, whereas in the second one, we implemented argumentative agents.
We provided negotiating agents with some supporting arguments for each offer and allowed
them to test the effect of the agents’ uncertainty on their decisions by considering the dif-
ferent classes of the supporting arguments.
Table 5.4 gives the negotiation settings for the two scenarios which include the target
and the resistant point of each agent, the negotiation space and the agreement space for both
agents. We ran the negotiation under these settings several times by changing the agents’
profiles each time and report the achieved agreement and the utility of each agent as well as
the number of steps (i.e., the negotiation length).



























Scenario 1: Non-Argumentative Agent Profiles
In this scenario, we intentionally disabled all supporting arguments ( i.e., there is no
supporting arguments for all offers) to allow negotiating agents always reach an agreement
in all possible combinations of agent profiles (as long as the agreement space is not empty).
By doing so, the effect of agent’s uncertainty on making concessions will be neglected and
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the agents will always be able to concede in all cases. However, the effect of acceptance
strategies will be very important on making decisions and reaching agreement and conse-
quently on the obtained agents’ utility. In what follows, we discuss some examples in which
the two agents adopt the same or different agent profiles.
Table 5.5 shows the negotiation progress in case of the two agents’ profiles are of type
AP1. This profile allows an agent to concede whenever possible and easily accept any offer
within its area of interest. So the negotiation successfully ended by achieving an agreement
in 9 steps on the Seller’s offer (13000), which equals to the resistant point for the Buyer
that makes it worse-off with utility (Ub(13000)=0), while it makes the Seller better-off with
utility (U s(13000)=0.33). The Buyer accepted this offer because its acceptance strategy,
which is EA, allows it to do so.
Table 5.5: Negotiation progress Scenario 1, example 1; (AP1 vs. AP1)
Seller (AP1) Buyer (AP1)














1 15000 x x x Rejected 2 10000 x x x Rejected
3 14500 x x x Rejected 4 10500 x x x Rejected
5 14000 x x x Rejected 6 11000 x x x Rejected
7 13500 x x x Rejected 8 11500 x x x Rejected
9 13000 x x x Accepted
The agreement was achieved in 9 steps on the Seller’s offer, Seller’s Utility=0.33 and Buyer’s Utility=0
Table 5.6 shows another example for the negotiation progress between two different
agents’ profiles, where the Seller’s profile is AP4 and the Buyer’s profile is AP3. In this
example, the agreement was reached in 10 steps on the Buyer’s offer this time and that is
because the Buyer is adopting HA strategy that did not allow it to accept the Seller’s offer at
step 9. Thus the Buyer rejected that offer and proposed a new offer (12000), which equals
the resistant point for the Seller. This offer was accepted by the Seller because of its accep-
tance strategy EA. This agreement makes the Seller worse-off with utility (U s(12000)=0),
whereas it makes the Buyer better-off with utility (Ub(12000)=0.33).
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Table 5.6: Negotiation progress Scenario 1, example 2; (AP4 vs. AP3)
Seller (AP4) Buyer (AP3)














1 15000 x x x Rejected 2 10000 x x x Rejected
3 14500 x x x Rejected 4 10500 x x x Rejected
5 14000 x x x Rejected 6 11000 x x x Rejected
7 13500 x x x Rejected 8 11500 x x x Rejected
9 13000 x x x Rejected 10 12000 x x x Accepted
The agreement was achieved in 10 steps on the Buyer’s offer, Buyer’s Utility=0.33 and Seller’s Utility=0
Another example is shown in Table 5.7 in which the two agents’ profiles are of type
AP9. In this example, the two agents were successfully able to achieve an agreement in
11 steps on the Seller’s offer (12500), which is also the Buyer’s next best offer. Despite
both agents are playing HA strategy, this offer was accepted by both agents because there
is no supporting arguments for better offer for both agents and they were able to make
concessions until they reached this offer that makes both agents better-of and the utility of
each is (Ub(12500)=U s(12500)=0.17).
Table 5.7: Negotiation progress Scenario 1, example 3; (AP9 vs. AP9)
Seller (AP9) Buyer (AP9)














1 15000 x x x Rejected 2 10000 x x x Rejected
3 14500 x x x Rejected 4 10500 x x x Rejected
5 14000 x x x Rejected 6 11000 x x x Rejected
7 13500 x x x Rejected 8 11500 x x x Rejected
9 13000 x x x Rejected 10 12000 x x x Rejected
11 12500 x x x Accepted
The agreement was achieved in 11 steps on the Seller’s offer, Seller’s Utility=0.17 and Buyer’s Utility=0.17
Scenario 1: Summary of Results
The above discussed examples are just samples of the negotiation progress and the
complete results are reported in Table 5.8. The table reports three main results as follows.
• The achieved agreement: where ψAchS means the agreement is on the Seller’s offer,
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whereas ψAchB means the agreement is on the Buyer’s offer.
• The utility of both agent is represented as a pair: U=(Buyer’s Utility, Seller’s Utility).
• The number of steps N.O.S.
• No deal in case the negotiation fails.
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Table 5.8: Scenario 1 - Results summary for all possible combination of agent profiles: Agreement, utility, and number of steps
Seller
Buyer























































































































































































































































Scenario 2: Argumentative Agent Profiles
In this negotiation scenario, we randomly enabled some supporting arguments for
some offers to examine the effect of the argument classes on the agents’ decisions about
whether to concede or not based on their profiles. Similar to what we did in the first sce-
nario, we ran the negotiation several times under the same settings presented in Table 5.4,
and for the sake of the comparison between the two scenarios, we reported the same results
again (i.e., the achieved agreement, the utility of each agent, and the number of steps). Here-
after, we selected some examples for different combination of agent profiles to demonstrate
the negotiation progress when supporting arguments for some offers exist, and to show the
impact of these arguments and their relevant classes on the agents’ decisions.
In Table 5.9, we present a negotiation session between two parties having the same
agent profile AP1. This agent profile allows an agent to concede whenever possible and to
accept easily, so even if there is some supporting arguments, the negotiating agents will still
be able to concede and move to the next preferred offer until they find first compromise. We
noticed here that the Buyer agreed on the Seller’s offer for the first time the Seller entered
the Buyer’s agreement space and the achieved agreement was the same as the one reported
in Table 5.5.
Table 5.9: Negotiation progress Scenario 2, example 1; (AP1 vs. AP1)
Seller (AP1) Buyer (AP1)














1 15000 x x X Rejected 2 10000 x x x Rejected
3 14500 x x X Rejected 4 10500 x x X Rejected
5 14000 x x x Rejected 6 11000 x x X Rejected
7 13500 x x X Rejected 8 11500 x X x Rejected
9 13000 x X x Accepted
The agreement was achieved in 9 steps on the Seller’s offer
However, in Table 5.10 in which the Seller’s profile is AP5 (i.e., CNS/RA), whereas
the Buyer’s profile is AP8 (i.e., CONS/RA), the case is different and the impact of the
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supporting arguments is very clear. In this example, the negotiation was terminated after 10
rounds without achieving an agreement and that is because the Buyer’s concession strategy
allows it to concede if the current offer is not supported. Hence, the Buyer was allowed to
concede just one time when there is no supporting arguments, after that, it insisted on its
second offer which was supported by some arguments from the Class C. On the other hand,
the Seller’s concession strategy allows it to concede only if not sure about the current offer,
which means it can still concede even if there are some supporting arguments from Class
C, as in steps 1, 3, and 7. However, in step 9, the Seller did not concede because its offer
was supported by some arguments from Class B. At this point, both agents insisted on their
last offers and the negotiation failed and ended without reaching an agreement.
Table 5.10: Negotiation progress Scenario 2, example 2; (AP5 vs. AP8)
Seller (AP5) Buyer (AP8)














1 15000 x x X Rejected 2 10000 x x x Rejected
3 14500 x x X Rejected 4 10500 x x X Rejected
5 14000 x x x Rejected 6 10500 x x X Rejected
7 13500 x x X Rejected 8 10500 x x X Rejected
9 13000 x X x Rejected 10 10500 x x X Rejected
Negotiation terminated after 10 steps without achieving an agreement
Another negotiation scenario that ended without achieving agreement is presented in
Table 5.11. In this example, the two agents’ profiles are of type AP9, which is the toughest
combination of the agents’ profiles, especially when there are supporting arguments. So
if the agreement space is not empty and an agreement is achieved, then the negotiation
outcome should be a Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately, in this example, the negotiating
parties failed to reach this agreement and the negotiation was terminated in short number
of rounds (in 6 steps) because there were some supporting arguments for the offers of both
agents. However, they were able to successfully achieve this agreement in the first scenario
as we discussed in the third example (Table 5.7) in the absence of the supporting arguments
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(without considering the agents’ uncertainty).
These three examples are just samples of the negotiation progress for the second
scenario, and the complete results are reported in Table 5.12.
Table 5.11: Negotiation progress Scenario 2, example 3; (AP9 vs. AP9)
Seller (AP9) Buyer (AP9)














1 15000 x x X Rejected 2 10000 x x x Rejected
3 15000 x x X Rejected 4 10500 x x X Rejected
5 15000 x x X Rejected 6 10500 x x X Rejected
Negotiation terminated after 6 steps without achieving an agreement
To summarize, from the reported results in Table 5.8, it can be observed that in the
absence of the supporting arguments (i.e., the absence of uncertainty consideration), the
negotiating parties were able to achieve an agreement in all agent profiles combinations,
which is not a good indicator because in some situations the achieved agreement is unde-
sirable for at least one of the two agents, but it was achieved because the agents did not
consider their uncertainty about the selection of their moves. On the other hand, from Table
5.12, we noticed that the negotiating parties could not reach this agreement in the pres-
ence of some supporting arguments and the consideration of their respective classes. For
instance, the agents could not achieve an agreement in all possible combinations of agent
profiles in which at least one of the two agent’s profile is AP8 or AP9. Furthermore, as
discussed in the theoretical part, if the two negotiating agents’ profiles are of type AP1
to AP3, then the negotiating parties will always successfully reach an agreement (i.e., the
negotiation is complete).
Scenario 2: Summary of Results
Table 5.12 reports the final negotiation results for the second scenario. These re-
sults were agreed by both agents Seller and Buyer using all possible combinations of agent
profiles and under the effect of argument classes on the agents’ decisions.
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Table 5.12: Scenario 2 - Results summary for all possible combination of agent profiles: Agreement, utility, and number of steps
Seller
Buyer
























































































































































































































































In this chapter, we proposed an efficient and flexible mechanism for argumentation-based
agent negotiation in uncertain settings. Using this mechanism, agents can adopt the suitable
negotiation strategies to be able to decide about the selection of their moves and the accep-
tance of the other parties proposals. In particular, we started by addressing important issues
related to the negotiation environment such as the negotiation constraints, concessions, and
the negotiation outcome. And then, we introduced new classification and evaluation for the
set of potential offers that assist the agents to decide about the acceptance of other agents’
offers. Afterward, we proposed two main sets of negotiation strategies namely, CONCES-
SION and ACCEPTANCE strategies, each of which is composed of three subsets. The com-
bination of all possible strategies of these two sets resulted in nine agent profiles (AP1 to
AP9). In each negotiation session, each agent has to select one agent profile that consists
of one concession and acceptance strategy using the “Strategy Selection Function”. Fur-
thermore, we discussed two important outcome properties namely, completeness and Nash
equilibrium. These properties are related to the negotiation outcome and corresponding to
the adopted agent strategy. Finally, we validated our work by implementing the proposed
approach using a Java-based tool developed mainly for this purpose. We tested the ABAN
framework in the e-commerce environment with the used car trading problem, and we an-
alyzed the dialogue outcome for the different agent profiles in two different scenarios. In
the first scenario, we tested non-argumentative agent profiles (i.e., we neglected the impact
of the supporting arguments and their respective classes), while in the second scenario, we
provided the negotiating agents with a set of supporting arguments associated to different
classes for each potential offer, and tested the impact of these arguments and their respective
classes on the agents’ decisions.
To summarize, this chapter has answered the research questions (RQ5, RQ6, and
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RQ7). By doing so, we have answered all the research questions and met all the research
objectives raised in Chapter 1. Therefore, in the next chapter, we conclude our research,
highlight some shortcomings of our work, and put forward some future directions that can
be done as a continuation of this work.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter concludes the thesis. We first give a summary of the main contributions of
the thesis. Then, we present a critical assessment of the proposed framework. Finally, we
provide some hints for future directions.
6.1 Contributions Summary
In this dissertation, we have proposed and implemented a framework for argumentation-
based agent negotiation in uncertain settings. The main goal of this research is to develop
techniques and design negotiation mechanisms that allow negotiating agents to make better
decisions about the selection of their moves and the acceptance of their partner’s propos-
als in dynamic and uncertain circumstances. In particular, the thesis makes three major
contributions presented in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 respectively.
In Chapter 3, we established the necessary argumentation framework that allows ne-
gotiating parties to precisely reason about and make the right decisions on the selection of
their moves in uncertain settings. The proposed agent theory is basically built based on
the argumentation-based mechanism proposed by Mbarki et al. in [88] and Amgoud and
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her colleagues [18], where both of them were built based on Dung’s abstract argumentation
framework [42]. We extended Mbarki’s framework by incorporating a new important pa-
rameter, agent’s uncertainty degree, to come up with a practical and yet effective argumen-
tation framework that allows the negotiators to explicitly influence each others’ preferences
and reason about the selection of their moves during negotiation when uncertainty matters.
More precisely, we presented the agent theory in a more abstract way to include the negoti-
ation constraints, the arguments owned by the agent, a preference relation over arguments,
an attack relation among those arguments, a set of offers, a preference relation over offers,
a function that specifies the arguments that support each offer, and a function that returns
a real number representing the agents’ uncertainty about the selection of their moves. By
doing so, we guarantee that each agent can interpret correctly the received arguments and
compare them with its own arguments. We also allow each agent to recognize whether the
received argument is in conflict or not within its own arguments. Moreover, we proposed
a new mechanism for selecting the most appropriate (relevant) argument based on three
selection criteria and analyzed the computational complexity of this selection mechanism.
Finally, we proposed two reasoning mechanisms namely, strategic and tactic reasoning.
These reasoning capabilities allow negotiating parties to reason about and decide on the
selection of the most appropriate (relevant) argument locally at each dialogue step (using
tactic reasoning), and decide about the global communication plan (using strategic reason-
ing) to achieve their goal (the agreement) according to the adopted strategy.
In Chapter 4, we have presented an efficient method to assess agents’ uncertainty
about the exchanged moves (offers/arguments) and their acceptance in argumentation-based
agent negotiation (ABAN). The main issue we have investigated is the agent’s uncertainty
about selecting its moves during the negotiation process from not only the perspective of the
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agent itself, but also from its beliefs about the acceptance criteria of the opponent. In par-
ticular, we used Shannon entropy—a well-known technique for quantifying information on
the randomness degree —to measure the uncertainty degree of each move at each dialogue
step first, and then, to measure this uncertainty for the whole dialogue. The probability of
each possible move reflects its degree of uncertainty. Thus, in order to be able to calculate
this uncertainty, we have defined a function calledMove’s Probability Function. This func-
tion assigns a probability value between [0,1] to each move, such that the summation of all
moves’ probabilities at each dialogue step is equal to 1. Moreover, in order to facilitate the
selection process we have defined a function called Probability Ordering Relation that order
the moves based on their probability (i.e., based on their acceptability sequence). Now that
we know how to assess the uncertainty degree for the move, we can measure he uncertainty
degree of the dialogue in three methods: in the first method, we simply take the average of
uncertainty degrees of all dialogue moves. Whereas, in the second method, we calculate the
number of all possible dialogues that can be generated from all possible moves, which can
be obtained by taking the Cartesian product of all possible moves at each dialogue step, and
then, we compute the probability of each possible dialogue by multiplying the probabilities
of its moves. Finally, we measure the uncertainty degree of the dialogue using the general
formula of Shannon entropy. In the third method, we used a hypothesis testing approach. In
particular, instead of going through the process of calculating the uncertainty of all dialogue
moves one by one, we simply calculate agents’ uncertainty for sample of moves, take the
average of uncertainty of these moves and assume that it equals to the uncertainty of the
dialogue, then apply the hypothesis technique to see whether this assumption is true or not.
Further, we have presented a novel classification for the set of potential arguments
based on their uncertainty degree, and we used this classification for designing a new set
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of negotiation strategies in Chapter 5. Furthermore, an attractive discussion of some spe-
cial cases of arguments’ uncertainly based on the available number of arguments and their
relative classes at each dialogue step is presented. To validate our work, we implemented
the proposed technique by applying it on a real case study (Buyer/Seller) scenario from the
business domain. The obtained experimental results confirmed the effectiveness of using
our uncertainty-aware techniques in reaching agreements compared to those who assume
typical negotiation settings, which do not consider uncertainty.
In Chapter 5, an efficient and flexible negotiation mechanism for automated bilateral
argumentation-based negotiation has been proposed. The main purpose of this mechanism
is to help negotiating parties make their decisions about whether to make concessions or
not and whether to accept or reject other’s proposals during the negotiation process. This
can be done through the adaptation of the right negotiation strategy which considers agents’
uncertainty about their proposals. Therefore, to design such strategies, we started by ad-
dressing the needed parameters such as the negotiation constraints, concession mechanism,
and defining some metrics related to the negotiation outcome. And then, we introduced
a new classification and evaluation for the set of potential offers that assists the agents to
decide about the acceptance of other’s proposals. Having all the design parameters ready,
we then proposed two main sets of negotiation strategies namely; concession and accep-
tance strategies, each of which is composed of three subsets. The combinations of all
possible strategies resulted in nine agent profiles (AP1 to AP9). In any negotiation session,
each agent has to select its profile that consists of one concession and acceptance strategy
using what we called Strategy Selection Function. Furthermore, we discussed two impor-
tant outcome properties, completeness and Nash equilibrium, corresponding to the adopted
strategy (i.e., agent profile). Finally, we validated our work by implementing the proposed
approach using a Java-based tool developed mainly for this purpose. We tested the ABAN
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framework in the e-commerce environment with the used car trading problem, and we an-
alyzed the dialogue outcome for the different agent profiles in two different scenarios. In
the first scenario, we tested non-argumentative agent profiles (i.e., we neglected the impact
of the supporting arguments and their respective classes), while in the second scenario, we
provided the negotiating agents with a set of supporting arguments associated to different
classes for each potential offer, and tested the impact of these arguments and their respective
classes on the agents’ decisions.
From the obtained results, it can be observed that agents’ uncertainty about the se-
lection of their moves is a very important factor that should be considered during the ne-
gotiation process, especially when the agents do not have enough information about each
other. Also, it can be noticed that as long as an agent is highly or moderately certain about
its choice, it will not need to concede and move to the next offer. However, if the agent
is not sure or there is no more supporting arguments for its current best offer, it can easily
do so. In fact, considering agents’ uncertainty about their moves’ selection based on their
profiles in the design and development phases of agents are of great importance since they
contribute in automating the negotiation process in such a way that enables each negotiating
agent to choose its partner to achieve a better outcome.
6.2 Critical Assessment of Our Framework
In this thesis, we have successfully met all the objectives that we intended to address
through answering all the research questions raised in Chapter 1. However, dealing with
argumentation-based negotiation in uncertain setting is undoubtedly a complex task. There-
fore, in order to tackle this problem, we limited our selves to bilateral argumentation-based
negotiation, which considers only two parties negotiate over some issue(s) (i.e., bilateral
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multi-issues negotiation). Even though this topic is a very active area of research in au-
tomated negotiation, considering multi-party multi-issues negotiation is another important
direction of this research that we did not investigate.
Another point that we have not explored is the complexity of the whole system. In-
deed, we analyzed the complexity of the arguments selection mechanism presented in Chap-
ter 3, but not for the whole system. In fact, our framework is very complicated and involves
many interacting components, so analyzing the complexity of such a system is not a trivial
task, especially when uncertainty issues matter.
Another limitation in the assessment of our framework is the lack of using public data
sets which are missing in this research area.
6.3 Future Research Directions
This thesis has drawn its own direction in the area of argumentation-based negotiation in
uncertain settings. However, the work presented here is a step forward towards investigating
some other open issues for dialogues prone to uncertainty. Therefore, this work can be
improved or extended in many different ways. In what follows, we list some of them.
• We intend to improve the proposed framework by applying our results on multi-
party argumentation-based negotiation, i.e., many-to-one or many-to-many, where
new concepts need to be introduced such as group and coalition arguments. However,
extending the proposed approach to this type of dialogues is not straightforward. For
instance, defining the rules of a multi-party negotiation is much more complicated
than a two-party dialogue.
• Investigating some game-theoretic strategies such as Tit-for-Tat is another possible
improvement to this work.
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• We plan to apply the proposed uncertainty assessment technique for other types of
dialogue games such as persuasion, deliberation, inquiry and information seeking.
• Another possible extension of this work is to analyze argumentation-based dialogues
from the optimization perspective and analyze the computational complexity of such
optimization problems. Also, studying the computational complexity of converging
towards Pareto optimality depending on the adopted agent profiles is an important
point to be considered in future research.
• We are also interesting in calculating some metrics on different parameters, such as
the competence of each agent relatively to the selection of its arguments, and consid-
ering different agent profiles and their degree of trust.
• Providing the negotiating parties with a reasoning capability to self-adapt their pro-
files according to the opponent’s profile during the negotiation process is another
important point to be addressed in future research.
• We also plan to formalize the two types of agents’ uncertainty (Type I: uncertainty
about the selection of the right move, and Type II: uncertainty about the selected
move to be accepted by the address) discussed in our ABAN framework as a Markov
Decision Process (MDP). By doing so, the problem of achieving an agreement, which
satisfies both agents, become the problem of finding a joint policy that specifies which
move an agent should choose at each dialogue step.
• Finally, investigating model checking techniques for verifying argumentation-based
negotiation dialogues and their protocols using, for instance, the methodology pro-
posed in [116] is an important point for future research we plan to target.
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